

Defending Alaska from Being Another Pearl Harbor

"I believe that in the future, whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world."
General Billy Mitchell, 1935 Testimony to Congress

Few American realize that Alaska was attacked and partially occupied by Japan in World War II.

Few American understand that Alaska is one of the three most strategic places on the Earth. Alaska controls the Great Circle routes across the Pacific. Alaska is the bridge to America's Pacific Rim allies.

Alaska is a significant source of resources to America. An occupation of Alaska cannot be defended by or repelled using nuclear weapons. Alaska is America's common border with Russia. Alaska faces, and is the only defense of America from Pacific navies.



[Joint Forces Command's](#) Joint Operating Environment 2010 ([JOE-2010](#)) warning to all US military commands (Forward by General James N Mattis):

"By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely disappear, and as early as 2015, the shortfall in output could reach nearly 10 million barrels per day."

"A severe energy crunch is inevitable without a massive expansion of production and refining capacity. While it is difficult to predict precisely what economic, political, and strategic effects such a shortfall might produce, it surely would reduce the prospects for growth in both the developing and developed worlds. Such an economic slowdown would exacerbate other unresolved tensions, push fragile and failing states further down the path toward collapse, and perhaps have serious economic impact on both China and India. At best, it would lead to periods of harsh economic adjustment. To what extent conservation measures, investments in alternative energy production, and efforts to expand petroleum production from tar sands and shale would mitigate such a period of adjustment is difficult to predict. One should not forget that the Great Depression spawned a number of totalitarian regimes that sought economic prosperity for their nations by ruthless conquest."

"Energy production and distribution infrastructure must see significant new investment if energy demand is to be satisfied at a cost compatible with economic growth and prosperity."

"The discovery rate for new petroleum and gas fields over the past two decades (with the possible exception of Brazil) provides little reason for optimism that future efforts will find major new fields."

In the late 1970's several Army officers stationed attempted to improve Alaska defenses. For a short time, the Army increased the defenses to a Division. If the Joint Forces Command is correct, a repeat of resource wars is possible; it is necessary to improve Alaska's defenses. It is essential to have a winter warfare capability, the specific mission to defend Alaska and other units designated to reinforce Alaska relative to her strategic importance and invasion history.

Bill James, 612.414.4211, bill.james@jpods.com

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

Unqualified Resignation

TO Cdr, 4th Bn, 23d Inf

FROM

Cdr, Co B,
4th Bn, 23d Inf

DATE 14 Nov 79

CMT 1

CPT James/bto/3-8102

1. I, William D. James, Captain, Infantry, 398-54-5921, hereby tender my unqualified resignation from the Army under the provisions of Chapter 3, AR 635-120, to become effective 1 May 1980 or as soon as practicable thereafter.

2. I desire to tender my resignation because the Army is not meeting its Constitutional obligations.

a. Article 4, Section 4, requires each State to be "protected against invasion". Alaska is not "protected" despite a clear and present danger. Using the Army's definitions of what is required to be effective in a modern war, the units stationed in Alaska are not effective. The units have neither reasonable air defense nor anti-tank capabilities. The units are neither organized nor equipped to meet the requirement for defense of Alaska. I am a company commander, I can not effectively feed my men much less fight a war.

b. Article II, Bill of Rights requires a "well regulated Militia,...". The personnel turn-over, lack of discipline, drug abuse, poor equipment, lack of ammunition, etc., are not indicators of a "well regulated Militia".

c. I, as have some of my contemporaries, have tried hard to improve this situation. Over the past year I have surfaced the problem at every level of command from Battalion thru Chief of Staff of the Army. I have found that battalion commanders have been supportive and all others seem indifferent or worse.

d. The first thing I did as I became an officer was to swear "to support and defend the Constitution of the United States...". The last thing I will do as an officer is to resign in protest because the Army is not supporting the Constitution of the United States.

3. I understand that my resignation, if accepted, will be under honorable conditions and that I will be furnished an Honorable or General Discharge Certificate as determined by HQ, Department of the Army.

4. My present duty is Commander, Company B, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, Fort Richardson, Alaska.

My resignation was not made for light or passing reasons. Only when all reasonable actions to satisfy my obligation were exhausted, when the personal value of a career no longer met the demands of duty, was this cost accepted. *W.D. James*

LETTERS: A CRISIS IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

Half the Officers Corps believes, "the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today's Army." The policies which have lead to this demoralization of leadership not only causes waste indicated by \$600 ashtrays, it trains those commanding the defense of the Nation that they cannot win.

To quantify the problem and initiate action for reducing costs and risks to the Nation, documentation has been assembled illustrating the leadership failure in the Army. The enclosed letters partially record the attempts of officers serving the defense of Alaska to complete their duty. The mission risk behind the efforts is noted in "Another Pearl". The failure of the organization to support the concerns of field commanders is documented in "Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership." Though some specific problems noted in these documents have changed, the basic leadership failure and many specifics remain.

This crisis was not caused by bad men or evil intentions, rather from a desire for uniform perfection, for policies and regulations to cover all circumstances. The result has been the sacrificing of judgment and initiative, critical ingredients in working the subtle variations which often make the difference between victory and defeat. This sacrifice violates the military Principles of Morale, Unity of Command and Simplicity. Principles which are essential to maintaining peace.

Morale, the will to win, respect for the unusual, the creative, the excellent, is seriously undermined. Leadership requires a willingness to risk, the inspiration to reach beyond what we have known before. Excessive procedures and overly rigid demands for conformance have attacked the willingness to risk to an extent that America's front line commanders believe that to reach for excellence will cost their careers. -- believe that inspired leaders cannot win, they cannot even survive. Few of the impediments to a winning attitude are as obvious as that documented in this study. They are far more subtle and difficult to eliminate.

Unity of Command requires that those with mission responsibility also command the assets to accomplish the mission. Splitting that responsibility between Major Commands makes it very difficult to communicate or direct resources to support the mission.

Simplicity, plans and organizations must be simple to succeed in the complex and confused environment of military operations. The military philosopher Von Clausewitz noted that, "Everything is

very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction beyond the imagination of those who have not seen war". Current military institutions are designed to be complex, designed with so many safeguards to control waste that the entire system is wasteful; division of responsibility is so thorough that no one is responsible. The long development cycle, procurement errors and the inability of commanders to communicate on mission critical problems are indicators of the inability to organize assets to achieve objectives.

To maintain peace at the least cost the military must be organized to effectively and efficiently use military Principles. With the dynamic leaders available and the character of the American people, the assets to succeed in this are at hand. Success will depend on being aware of existing problems and coordinating action to solve them. "Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership" has been developed to aid in this effort.

If additional information is needed, please contact William D James, 3315 Centerville Road, Vadnais Heights, MN 55110, (612) 483-2717.

INDEX

1. "Another Pearl"

"Another Pearl" is the background against which the leadership crisis defined itself.

2. Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership.

Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership is a series of letters requesting help in addressing mission critical deficiencies and reporting the difficulties in communicating through the Chain-of-Command. The documents are structured as enclosures to a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Army:

Cover Letter -- The 16 Jan 1981 Letter to Gen Meyer was divided into two parts, "The Symptom" which defines a mission deficiency and "The Problem" which documents the Army's failure to support communications through the Chain of Command.

The Symptom -- indicates America's inability to meet its defense obligations in Norway and Alaska.

The Problem -- documents a leadership failure which exposes the Nation to dangers far exceeding those of its Western defense. Military historians have developed "Principles of War" which describe how militaries must be must be in operated to prevent or minimize the cost of war. This section documents the violation of the Principles of Unity of Command and Moral.

Many of the documents enclosed in this section are rough and unsophisticated, they were written to work mission problems in an environment with few administrative assets. They are intended to indicate the step by step working of problems through the Army's Chain of Command; and the repeated failure of those efforts.

Memoranda on the Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade -- Memoranda noting readiness problems.

Opinion -- The opinion of two soldiers on training and equipment.

Training -- Historical and recent lessons learned on improving winter warfare capability.

Equipment -- Requests for improved equipment and a photo of equipment used by an effective northern army.

Personnel -- A study on how personnel turbulence decays unit effectiveness.

History -- A summary of improvisation required by poor planning during the German Campaign in Russia, World War II.

Unlimited Liability -- A letter from Gen Meyer on the ethics of Command.

An Appeal for Help -- A letter (dated 3 October 1979) written to Gen Meyer (Army Chief of Staff) appealing for help in solving mission problems.

The Army response to that letter and notes on that response are also included.

A Path to an End -- This is a log of events, results and personal costs in working the mission critical problems under the current command system.

Response -- The response from the Office of the Chief of Staff on the Jan 16, 1981 letter. Though sincere, it excuses rather than makes a commitment to correct problems. The letter accepts the inadequacies with America's western defense as necessary.

Counter -- An end to efforts within the Army.

3. Added Personal Cost

Presenting problems up the chain of command resulted in personal hardship.

4. Wm James

This section contains background information on the compiler of this document.

Another Pearl

This article outlines the importance of and weaknesses with America's western defense. Attempts by field commanders to report problems with units committed to that defense provides the background against which the Army's leadership failure is defined.

Japanese newspaper headline referred to as the "smiling diplomacy" of the Kremlin. Of key importance, though, were hints that Moscow might bend on the overriding issue in Soviet-Japanese relations—the Kremlin's refusal to return to Japan the Kuril Islands, which were seized after World War II.

For weeks before the recent Tokyo talks, Kremlin officials trumpeted a desire to remove the chill from Japan-Soviet relations. "It is our conviction," Gorbachev told delegates to a Kremlin session, "that this is possible."

Diplomatic analysts nevertheless predict that Gorbachev will be content to accumulate small gains rather than risk bold moves in Asian policies. His most recent successes, in fact, fall into the marginal category. In the South Pacific, the Soviets registered a minor breakthrough by obtaining fishing rights from tiny Kiribati. Left-leaning Vanuatu may give approval to a similar agreement, one that could give Soviet ships access to the ports of that island state.

Over all, deep-seated suspicions and other obstacles remain in the way of normalizing ties. Japan and China are mindful of the history of Soviet belligerency. Indonesian President Suharto's wariness of Communists prompted him last fall to rebuff the Soviets' first substantial aid offer since the era of leftist dictator Sukarno ended 18 years ago.

But the Soviets seemed undaunted. With an eye on President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, they hope, for example, to dissuade Tokyo from helping Washington develop new high-technology arms. Moscow worries that Star Wars will benefit from Japanese know-how in lasers and other high-tech items. Yet Gorbachev is not likely to make major concessions to achieve his objectives. In the case of the Kurils, the Soviets may feel they have no choice but to retain them. Fearing a possible strategic alliance of the U.S., Japan and China, Moscow has turned the islands into major fortifications.

Shevardnadze, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe instead focused on concluding secondary trade agreements. They also aimed for an exchange of top-level visits that would bring the Soviet General Secretary to Japan for the first time in history.


The Soviets have been sharply critical of what they see as the militarization of Japan. Moscow cites the stationing of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers on northern Hokkaido to justify its buildup of 135

SS-20 medium-range missiles, 85 Backfire bombers and hundreds of warships in the vicinity of the Sea of Okhotsk.

On the economic front, the Soviets want Japanese participation in developing Siberia's natural resources and exploiting offshore natural-gas fields near Sakhalin Island. But Japanese businessmen see easier markets elsewhere.

Later this year, the Soviets will send Shevardnadze to China to seek improved relations in hopes of playing the "China card" to the detriment of the United States. Here, too, chances of a dramatic turn are small. The Kremlin consistently rejects China's demands for a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, an end to Soviet aid to Vietnam in subjugating Kampuchea and a pullback of troops from the Sino-Soviet border. Says one diplomatic observer: "The

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



A Soviet carrier task force adds muscle as Moscow vies for influence in the Pacific

Russians have the impression that if they yield to China's three demands, they would be confronted with yet a fourth. Moscow's incentive is to hang tough and see what happens after Deng leaves the scene."

Gorbachev himself is expected to go to India this year. Moscow has been urging an Asian security conference as a forum for legitimizing regional policies, but even longtime ally India is cool to that idea.

Thus, the future of Sino-Soviet relations seems to promise little beyond improved trade and cultural ties, with differences enduring. Though major international alignments should survive, Asian tours by Shevardnadze and other envoys point to a new dynamism in Soviet policy—one in which Gorbachev is a far more active adversary in the region than his predecessors. For the U.S., that signals worrisome Soviet probing for influence in an area whose importance will steadily increase. ■

by Bob Horton in Washington with
Walter A. Taylor in Tokyo, Robert Kaylor
in Singapore and Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow

THE KURILS QUANDARY

Islands small, problem big


In the tangled scheme of Japanese-Soviet relations, a cluster of tiny islands—the Kurils—looms as the biggest obstacle of all.

The fog-shrouded Kurils were seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II. Japan tried for many years to secure their return as the major condition for improved relations with Moscow. The Soviets fear that giving in to Japan would reinforce other nations' claims to disputed territory. Of particular interest to Tokyo are the four southernmost isles, which contain many Japanese graves.

Complicating the issue is the importance of the resource-rich Kurils to Soviet defenses. A division of Soviet troops and large amounts of equipment are deployed on one of the islands—Etorofu, which commands the strategic northern deep-water route between naval bases in Siberia and the Pacific. Moscow sees the Kurils as an essential part of its effort to offset the substantial American military presence in Japan.

The issue is an emotional one as well because of the many graves plowed under when Moscow built its military installations. In the minds of many Japanese, who have deep reverence for their ancestors, that desecration is cause enough to keep relations on ice for eternity.

WHAT THE ARGUMENT IS ABOUT



Soviet aim: Curb Americans in Pacific

Moscow courts Japan and China, works to reduce U.S. influence elsewhere. But it makes slow progress

■ For decades, the Soviet Union looked on this part of Asia as little more than an American military outpost. But no longer.

A mid-January visit to Japan by Moscow's Foreign Minister is the latest sign of Mikhail Gorbachev's resolve to win a measure of influence in a region of immense strategic importance to the United States.

Moscow's goals seem clear enough. Above all, the Kremlin leaders want to loosen tight Japanese-American bonds. Beyond that, they seem bent on both mending relations with China, an ancient enemy, and using their base in Vietnam as a springboard to undermine U.S. influence elsewhere in Asia.

As viewed from the Kremlin, these developments throughout Asia and the Pacific are encouraging—


- In Japan, a pervasive antinuclear sentiment that analysts believe could be ready for exploitation by the kind of peace offensive long pursued by the Soviets, most recently by Gorbachev in Western Europe.

- In China, an effort by the Communist leadership to strike a more "equidistant" policy between the superpowers, giving Moscow extra weight partly because of need for Soviet help in modernizing China's aging Soviet-built factories.

- In the Philippines, a deepening challenge by the political opposition and by Communist insurgents that jeopardizes the pro-U.S. government of President Ferdinand Marcos and thus the future of vital U.S. naval and air bases on the islands.

- In Taiwan, political uncertainty about a successor to aging Nationalist President Chiang Ching-kuo and the growth of an independence movement that could upset America's fragile China policy.

Tokyo



With a handshake, the Soviet Union's Shevardnadze and Japan's Abe renew contact

- In North Korea, a desire for nuclear-power development and other high technology that the government of Kim Il Sung wants but cannot obtain from his Chinese allies.

If the Kremlin does manage to exploit any of these openings, it is not likely to be soon. The Soviets are now employing in

Asia a strategy that so far has failed in Western Europe—magnifying political and economic differences between Washington and its allies. Clearly evident in the January 15-20 visit by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the tactic leans heavily on cultivating an image of Gorbachev as head of an enlightened new Kremlin leadership intent on replacing confrontation with cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

For years, Moscow's Asian policy suffered in benign neglect under the stewardship of former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. A key question now is whether the Kremlin intends at long last to make any substantive changes in its policies. To date, the answer seems to be that Mos-

cow is putting form over substance. Diplomatic analysts say recent overtures probably reflect more a tactical change in diplomatic style than a willingness to stop saying *nyet* to settling thorny issues that for years have marred Soviet relations with Japan, China and Southeast Asia. Still, Moscow appears intent on fostering the impression that it will be more accommodating on Asian issues.


Shevardnadze's trip was the first to Japan by a Soviet Foreign Minister in nearly a decade. And a December trip to Peking by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa was coupled with an announcement that in 1986 the two nations would exchange visits by foreign ministers for the first time in 20 years.

In addition, Moscow recently began courting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which is united against occupation of Kampuchea by Soviet-backed Vietnam. A Soviet minister held out the prospect of expanded trade and economic aid during official visits to Indonesia and Malaysia and an unofficial stop in Thailand, a longtime American ally.

The diplomatic road for Moscow also remains uphill because of unyielding policies that have long antagonized Peking, Tokyo and other Asian capitals. These include continuation of the Afghan war, deployment of nuclear missiles targeted on Asia and the buildup of Moscow's Pacific fleet.

Despite Shevardnadze's visit, Tokyo has seen little evidence that impending policy shifts may underlie what one

BIDDING FOR INFLUENCE



Critical Opinion of "Another Pearl" -- An early draft of "Another Pearl" was provided to MG Jenes, his comments are enclosed. As is a response to his letter.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FORT CARSON
AND
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT CARSON, COLORADO 80913

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

October 5, 1983

Mr. William D. James
3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, Minnesota 55110

Dear Mr. James:

Thank you for the opportunity to read your draft article. I agree with your basic thesis about the strategic importance of Alaska, but I differ in my assessment of how an enemy might take advantage of the opportunities it presents. I believe there are scenarios that would be easier to execute, cost them far less in terms of casualties, be much easier to support and sustain and still provide them the strategic and operational advantages the position of Alaska presents.

You may, of course, publish anything you so desire. Let me point out, however, one misperception the article contains, one error of fact and some additional information of which you are apparently not aware.

First the misperception. The "no" you refer to on the note concerning LTC Herrick's letter pertained to action about or against either LTC Herrick or COL Waldeck. There was obviously a professional difference of opinion between the two officers into which I did not intend to interject myself. Neither did I intend to do anything to criticize LTC Herrick for being open, honest and sincere in stating his concerns. Some, but not all, of his observations were correct. At the time LTC Herrick wrote his letter, actions were underway on some of the issues he raised and some additional ones were initiated later.

The error of fact in your draft pertains to readiness reporting. While the specific information is classified, I can assure you that each readiness report submitted from Alaska accurately portrayed the good and the bad. We were always particularly careful to enumerate any specific problems and shortfalls in training, equipment and personnel.

Finally, you may not be aware of many actions taken by the Army prior to and subsequent to your departure from Alaska. Some significant improvements have been and continue to be made in our ability to fight in Alaska as well as other arctic and sub-arctic areas of the world.

After nearly five years of hard work by a lot of dedicated people in Alaska, TRADOC and Department of the Army, the small unit support vehicle (SUSV) is being procured for the Alaska Brigade. The final selection was the BV-206. I understand that the first ones have already arrived in Alaska. This will significantly improve our over-the-snow and over-the-tundra movement capability. I believe that the Marine Corps is also interested in the SUSV. In addition, 200 new heavy

duty snow mobiles were delivered to Alaska in time for BRIM FROST '81. I am told that an additional quantity arrived in time for BRIM FROST '83. This improvement in mobility is the most significant step that could be taken to improve our capability to fight in the arctic.

As a result of a Letter Requirement originally submitted from the Alaska Brigade in 1980, the Army is redesigning its cold weather equipment from the snow up. The new equipment will be designed as an entire system so that each piece of gear is compatible with the rest. I recently received an advance issue of some of the new clothing to use this winter in Colorado so that I can submit my personal evaluation of its effectiveness. This will be in addition to the normal testing planned by the Army. It looks much better and is a lot lighter and less bulky than the current equipment. I am withholding my final judgment, however, until I try it myself.

Based on comments from Alaska, the Army adopted the "closed cell" sleeping pad for use in lieu of the standard air mattress. We are still making a few modifications pertaining to size and thickness, but it is in use by the troops. I have them here in the 4th Division.

The "High Technology Test Bed" effort currently underway at the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis is producing a lot of new equipment and tactical techniques for use by light forces. Among the many new innovations are several lightweight air defense artillery systems. If they prove as successful as it would appear, they will have direct application to the forces in Alaska. These would be in addition, of course, to the Stinger missile system which is replacing the Redeye Army-wide. Stinger is a major improvement over the Redeye with a better range, an IFF capability and a significantly improved ability to engage attacking enemy aircraft.

The introduction of the SUSV will allow the forces in Alaska to use the improved TOW as well as the DRAGON anti-armor missile systems. As you may know, lack of a suitable means of transporting these systems in the arctic has been the principal reason for delaying their deployment to Alaska. The forthcoming procurement of the SINGAARS radio will provide a greatly improved FM secure radio capability Army-wide to include Alaska. Similarly, the lightweight AN-PRC 104 radio is going to provide a great leap forward in our AM radio capability. This will be particularly significant for the Alaska Brigade.

You and I do not agree on the issue of skis. The problem is not with the ski; rather, it is the boot/ski binding combination that causes the problem. Once solved, almost any ski will do the trick. Of course, our next procurement of skis after the Trucker BCP, which is an improvement over the older skis, should take advantage of new designs, materials and technology. I do agree that whatever that ski is, it should be basically a cross-country ski. The cold weather boot/ski binding interface is a part of the Letter Requirement I mentioned earlier. Again, that requirement was to design a complete system from the snow up.

The doctrinal issue is one of the most difficult to solve but not because people aren't trying. With the publication of the new FM 100-5 in 1983, most of the Army "How-To-Fight" manuals are being rewritten. The new FM on Northern Operations is in draft at Fort Leavenworth. As the people at Leavenworth get


out the Army 86 doctrinal literature, the new Northern Operations manual will be included. I have been away from Alaska for 2 1/2 years now so I won't presume to be current on the content of NWTC courses. When I left, however, we had placed a great deal of emphasis on tactics at the expense of purely "survival techniques", although the latter is still an important subject.

I should add that the Air Force in Alaska has not stood still. The F4 Squadrons in the Alaskan Air Command have been replaced by F15 and A-10 Squadrons. This has significantly improved the air defense capability in Alaska as well as the quality of close air support to the Alaska Brigade. In addition, they have improvements underway in their early warning radar set up. The new Command Operations Facility at Elmendorf AFB will greatly enhance command and control of the Alaska air defense forces as well as JTF Alaska Operations.

My basic problem with your draft article is the implication that no one cares about or understands the problem of fighting in northern regions or the strategic importance of Alaska. Nothing could be further from the truth. A lot of dedicated professionals have been working quietly and unemotionally to improve the Army's ability to fight in the arctic and sub arctic and our capability to defend Alaska. While these efforts have not been spectacular or widely publicized, they have been effective.

I hope the preceding material will be of some assistance to you in the drafting of your article.

Sincerely,



T. G. Jenes, Jr.
Major General, USA
Commanding

3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, MN 55110

January 24, 1984

MG Jenes
Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
Fort Carson, CO 80913

SUBJECT: Alaska, America's Next Pearl Harbor

Dear General Jenes

I appreciate your concerns and your October 1983 Letter.

I agree that efforts are being made to improve the defense of Alaska and that many earnest people care about what happens.

But caring is not the point. I am sure the Marine commanders in Beirut cared, and those at Pearl Harbor cared. The point I try to make is that history will measure us by our successes and failures -- not our good intentions.

From this realization a concern has developed that given Alaska's strategic importance, Soviet capabilities and U.S. weaknesses, the efforts being made are not adequate.

We differ on our view of the Soviets. You believe they can achieve their objectives at a lower cost through other options. I believe, as with Afganistan, they will maintain their historical tendency to use mass formations to seize strategic areas. Further, I believe General Buckner's assessment of World War II is still valid, that Alaska can be taken with relatively small effort. In addition, the hostage affect of seizing Anchorage and Fairbanks would protect their forces from nuclear retaliation.

Based on this assessment of the situation, I tried to draw a distinction between reporting readiness (Given Mission, Enemy, Troops and Terrain) and Readiness Reporting (responding to specific questions). I believe you honestly submitted Readiness Reports; I do not agree we were mission effective. I will work to make this distinction more clear.

As for the relationship between Col Waldeck and Ltc Herrick, I believe you had a command obligation to become involved. I believe you are a reasonable man, and that had you exercised more control, damage to the careers of several dedicated officers could have been avoided; effective channels of communications could have been opened; and my step-by-step reporting of deficiencies up the chain of command could have been satisfied at a level far below the Chief of Staff of the Army. Also, it is possible that

① misia effectiveness,
give misia, Encom


Col Waldeck's relief as Chief of Staff of the Berlin Brigade could have been prevented.

Although we have differences, I would like to overcome them and clear the air on events in the 172nd. In deference to your thoughts, I will polish and adjust my article.

In the interest of overcoming our differences, I would like you to better understand me. Enclosed is a letter I wrote my children on Education. It outlines my basic philosophy. Under a separate letter additional information will be sent on my interpretation of events in Alaska.

Regardless of where we end, I wish you well.

Sincerely



William D James

Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership

The letters enclosed are the partial record of efforts to communicate mission critical information through command channels. They are a case study of why many officers believe, "the bold, original, creative officer cannot survive in today's Army."

Specific details are of secondary importance. The documentation is primarily intended to illustrate the extent of efforts to report critical deficiencies. This degree of documentation is not typically available in field units, such activity is primarily verbal.

The documents are structured as enclosures to a letter to the Chief-of-Staff of the Army. The 16 Jan 1981 Letter to Gen Meyer was divided into two parts, "The Symptom" which defines a mission deficiency and "The Problem" which documents the Army's failure to support communications, violating military Principle.

A Path to an End -- This is a log of events, results
and personal costs in working mission critical
problems under the current command system.

I wrote my letter to General Meyer only after a great deal of soul searching. The decision to send the letter took me several months to make. I found that there is a considerable difference between knowing you are expendable, and knowing that you are expending yourself. I wrote the letter because I was duty bound, by honor and by Army Regulation (AR 600-25), to accomplish my unit's mission or obtain relief for my unit from that mission. I was also bound to work within the chain-of-command; the following is an approximate log of major efforts to surface mission deficiencies through the chain-of-command:

DATE ACTION AND RESULTS

1978-1979 Action: Many communications with Combat Developments Activity (CDA). The objective of these discussions was to assure the criteria use to design and test new equipment reflected mission requirements.

Result: LTC Dixon, the head of CDA, was helpful initially, but became defensive. In the three years I spent in Alaska CDA failed to improve field equipment or doctrine, and often fought field unit efforts to initiate necessary changes. I believe LTC Dixon is a good man, but trapped in a development system so complex and ineffective, that he had been defeated by that system.

JAN 1979 Action : I told a Major General, on Jack Frost, that our clothing is not as good as it could be, and showed him a Norwegian Army sweater.

Result: Unknown.

JAN 1979 Action: I submitted a Memorandum for Record to Ltc Herrick, my Battalion Commander, about the combat ineffectiveness of my unit. This memo was discussed with and agreed to by other company commanders. Ltc Herrick rewrote the memo and sent it to the Commanding General, Major General Jenes.

Result: The memorandum and Ltc Herrick were attacked by Col Waldeck, the Light Infantry Brigade Commander, and side stepped by MG Jenes, the Commanding General. Col Egbert, who signed the response as the Acting Commanding General said that deficiencies would be reported to Forces Command (FORSCOM) with the Jack Frost After Action Report.

FEB 1979 Action: 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry submitted its "Jack Frost" After Action Report, listing equipment problems and solutions.

Result: The information was included in the 172nd Light Infantry Brigade's After Action Report, but was edited out of the Commanding General's Report. This is the document Col Egbert said would communicate mission critical deficiencies to FORSCOM.

FEB 1979

Action: I submitted a Staff Study on why we need a Nordic (cross country) ski instead of an Alpine (downhill) ski. Against the recommendation of CDA, but with the support of Ltc Herrick, I briefed Colonel Waldeck and later Major General Jenes on the Staff Study.

Result: Major General Jenes dropped the Staff Study without approving or disapproving it. Inadequate skis were ordered. The cost of this mistake is \$500,000 and possibly the lives of many soldiers if U.S. troops have to fight a properly equipped opponent.

FEB 1979

Action: I distributed copies of Norwegian Army Doctrine. These documents explain many of the equipment and training requirements which must be met to operate effectively in the Northern Environment.

Result: Unknown

FEB 1979

Action: I distributed (to Battalion and Brigade Headquarters) copies of DA Historical Studies on Winter Warfare. These documents highlight the errors and successes of German and Russian units fighting World War II, in a northern theater.

Result: Unknown

MARCH 1979

Action: Under mission conditions my company demonstrated superiority of water bottles, gaiters, nordic skis, and white balclavas.

Result: Brigade Policy Letter #10, issued 31 May 1979, ~~now~~ forbids the use of these items.

NOV 78-MAR 79

Action: Demonstrated the tactical superiority of ski mounted troops (400% increase in mobility).

Result: Although my company was used to perform high mobility operations, no one in the chain-of-command ever skied with the company to learn the capabilities and limitations.

APRIL 1979

Action: Submitted an After Action Report on lessons learned about military skiing.

Result: Unknown

MAY 1979

Action: Distributed copies of a New York Times article, March 26, 1979; US Marines Units Struggle to Cope With Norway's Arctic. (Copies to CDA, Colonel Waldeck and Major General Jenes). The article indicates the U.S.'s inability to fight a winter war and inability to meet NATO commitments.

Result: Unknown

MAY 1979

Action: I told 172nd IG (Major Crown) that my unit is not capable of performing its mission.

Result: My points were not included in the minutes of the Junior Officer's Seminar.

JUNE 1979

Action: I submitted Suggestions Number R79-315M through R79-318M. These are suggestions which would provide for better equipment (boots, skis, water bottles and fishnet underwear) and save the Army over \$1,000,000.

Result: Moving through channels or disapproved, CDA had action authority on these suggestions.

JULY 1979

Action: Forwarded, from one of my LT's, a request for a strength training program. This program could have prevented or rehabilitated many injuries.

Result: Disapproved.

JULY 1979

Action: Submitted a fact sheet explaining the use of biathlon, as a competitive sport and as a military training skill.

Result: Received command guidance from Colonel Waldeck to "back off... case closed".

JULY 1979

Action: Major Kreger and I told the FORSCOM IG Team Chief that we cannot perform our mission, that we are not properly organized or equipped.

Result: Unknown

AUGUST 1979

Action: Interview with Colonel Waldeck about my possible resignation.

Result: I was told not to worry about problems; a board would be set up to solve them if we go to war. Col Waldeck recommended that if I did not like something I should write an article.

AUGUST 1979 Action: 172nd Brigade put out a mandatory ski training program which is exactly contrary to the conclusion of DA Historical Study, 20-201. It is also contrary to the experiences gained by my company. I submitted a statement showing what is required if skis are to be effectively used in military operations.

Result: No effect

AUGUST 1979 Action: Prepared an NCO, Sargeant Callow, to brief a DARCOM General about the poor equipment. DARCOM is the Major Command controlling CDA.

Result: CDA (Major Womble) tightly controlled Sargeant Callow. Sgt Callow was not allowed to air problems or show superior equipment.

OCTOBER 1979 Action: After exercising all levels of command below the Army, I mailed my letter to General Meyer. I hoped the letter would result in a serious review of the mission deficiencies which endanger the defense of Alaska.

Result: I received a reply on 15 November 1979. The answers were shallow and reflect a lack of research (some footnotes were made on this letter when it was received).

15 NOV 79 Action: Submitted my resignation.

I tried every reasonable course of action I could think of. I found the chain-of-command indifferent, or committed to a failing course. The Chain-of-Command is not full of bad men; I believe that many are very good men, but that they are acting with poor assumptions, and that their channels of communications are badly jammed. I moved outside the constraints I accepted as an Army Officer to correct these errors.

The chain-of-command failed to work in this case. But tolerance of mistakes must be maintained, for learning often seems to be an erring process. However, in the harsh prey/predator environment of power politics, this tolerance must be balanced with the realization that errors indicate weakness; attracting and exciting predators.

I asked much from my men in a difficult situation. They responded with hard work, loyalty and affection. I cannot ask less of myself than that which they gave freely to me. I am obligated to see that their mission is attainable and that they are respected for the sacrifices they have and will make.



William D James

History -- A summary of improvisation required by
poor planning during the German Campaign in
Russia, World War II.

This pamphlet supersedes MS # T-51 "German Military Improvisations" which was given a limited distribution by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, U. S. Army.

MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS During the RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

PREFACE

This pamphlet was prepared for the Historical Division, European Command, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. The names of the contributors are not announced at this time. The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained the rank of full general (*Generaloberst*), served on the Eastern Front throughout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into the northern plains of Germany. He was successively commander of an infantry brigade, of a panzer division from November 1941 to February 1943, and of two different corps in the battles for Kharkov and Belgorod during 1943. Appointed commander of a panzer army on 1 December 1943, he participated in the withdrawal in the south until the Germans reached the Carpathians. In August 1944 he was transferred to Army Group Center, and his last assignment was with Army Group Weichsel. During this final phase of his military career he played an important part in the retreat from Lithuania, East Prussia, and Pomerania.

The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view and that the procedures of the German Army differed considerably from those of the United States Army. Authorized German tables of organization and equipment, official German combat doctrine, or standard German staff methods form the basis for improvisations throughout this pamphlet. As prepared by the authors, this study consisted of a collection of 157 examples of improvisations which were screened by the editors for pertinence, clarity, and interest to the American reader. Moreover, an attempt was made to establish common denominators for the great variety of examples. Although the manuscript was completely reorganized during this editorial process, every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors.

PART SIX

CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 17

Are Improvisations Inevitable?

A considerable number of the improvisations described in the preceding chapters could undoubtedly have been avoided by normal advance planning. Other improvisations could have been minimized by preparatory measures of a general nature which could have been further developed if and when the need arose. A third category of improvisations could not have been even generally anticipated because they were caused by such abnormal conditions or extraordinary circumstances.

I. Avoidable Improvisations

In an attempt to avoid improvisations one must search for and examine all the problems that may possibly confront an armed force in future wars. First of all it is necessary to determine the probable theaters of war. Nowadays any conflict is likely to assume the proportions of a global war if it transcends the limits of a purely local police action. Prior to World War II the Germans did not think far enough ahead. When, for instance, the Armed Forces Academy needed maps of Finland, it was discovered that the available supply of such maps at the Map Service of the Reich War Ministry was inadequate.

The next step is the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of the potential theaters of war, a knowledge not limited to their broad geographic or military-geographic features, but which includes above all their climatic conditions. In every geographic region the native mode of life is determined by the climatic conditions. For obvious reasons this influence is especially pronounced in the many fields of military activity. Strategy and tactics, organization, weapons, munitions, equipment, clothing, food, training, replacements, billeting, and many other factors are strongly affected.

Moreover, a great deal may be learned in advance about one's potential enemy. Differences between his armed forces and one's own are usually not fortuitous but rather reflect a discrepancy

in the military policy of the two nations. The observation of any striking deviations from standard procedures should therefore give rise to speculation about their inherent causes. This will make it possible to decide upon the appropriate measures which must be introduced in every military sphere in case of an armed conflict with that country. Friendly nations which are subject to the same climatic conditions as those of the potential enemy may serve as a source of useful information in peacetime.

Senior commanders in the armed forces and military specialists in all important fields must acquire firsthand knowledge of the climate and terrain as well as the social, economic, political, and military conditions in any potential theater of war or at least in those neutral or friendly countries which show similar characteristics. On the basis of their own observations, these men must determine what is essential for the conduct of military operations. Firsthand personal impressions are indispensable; they may be supplemented by the study of pertinent books and documents and by consultation with private citizens who are likely to have a sound judgment of foreign countries.

Military history is another source of valuable information. It is never too late to determine the reasons for the success or the failure of past operations. Many of the decisive factors have retained their validity throughout the years and their effect on military operations in our time would be very much the same as in the past.

In view of the foregoing, the Germans were in a good position to learn the general as well as the climatic conditions of European Russia and the far north. If they actually acquired this knowledge, the Germans certainly failed to draw the proper conclusions for their military policy. Instead, they were forced to use improvisations because of the lack of advance planning and preparations. If they did not get that information in the first place, they were obviously guilty of neglect. For instance, the Finns might have told them that ordinary flat-country divisions are not suitable for fighting in the impenetrable forests, the rocky labyrinths, and the swamps and marshes of the arctic. Perhaps German planners were still too deeply entrenched in Central European military traditions. Also, the military were not sufficiently familiar with foreign lands and particularly with countries whose climatic conditions differed from the German. As a result they were lacking in proper personal understanding of what was to be expected. They probably took matters too lightly at the outset. In the field of tactics and logistics in European Russia and the arctic, better preparations might have been made

taining to tactics and logistics could have been foreseen, in particular those which developed into permanent institutions and were eventually incorporated in German standing operating procedures.

Thus if improvisations are to be avoided, one of the essential prerequisites is the logical application of any knowledge possessed or acquired about a potential theater of war. It may happen that a country becomes involved in a war by surprise; in that event the top-level military leadership must act immediately and take appropriate steps to master the situation. It is wrong to wait until the field forces began to help themselves by introducing improvisations which in some cases may be the wrong ones and difficult to eradicate. After weighing the requirements against the available emergency resources, all spheres of the war effort must immediately be adjusted to the new situation by concerted action. This will prevent many adverse psychological effects which may otherwise easily disrupt the confident relationship between the top-level command and the field forces.

II. Unavoidable Improvisations and their Minimization

A different category of improvisations will be unavoidable whenever an unexpected or unpredictable situation produces the need for extraordinary tactical or logistical measures. A number of the improvisations mentioned in the preceding chapters could not have been avoided, even if adequate preparations had been made. The need arose so suddenly or was so localized that preparations carried out elsewhere could not be used in time to remedy the situation. Logistic preparations, for example, will prove effective only if mobile transportation is readily available in case of a sudden break-down in the movement of supplies. For this purpose higher headquarters may resort to airlift, truck, railroad, or inland water transportation. Such preparations must be made well in advance in order to assure immediate availability of stand-by transportation of the above-mentioned types in sufficient numbers and within reasonable distance.

In situations which require immediate emergency measures there is at first no choice but to improvise extemporaneously. If such improvisations are enforced for some time, it will be possible to correct their deficiencies gradually and to introduce systematic improvements.

Improvisations in the fields of weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothing, or rations can rarely be avoided since it is impossible to anticipate all requirements. In some instances stan-

goods, but a general solution can be found only if the rigid system of standards and specifications adhered to in military procurement can be modified and adjusted to the flexible methods applied by private industry. It would then become possible to provide suitable equipment for specific needs in time, thereby eliminating many improvisations. It goes without saying that one cannot possibly mass produce arctic equipment in peacetime in expectation of an armed conflict in the arctic at some time in the future.

III. Improvisations in Extreme Emergency

In times of extreme emergency, improvisations must be approached from a different point of view and applied with other standards than those used during other periods of the war. In such situations preparatory measures hardly enter the picture because then it is a matter of living from hand to mouth while being catapulted from one crisis to the next. The pressure of time assumes tremendous proportions. Obviously no country at war will ever expect to be faced by a situation such as that with which the Germans had to cope during the closing days of the last war. Much less will any country attempt to prepare for such an emergency.

Chapter 18

The Relative Value of Improvisations


The preceding chapters give a fairly detailed account of German military improvisations and indicate their relative value in a variety of situations. By presenting numerous examples, an attempt has been made to demonstrate why certain improvisations served their purpose whereas others failed. This presentation should enable the reader to draw a number of conclusions that have general validity. The most obvious conclusion is that, because of their always-present inherent defects, improvisations should be avoided altogether whenever possible. On the other hand, some of the improvisations presented in this study were absolutely essential and proved effective. For instance, it would have been absolutely impossible to conduct operations in the arctic or to control the supply situation in the Russian theater, had not improvisations been introduced. That many of them were eventually accepted as standing operating procedures simply indicates that they should never have been improvisations. Their success was based on the fact that they were initiated and carried out by experts and that the essential prerequisites for putting them into effect existed in these specific cases.

The failure of any improvisation could be attributed either to the lack of proper planning or to the fact that it had been introduced at a time when the necessary means to implement it were no longer available. In many instances its failure could be traced to the laymen who were charged with the responsibility for its execution. All these factors predominated during the last stage of the war when a great number of improvisations failed to meet expectations.

In general, however, improvisations proved effective provided the right men were selected for their implementation and provided they were enforced with the best available matériel and the firm determination to achieve the intended military purpose.

An observer who looks at the Russian campaign in retrospect will come to the conclusion that the multitude of improvisations which were employed far exceeded what Moltke once designated as a "system of expedients" in the tactical sense. Actually, the Germans were forced to introduce the first improvisations as soon as they crossed the eastern border. The farther they advanced into Russia the more expedients they had to devise. The number rose by leaps and bounds when operations began to be hampered

last stage of the war, improvisations permeated every compartment of the war effort both within Germany and at the front. At the culminating point expedients assumed the proportion of an avalanche, the momentum of which eventually buried the entire military machine. Improvisations could never be expected to compensate for the lack of vision and the fundamental blunders of German leadership. It is no exaggeration to state that the entire Russian campaign will go down in history as one gigantic improvisation.



U.S. Marine Units Struggle to Cope With Norway's Arctic

By JOHN VINOCUR

Special to The New York Times

HARSTAD, Norway, March 24 — The Marine Corps general entered the permafrost theater a bit later than planned. Unfortunately, someone had booked his ticket to the war on an airline that will not start flying there until next month.

After two weeks of maneuvers above the Arctic Circle, the general's confused arrival was not the only sign that when it comes to combat in the cold, the United States' military commitment to defend Norway against Soviet incursion is still in a rudimentary phase.

There were snowshoes that looked like they had been left to the Marine Corps in the will of Sergeant Preston of the Yukon, stoves that heated poorly, gigantic awkward boots of go-go dancer white that hobbled the troops while requiring them to change soggy socks four or five times a day, a machine-gun position so poorly chosen it would have meant automatic failure in officer candidate school, squads of riflemen who had never seen each other before and probably never will again, and a rate of mobility about 80 per cent under top standard.

There were improvements, too, over past performances, when the Americans' lack of expertise left some Norwegians commenting ironically about the Marines' reputation as an elite fighting force. But more than two years after American units began practicing Arctic warfare here, the impression lingers that the United States has not been able to devise a formula for making the most effective use of its forces on NATO's northern flank.

Two U.S. Companies Participate

This year's maneuvers brought two companies, 266 regulars from the Second Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, N.C., and 168 reservists from the Albany, N.Y., area and scattered points in Maine and Massachusetts, to the snow of Troms County, 1,000 miles north of Oslo and 350 miles from the Soviet border. They joined in mock combat with about 8,000 men



The New York Times/John Berling

Members of a U.S. Marine reserve unit in maneuvers in Norway's Troms County, above the Arctic Circle

problems were fewer, although there were 11 cases of flu among the reservists during the first week, a high percentage, and a Marine regular suffered from hypothermia, a dangerous loss of body heat.

The details seem trifling, but they form a mosaic. When John Berg, the military correspondent of Aftenposten, the country's largest newspaper, was told that the

ods returning to develop their skills year after year.


John Berg, the military correspondent, says the example of the British Royal Marines is a good one. They began coming to Norway in 1970 and soon conceded they needed more intensive training. They now train for seven weeks a year here, which Mr. Berg describes as a mini-

mum, and are considered an effective unit.

When he was asked if he thought the Marine Corps participation was now satisfactory, Mr. Holst maintained his Norwegian tact: "There's always a discrepancy between the ideal world and reality. But we could turn it on some more."

from specialized units of the Norwegian, Canadian and Dutch armies and the British Royal Marines.

The landscape here pushes together a New England red farmhouse softness and the hard edge of the mountains rising out of the fjords. With a little sun, the area has the blue sky stuff of ski vacation fold-



The New York Times / March 26, 1979

NATO maneuvers took place in Arctic region of Norway.

ers, but the weather changes unpredictably and viciously. When it goes bad, staying alive takes great skill.

Strategically, this terrain and that further north in Finnmark County is of high interest to the Soviet Union because from it the sea lanes to Murmansk, a supply center and base of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet, could be threatened. In a time of trouble, the Marines' mission would be to reinforce the Norwegians.

Since late 1976, American units have participated five times in maneuvers in northern Norway. At first, the Norwegian attitude was indulgent — no one expected the Marine Corps to schuss from landing craft into Narvik. But last year, a newspaper account here told of a group of marines in a state of near exhaustion being rescued by helicopter from a mountain-side. A Norwegian lieutenant who accompanied the group told a friend: "There was no failure of strength or will, but just an inability to cope. The elementary mistakes were overwhelming."

There were also a number of cold weather injuries, which usually indicate poor equipment, inexperience and lack of preparation. This time, the weather was milder than usual and the cold weather

them change socks almost continually, he said. "That's the kind of thing that makes you want to tell them 'If you want to do the job up here, do it well. Otherwise don't.'" ~~It's not a~~

As individuals, the marines just laugh at that idea.

Lying on planks spread over the snow inside the low-slung tent that served as his command post, Capt. Jerry Humble, who has had three consecutive years of Arctic training, leaned toward a stove where canteen cups were being used to heat spiced tea.

"Norwegian stove," he said. "Ours just doesn't cut it. We're just not up to the state of the art. Our equipment is too old and too heavy. I have my men get rid of about half the things in their packs so that they can move a little."

"Even so," he said, "with full packs on and combat conditions we can move about one kilometer an hour. The Norwegians move four or five."

Norwegian discussion of the Marine Corps role in the north ~~remains at the~~ level of caution as it gets further away from the area of official statements.

U.S. Role Called Essential

Johan Jorgen Holst, the Under Secretary of Defense, describes American reinforcement and participation as the "sine qua non for security in the area."


"To the extent that the Marine Corps appears to be a service in search of a mission, we think we have one here. I hope we can clarify the role of the corps in the area, however. We think that the groups that participate in the exercises should be the ones that would come here in a real situation."

As restated by Anders Sjaastad, a military analyst on the staff of the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, a group that is financed by the Government and often reflects its thinking, this means "that the whole thing lacks continuity."

"A couple of companies come, spend some time in the snow and that's the last we hear of them. The Marine Corps should designate its Arctic units, which it hasn't done, and then train them hard."

Longer Training Urged

As far as the Norwegians are concerned, no place in North America can be used to simulate the climatic conditions here, which involve extremely dangerous combinations of humidity, sudden rainstorms and brutal cold. They say the Americans can cope with conditions only if they train in the area for longer peri-



Snow and frigid temperatures are rugged foes for U.S. marines on maneuvers.

NATO's Defense: A Look At the Blind Side

Arctic war games show it's no easy task to turn Norway into the Atlantic Alliance's mighty fortress of the north.

HARSTAD, Norway

It is here aboard a military helicopter picking its way through jagged Norwegian mountains in a blinding snow-storm that the difficulty of defending the strategic northern flank of the Atlantic Alliance really hits home.

Below, some 10,000 troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Norwegian, American, Canadian, Dutch and British—encounter punishing weather, rugged terrain and treacherous fiords in the alliance's annual winter exercises 155 miles north of the Arctic Circle.

The bitter cold saps the strength of even experienced Arctic veterans. The deep snow slows to a snail's pace—barely 4 miles a day—the heavily laden military men pulling sledges piled with 200 pounds of equipment.

A Norwegian battery of six 155-mm self-propelled howitzers that normally is able to dig in and start firing in 20 minutes takes 10 hours to prepare for action in the deep drifts.

But more than the physical hardships of the Cold Winter '83 maneuvers poses problems for Western strategists planning defense of the north.

The alliance has been slow to build up its bases and logistics here. Norway, wary of upsetting

its powerful and suspicious Soviet neighbor, sharply limits the activities of NATO forces in the country. Pressures to cut military spending and a mushrooming antinuclear movement complicate the decision making of Prime Minister Kaare Willoch's center-right government.

What is most worrisome about the many difficulties is the realization that Norway, while relatively small and isolated, is a vital cog in the West's security network—a key to keeping open the shipping lanes of the Atlantic in the event of war with the Soviet Union.

Were the Russians to take Norway, their long-range Backfire bombers, armed with 250-mile-range air-to-sea missiles, could maraud Allied convoys carrying reinforcements from the U.S. to Europe. At the same time, Moscow would be better able to protect its own 700-vessel fleet making the passage be-

tween the ice-free port of Murmansk and the North Atlantic.

Norway is crucial to Western offensive capabilities as well. From Norwegian airfields, it is only a few minutes' flight to Soviet targets on the Kola Peninsula, including the home bases of 195 submarines, among them 45 craft accounting for two thirds of Russia's underwater nuclear-missile power.

For all of Norway's importance, the March military exercises show that the NATO war machine here has ample room for improvement.

Some of NATO's fighting gear seems ill-adapted for the cross-country assaults that mark Arctic tactics. Mechanical problems claimed seven of 24 vehicles in the first 36 hours of the maneuvers, delaying deliveries of food and ammunition to front-line troops.

The 2,400 U.S. marines who participated partly blamed heavy clothes and 90-pound packs for their slow going through open country. Equipment varied widely between national units. For example, American, Dutch and British troops wore different types of survival suits for amphibious attacks.


Decisions to be made. Potential problems over the longer haul are of even more concern. Plans to pre-position tons of heavy equipment and ammunition for Allied forces are running behind. So far, only 20 percent of the scheduled material is in place. Construction of permanent storage facilities awaits actual funding by NATO, a procedure that could delay completion until 1986. Forward air bases still are vulnerable to Soviet attack because there has been no decision on what kind of air-defense system would best protect them.

Disquieting, too, is what some military experts see as Norway's reluctance to become NATO's northern fortress:

To avoid antagonizing Moscow, no foreign troops are stationed in Norway, and Oslo posts only some 500 of its own soldiers along the border with the Soviet Union.

No nuclear arms are allowed on Norwegian soil. NATO maneuvers can take place no closer than 300 miles from the Soviet frontier, and Allied stockpiles are kept only in the southern third of the country. There are no plans to extend rail or highway systems to the far north, although this would speed mobilization in time of war.

Kjell Colding, Deputy Prime Minister for Security Affairs, explains Norway's delicate position this way: "We are in a particular situation. We're allied to one superpower [the U.S.] and neigh-



bor to the other [the Soviet Union]. Irrespective of East-West winds, we always have to take care of our bilateral relations with the Russians."

Another analyst adds: "Norwegians dread direct 'provocations' to preserve a Nordic balance in which NATO members Norway and Denmark ease anti-Soviet actions in exchange for Soviet moderation toward their regional neighbor Finland."

Another contributing factor to the don't-rock-the-boat attitude is the specter of nuclear war. Even without nuclear arms on its soil, Norway is awash in antinuclear sentiment. The moralism of the predominant Lutheran Church accounts for much of that feeling, but it also reflects a marked hostility to President Ronald Reagan. Many Norwegians see him as an anti-Soviet hard-liner who is more anxious to arm than to disarm.

Deployment issue. This portrayal has been sharpened by the planned deployment later this year of new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe—though not in Norway itself—to offset a Soviet missile threat. The deployment issue has proved as divisive here as elsewhere on the Continent, eroding a longstanding consensus on defense matters. For instance:

The opposition Labor Party is calling for a freeze on financial help to defray the cost of missile deployment until it becomes clear that U.S.-Soviet talks on arms reduction are deadlocked. However, the Willoch government says it is confident that it would win a show-down vote on such aid.

Despite internal debate on nuclear arms and the curbs on NATO activities, there is no doubt Norwegians would staunchly defend their country if attacked. Norwegians earned widespread admiration for their resistance to the Nazis in World War II, and they are no less patriotic now.

"It would be Afghanistan all over

again if the Russians were foolhardy enough to take us on," says one young Norwegian, referring to failure of the Soviet invasion forces to stamp out the anti-Communist Afghan tribesmen.

In one sense, the 4.1 million Norwegians are more individually involved in national defense than any of their NATO counterparts. The standing armed forces of 43,170 are small but would swell to 325,000 within 48 hours after a call for full mobilization. Some 90,000 Norwegians are members of the Home Guard. They are permitted to keep weapons at home and are assigned local military tasks.

On top of that, while split over nuclear weapons, public opinion backs continued outlays for conventional weapons. The government has pledged to boost real spending—after inflation is taken into consideration—by 4 percent this year and by 3 percent a year until 1988. That is two years longer than pledges made by other NATO allies.

Norway has acquired American-designed F-16 fighter-bombers and is purchasing West German-built submarines to patrol a 1,647-mile-long coast indented by so many fiords that the

land line weaves in and out for 10 times that distance.

NATO officers point out that, for all its shortcomings, the latest Arctic exercise also showed some important strengths of the alliance.

The differing national units brought diverse skills to the overall fighting force. British troops who fought in the wintry Falkland Islands campaign against Argentina in 1982 demonstrated their recently acquired experience in deploying men and combat equipment. U.S. marines provided helicopter mobility and amphibious-landing capability. Ski-equipped British commandos and Norwegians excelled in long-distance reconnaissance missions and cross-country operations.

Prestocking of supplies and equipment, though below planned levels, proved its worth. Tracked over-snow vehicles, which might otherwise have had to be flown in, were on line, ready to roll as soon as British and Dutch troops hit the ground from their planes.

Point made. American and other Allied officers believe the exercises helped prove the value of Arctic training. Some of the U.S. marines who took part in the latest exercises had never seen snow before a 10-day preliminary training program that took place farther north earlier this year. In 1984, three times as many members of the Fourth Marine Amphibious Brigade are expected to join the NATO maneuvers.

For the Norwegians themselves, the increased attention by other members of NATO is reason enough to feel reassured. In the words of Christopher Prebensen, Director General of the Ministry of Defense: "We're getting Norway on the map. We've been way up yonder in the quiet corner of Europe for so long that we've been forgotten. Now it's not so quiet any longer." □

By STEWART POWELL

U S NEWS & WORLD REPORT

69



Norwegian helicopter patrols fiord-pocked coast commanding sea-lanes vital to West.

heavy packs and deep snow hamper American marines' advance through Arctic forest.



The contents of this report were obtained through the use of the Marine Corps Key Experiences Evaluation System (MCKEES). MCKEES is a computerized system designed to provide the unit commander, about to embark on an exercise, with a corporate memory of lessons learned and problems encountered on previous deployments, exercises, and operations conducted within the Marine Corps. Topics available within MCKEES are:

| | |
|----------|-----------|
| ORGANZTN | FSCORD |
| PLANNING | AVIATION |
| CMSTRPTS | CSS |
| COMM | EQUIPMENT |
| INTELL | SPEC OPS |
| CMBT OPS | WEAPONS |

Additional categories enable the user to gain more specific information concerning his topic.

For further information concerning MCKEES contact:

LtCol F. J. KIRCHNER
Head, Evaluation Section
Concepts, Doctrine, and Studies Activity
Development Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
Autovon: 278-2872

REPORT 429
RESERVES OBSERV/EVAL 178 BN CCMB EUROPE SPEC OPS COLI

PROBLEM

DISCUSSION: (P) MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD SUFFER AN EXTREMELY HIGH NUMBER OF UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES DUE TO OUR LACK OF TRAINING AND POOR EQUIPMENT IF WE WERE REQUIRED TO OPERATE ON AN EXTENDED TERM IN THIS ENVIRONMENT. IF WE ARE GOING TO COMMIT 7,000 MARINES TO AN EXERCISE IN NORTHERN NORWAY IN THE WINTER OF 1980 WE BETTER GET THEM PROPERLY EQUIPPED AND PROPERLY TRAINED TO HANDLE THE WEATHER.

REPORT 4597
RESERVES OBSERV/EVAL 178 BN CCMB EUROPE SPEC OPS COLI

PROBLEM

DISCUSSION: (S) BASED ON THREE WEEKS OF OPERATING IN EXTREMELY COLD ENVIRONMENT (DOWN TO -35 DEGREES C.) IN NORWAY, IT IS MY OPINION THAT THE COLD WEATHER GEAR AVAILABLE THROUGH NORMAL MARINE CORPS SUPPLY CHANNELS IS TOTALLY INADEQUATE FOR ACTIVE MANEUVERING. U. S. ARCTIC EQUIPMENT MAY BE EXCELLENT FOR A STATIC, NON-TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT BUT THE EQUIPMENT ACTUALLY BECAME AN IMPEDIMENT TO MOVEMENT IN AN EXTREMELY COLD ENVIRONMENT.

REPORT 427

RESERVES

OBSERV/EVAL

178 BN

CCMB EUROPE SPEC OPS COLC

PROBLEM

DISCUSSION: (P) DUE TO AN APPARENT LACK OF TRAINING AND POOR PHYSICAL CONDITION, THE MARINE COMPANY WAS ALMOST INEFFECTIVE. A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THESE MARINES SUFFERED FOOT PROBLEMS INCIDENTAL TO WEARING THE ARCTIC BOOTS. FIRST OBSERVING THE UNIT AFTER 24 HOURS IN THE FIELD IT HAD A GENERAL APPEARANCE OF PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION. FORTUNATELY THE NORWEGIAN COMMANDER APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THIS AND ALLOWED THE UNIT TO REMAIN IN CAMP IN A STATIC POSITION WITH HEATED TENTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS. THEIR MOBILITY, EVEN THOUGH EQUIPPED WITH SNOWSHOES, WAS LIMITED TO A PAVED TWO-LANE ROAD WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARED. DURING THE PERIOD I OBSERVED THE UNIT, WHICH ADMITTEDLY WAS SPORADIC, I NEVER SAW ANY UNIT MEMBERS MORE THAN 50 YARDS FROM THE ROAD. BRIEF DISCUSSIONS WITH UNIT LEADERS AND TROOPERS REVEALED A GENERAL FRUSTRATION WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT, THE WEATHER AND THEIR LACK OF ABILITY TO DEAL WITH IT

REPORT 1595

RESERVES

OBSERV/EVAL

178 BN

CCMB EUROPE SPEC OPS COLC

PROBLEM

DISCUSSION: (P) ON THE THIRD OR FOURTH EVENING OF THE PROBLEM, NORWEGIAN PATROLS MOVED INTO THE MARINE COMPANY'S NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION WITH OUT RESISTANCE AS, APPARENTLY, NO FLANK SECURITY HAD BEEN POSTED. EVEN PRIOR TO OBSERVING THE MARINE UNIT AS I DID, AND READING AND HEARING ABOUT THE OTHER COMPANY, WE WERE EXPOSED TO VERY POLITE, PATRONIZING COMMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT U. S. UNITS "ARE EFFECTIVE FOR ABOUT 24 HOURS" OF SUCH OTHER EXPLANATORY COMMENTS AS "NORWEGIAN UNITS WOULD NOT DO WELL IF EXPOSED TO EXTREME HEAT CONDITIONS". CLEARLY THE CONSENSUS AMONG OUR NORWEGIAN ALLIES, BASED ON THEIR PERSONAL OBSERVATION, IS THAT WE ARE POORLY EQUIPPED AND POORLY TRAINED TO OPERATE IN THEIR COUNTRY AND THEY HAVE LITTLE REGARD FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS IN ARCTIC CONDITIONS.

THE GERMAN NORTHERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 1940-1945

BY
EARL F. ZIEMKE

Department of the Army Pamphlet

No. 20-271

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$10.30
Stock Number 008-020-00549-5

FOREWORD

The Office of the Chief of Military History of the Department of the Army is currently preparing a series of studies on German military operations in World War II against forces other than those of the United States. In addition to the volumes already published dealing with Poland and the Balkans and the present volume on Norway and Finland, these monographs will cover German operations in Russia, France and the Low Countries. These campaign studies are being made available to the General Staff and to the Army schools and colleges as reference works. They will also prove of value to all who are interested in military affairs.

The German campaigns in Norway and Finland established landmarks in the evolution of military science even though they failed in the long run to influence the outcome of the war. In the invasion of Norway the Germans executed the first large-scale amphibious (in fact triphibious) operation of World War II. The subsequent German operations out of Finland provided the first, and still unique, instance of major military forces operating in the Arctic and created a precedent, at least, for the inclusion of that region, once considered almost totally inaccessible, in strategic considerations. In these respects the operations in the German Northern Theater have a direct association with concepts of warfare which have not yet reached their final stage of development and are, therefore, of current and possible future interest.

The most frequent criticism directed against Hitler's conduct of operations in the Northern Theater, and in Norway particularly, is that he poured in troops and material there on a scale which far surpassed the need and drained strength from more active theaters. His exaggerated concern for an invasion of that area was one of his major errors as a strategist, besides being a first-class example of the malfunctioning of his intuition. On the other hand, if Norway was to be defended, the commitment of forces there had to be large, although not as large, perhaps, as it was. By nature the German position in Norway was weak: a long coastline had to be defended against an enemy who had naval superiority; and poor internal lines of communication ruled out a mobile defense. A static defense was the most reliable solution and that cost men and matériel.

The crucial error of German strategy in the Northern Theater was the failure to cut the northern sea route to the Soviet Union. In 1941 its importance was not fully recognized, and the mistake could not be rectified later. Furthermore as General Buschenhagen has pointed out, the failure to stage an adequate offensive against the Murmansk Railroad, serious as it was, was fundamentally less significant than the error in strategy that left Arkhangel'sk, which could be kept open throughout most of the year, completely out of consideration. An operation to cut the railroad at Belomorsk, followed by an advance to Arkhangel'sk, would have completely closed the northern route and dealt the Soviet Union a severe blow. It would probably also have made possible a stabilization of the situation in northern Europe which, in the light of their predominantly defensive interest there, would have been entirely to the Germans' advantage.

Another error which had a most baneful effect on operations in the northern theater was the failure to take Leningrad. It appears that the city could have been taken in September 1941 had it not been for Hitler's wild and pointless determination to wipe it out entirely. The capture of Leningrad would probably have made a German-Finnish drive toward Belomorsk and Arkhangel'sk possible. It would certainly have greatly strengthened the position of the Finnish Army and paved the way for further combined operations. Above all, once the issue had been decided at Leningrad, the Russians might have turned their attention to other sectors of the front, enabling the Army Group North and the Finnish Army to establish relatively stable positions in their areas.

The poorly defined and inherently unstable partnership with Finland contributed greatly to the atmosphere of frustration which prevailed throughout the history of the Northern Theater. The Finns could have performed two services of major strategic significance, assistance in the capture of Leningrad and participation in an operation against the

Murmansk Railroad; both of these they refused. Long before the association was dissolved it had become a liability to both partners.

For Finland, which sacrificed heavily in men (55,000 killed, nearly 145,000 wounded) territory, and economic resources, the war was a costly experience. Finland was in part, as it claimed, a small nation caught in a war between two great powers and in part a victim of its own ambitions. That some of its territory would have become involved in the war was inevitable, and that it could have remained neutral was unlikely. In the end it emerged from the war still an independent nation, a better fate than befell many of the Soviet Union's small neighbors, some of which were not its enemies. This relatively favorable outcome can be credited in part to the fund of good will which Finland had built up in the United States and Great Britain and their continuing recognition of a certain amount of justice in the Finnish cause.

One significant historical precedent was established in the German Northern Theater: there, for the first time, major troop units conducted extended operations under arctic conditions. Although in the final battles of the war the Russians maneuvered large units with tanks more quickly and over greater distances than had previously been thought possible, the following conclusions regarding arctic warfare drawn from the German experience still apparently retain their validity:

1. In the Arctic the human element is all-important. The effectiveness of motorized and mechanized equipment is greatly reduced; the chief reliance must always be on men, not machines. Specialized training and experience are essential. The climate allows no margin of error either for the individual or for the organization as a whole.

2. The mobility of all units, large or small, is low. Maneuvers must be precisely planned and executed with the knowledge that distance can be as difficult to overcome as the enemy. Momentum is difficult to achieve and quickly lost.

3. Control of space is unimportant. Roads are difficult to build, and operations inevitably center around those few which already exist or can be constructed. One good line of communications such as the Murmansk Railroad can be decisive.

4. There is no favorable season for operations. Climate and terrain are always enemies, particularly to offensive operations. The winter is relatively favorable in one respect, namely, that the snow and ice make rapid movement by specially trained and equipped troops possible. Throughout much of the winter, however, operations must be conducted in near-total darkness. The most satisfactory period is in the late winter when the days are lengthening; but then time is limited, and operations must either be completed or abandoned at the onset of the spring thaw.

Memoranda on the Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic
Brigade -- Memoranda noting readiness problems.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION, 23D INFANTRY
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505

AFZT-LIB-CO

8 February 1979

MEMORANDUM THRU: Commander, 172d Light Infantry Brigade (Separate)
FOR: Commanding General, 172d Infantry Brigade
SUBJECT: Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend procurement and training priorities for the Alaskan Brigade to enhance combat effectiveness.
2. There is considerable concern by this battalion commander and my company commanders, that our equipment and the thrust of our training is essentially geared to a temperate climate with only surface treatment given to arctic and mountain warfare. Also there is great concern that we are not capable of fighting a sophisticated enemy because essential weapons systems and equipment, though programmed, are not presently in the field.
 - a. The arctic and other equipment deficiencies are generally recognized by combat developments and new items are either programmed or are in various stages of the development/procurement process. However, until such critical items as an over-the-snow support vehicle and an adequate air defense system are on the ground we can not hope to be an effective arctic fighting force. Following are equipment and support areas of greatest concern:
 - (1) We have no effective over-the-snow logistics capability. We are combat ineffective in many of the arctic regions of the world because we are virtually bound to plowed roads. The cancellation (delay) of the small unit support vehicle (SUSV) is a fatal blow to near term achievement of the mobility critical to successful arctic combat. The snowmobile can fill the gap to a limited extent but we have insufficient vehicles to meet logistic requirements.
 - (2) Other major equipment items lacking in our inventory include an effective air defense above the redeye, modern antitank systems, and lighter and less fragile secure radios.
 - (3) Individual support and equipment items in need of replacement or upgrading include rations designed for arctic use, lighter and better designed individual clothing, better designed boots that will decrease foot injury during sustained use, lighter akios, and skis designed for cross-country military use rather than downhill skiing.

AFET-LIB-CO

8 February 1979

SUBJECT: Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade

b. Training for arctic warfare is severely degraded by equipment deficiencies. However there are areas where greater emphasis should be given.

(1) NWTC should refocus to teach more on arctic warfare doctrine, tactics, and combat techniques rather than the present emphasis on survival and equipment orientation. This charter would provide direct input to Army doctrinal centers and maintain a repository of knowledge concerning arctic and mountain warfare in addition to arctic and mountain techniques.

(2) Presently we attempt to adapt current Army doctrine (FM 7-20 and ARTEP 7-15) to arctic and mountain warfare. Although most is applicable, there is genuine concern that conventional tactics are not the best in an arctic environment. Arctic doctrine and ARTEPs need to be published which relate to the realities of our environment.

3. The conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is that over the years we have gotten off track from the true direction we should be moving, to the extent that should war break out tomorrow we would be ill-prepared to fight.

4. Our recommendations are: that every effort be made to accelerate the delivery of the needed equipment to the field; that serious effort be made to develop and teach arctic and mountain warfare doctrine and tactics; that FORSCOM and DA be fully and candidly apprised of our limited combat capabilities under existing constraints.




ROBERT M. HERRICK
LTC, INF
Commanding

AFZT-L1-CO (8 Feb 79) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade

DA, HQ, 172d Light Infantry Brigade (Separate), Ft Richardson, AK. 99505
12 February 1979

TO: Commanding General, 172d Infantry Brigade (AK), Ft Richardson, AK 99505

1. Do not concur with LTC Herrick's observations.
2. Although we do not, in fact, possess modern AD systems, over the snow vehicles, etc., we can still optimize our effectiveness by becoming more proficient with what we have.
3. I do not think it is appropriate to state the obvious to higher headquarters. Neither do I believe it is appropriate to excuse our being "ill prepared to fight" on hypothetical scenarios and opponents.
4. I appreciate LTC Herrick's concerns. However, these are not within the realm of either his or my influence. Our task is to train our troops to fight with what equipment we have now. Our efforts would be better directed if we could achieve this task rather than restating obvious equipment short falls to our superiors.
5. Our arctic and mountain doctrine are adequate. Simply stated, we must be able to close with and destroy the enemy under these conditions. I believe we can now perform the former task. The latter task will be evaluated in July.


JAMES E. WALDECK
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL



DATE: 12 FEB 79

TO: C/S

SEE ME ON THIS - BRING

D, BEE & DICK DIXON WITH YOU.

TBT

WTC Anderson - 8 Mar 1979.

1. James TOTTEN Brought the attached Book today
Though you might like to Read it.
2. It would appear that Bob H. let it all hang
out and Walden cut it off. Heine's got
some good points.
3. TOTTEN's Reg Question Concerned Para 2. IE Do we
tell the Bn CDR How to Train - answer was no!
Training is decentralized and he makes his own decision.

15 MAR 1979

AFZT-CG

SUBJECT: Combat effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade

THRU: Commander
172d Infantry Brigade (Light) (Separate)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

TO: Commander
4th Battalion, 23d Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1. I appreciate your concern over the combat effectiveness of the Brigade. I am also well aware of the equipment and doctrinal literature shortcomings to which you allude.
2. As you stated in your letter, equipment deficiencies are recognized and are in various stages of the development process. We anticipate solutions to most of the problems you mentioned in the 1980-1985 time frame. In the interim, we must train to optimize the equipment on hand.
3. Doctrinal literature is also undergoing a change. A list of currently available literature and its programmed replacement is at Inclosure 1. As you know, the ARTEP is designed as a document of guidelines and may be modified as necessary by the user. A few suggested additions are attached as Inclosure 2. The Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) has been tasked to develop unit level mountain combat training exercises which should lead to a refinement of doctrine. Evaluation and development of tactical doctrine for unit level combat operations under arctic conditions will receive additional emphasis at the NWTC.

AFZT-CG

15 MAR 1979

SUBJECT: Combat Effectiveness of the Arctic Brigade

4. As a result of Exercise JACK FROST '79, this headquarters is currently preparing a letter to the Forces Command Commander which will describe our perceptions of the doctrinal, organizational, and equipment deficiencies of the Army's preparedness for arctic warfare. Your comments are appreciated as they will assist in our endeavor to identify areas in need of improvement.

2 Incl
as

signed
GEORGE L. EGBERT, JR.
Colonel, GS
Acting Commander

The report which was promised to be sent to Forces Command on deficiencies in Alaska presented few of the driving concerns noted by Ltc Herrick. Most were documented in the Jack Frost Report from the Light Infantry Brigade but were edited out of the Commanding General's Report to Forces Command.

At this time the 172nd Infantry Brigade was being reported in a high state of Combat Readiness through the Readiness Reporting System. This system requires that certain questions be answered; answers which indicate the readiness of units to perform their mission. Unfortunately, these questions do not relate well to all missions, the soldiers who must execute those missions, the danger being guarded against and the terrain of the mission. A possible example of the inadequacy of the Readiness Report in Alaska is the requirement for documenting the number of operational ambulances. Theoretically this indicates the ability to rescue wounded soldiers. No consideration is given to the fact that there are few roads and they are impassible much of the time.

Commanders can subjectively lower the Readiness Rating of their unit to advise superiors of problems which are not specifically questioned by the System. I know of no time this was done in the 172nd Infantry Brigade.

Opinion -- The opinion of two soldiers on training
and equipment.

21 December 1978

This is a statement concerning the Ski Instructor Class given at Fort Greely, Alaska from 30 October to 17 November. This class concerned itself ~~not~~ mainly with downhill skiing techniques. It was to send soldiers back with the ability to teach the brigade how to ski, downhill. In my opinion it accomplished this, but the knowledge most needed to be taught to the brigade soldier is cross-country skiing techniques. The course dealt with this type of training only lightly, one afternoon was all the consideration given to it.

Sgt/4 Albert W. Roberts

14 sept. 1979

Dear Sir,

I had the opportunity today to attend a meeting with some officers from DARCOM. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the pros and cons of Arctic equipment. I had taken over some alternative equipment to display. I was not allowed to display this equipment because "IT WAS NOT PLANNED". The only equipment that was to be discussed was what the BDE. STAFF had provided. They did not have much of the equipment essential to an Arctic soldier, nor did they want to hear my fresh ideas on improving our already inadequate equipment on display.

The only discussion concerning the displayed equipment was which equipment is better for the price, the old equipment or the new equipment. They did not even consider the more advanced equipment now on the market. In my opinion, the civilian market has totally out classed the military in cold weather equipment advancements.

With all due respect Sir, I have never been so disgusted in my life! The only apparent concern was for saving money, not getting the equipment that Arctic soldiers need. The individual soldier is the backbone of the Army, not the STAFF GENERALS. I feel that the Army should listen more to the soldiers who must depend on this equipment, than to the people who purchase it. If the Army is so worried about spending money, why are they spending \$120 per pair for TRUCKER BCP skies, when they can get KARHU skies for \$60 per pair.

Sincerely,

JAMES M. CALLOW
SGT U.S. ARMY

James M. Callow

*Generals can inspire
soldiers, unfortunately, both ways.*

Training -- Historical and recent lessons learned on
improving winter warfare capability.

Chapter 12

Technical Training for Arctic Conditions

The improvisation of arctic clothing, equipment, and weapons had to be complemented by special training. The most important objective in this technical training was to make an indefatigable and accomplished skier of every soldier, regardless of where he might be employed. The German training methods deviated from the Finnish since the Finns stressed cross-country skiing. Accustomed to the use of skis as a means of locomotion from their early childhood, the Finns were capable of covering distances of twenty-five to thirty miles a day even during heavy snowstorms. The German skiing technique always emphasized downhill runs. The type of bindings used by the two nations fully expressed the difference between their skiing techniques. Finnish skis merely had a loop to hold the pointed boot whereas the Germans used a regular binding like the Kandahar and mountain boots with toe plates and grooved heels. The Finnish binding did not permit the execution of speed turns while the German binding which had a tight hold on the foot made it impossible to discard the skis instantaneously whenever the tactical situation required it. Although the Finnish method had great advantages in the arctic, where the downhill technique is of little use and where one can easily dispense with speed turns, German skiing instruction continued to follow the Alpine method. The training program included certain theoretical courses such as those on the proper treatment of skis, on the best way to dress in arctic temperatures, and on protecting oneself from frostbite. Special instruction in the handling and firing of weapons by troops on skis played an important part. The training program was standardized throughout the entire theater; it culminated in a field exercise under combat conditions continuing several days and in winter sports competition.

Every replacement assigned to the Kandalaksha front first had to undergo a two-month special training course at Kairala in order to adjust himself to the living and combat conditions of the arctic. The local command had issued explicit directives for this orientation course, including examples of the proper tactics to be employed in the wilderness north of the Arctic Circle. These directives were brought up to date by the inclusion of the most recent tactical lessons, above all in small unit actions. Thus, for instance, pamphlets were issued on the subject of long-distance marches, march security, combat and reconnaissance patrols, outposts, strong points, guard duty,

combat intelligence, movement of supply through exposed areas, and operations in snow and ice as well as in primeval forests and swamps.

This type of training was designed to adjust a newcomer to his environment and its peculiar climatic features. Moreover it was to stimulate and further the soldier's natural affinity to primeval forests and vast spaces and to assist him in orienting himself, tracking down the enemy, avoiding ambush, and interpreting footprints and ski tracks. In fact, it was a kind of "Cowboys-and-Indians" training course. Proper attention was devoted to everyday problems such as passing the night in the open in the arctic winter, constructing a brushwood shelter or an igloo, building a reflecting fire out of split logs, finding food in the wilderness, and applying first aid in case of accident or battle injury. A newcomer had to acquire a great deal of knowledge on such subjects before he was qualified to be assigned to a combat unit without jeopardizing himself and his comrades. The numerous field exercises often lasted several days and took place at great distances from the training center. They were conducted under the continuous threat of enemy raids and, almost without noticing it, the novices to arctic warfare became adjusted to the peculiarities of fighting and living in the extreme north. Whenever the combat troops were transferred to quiet sectors, they continued to receive supplementary training which ranged from improving their skiing technique to the proper care of weapons, equipment, clothing, and rations, and included protective measures against frostbite. Courses in the proper treatment of reindeer had to be repeated over and over again in order to prevent the loss of any of these animals which were so difficult to replace. Thus even the experienced combat soldiers in the far north could always acquire additional knowledge.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Company B, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1 April 1979

WASM BO A

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Skiing Experience Gained by
Company B, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Winter 78-79)

Commander
4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1. Training Philosophy:

a. 'Speed and endurance are the most valuable qualities in ski troops. During training the speed, the distance of the march, the weight of the pack to be carried and the difficulty of ground chosen for march should be gradually increased on a well planned toughening-up program" (Doctrine for the Norwegian Home Guard).

b. Leaders and soldiers are inventive; they will find solution when confronted with problems.

2. Goals:

a. Attain a combat mobility rate of 4km per hour with equipment.

b. Limit special ski training of new soldiers to 8 hours, not including PT [physical training] or tactical operations.

c. Learn problems and benefits of ski mobile infantry.

d. Use skis as the primary tool for over the snow mobility during winter.

3. Results: All goals were met.

4. Lessons learned:

a. Ski units have a 400% increase in mobility rate [over snowshoe equipped units]. A ski mobile reserve, on prepared trails and with good equipment can react with a ground speed of 10 km per hour.

b. Units will require 3 days of training to become proficient enough to conduct military operations. Additional time will be required to eliminate errors due to inexperience, probably a complete training cycle.

After Action Report Cont'd

c. Waxing is the key to effective use of skis. In most units the skill and equipment is lacking. Equipment required: Waxes, corks, waxing irons and scrapers (available through local purchase).

d. There is a great deal of misinformation, official and unofficial, about training, waxing and technique. There is much emphasis needed in this area.

e. Commanders and Training Officers must learn to ski if they are to effectively use the advantages of ski units and avoid the limitations.

f. If it is mandatory to ski during military operations the problems will quickly become evident and the solutions will appear almost as quickly, with the exception of fundamental equipment problems.

g. Our skis are a major obstacle to training ski units.

h. The VB (Vapor Barrier) Boot is inadequate for skiing. Its structure makes it difficult to put on and drop skis; the lack of a welt allows it to pop out of the binding under stress (a notable problem during initial training). Its weight and poor ankle support increase fatigue. Boots with covers or mukluks work better in all temperatures.

i. Trailbreaking parties will significantly improve rate of movement, security and preserve fighting strength.

j. Standing around and stop-and-go movement rapidly deteriorate fighting strength during cold weather.

k. Biathlon is an excellent training vehicle requiring speed, endurance and weapon accuracy while under physical stress.

l Stay off ski slopes! They are fun but to the inexperienced troop downhill skiing is discouraging and it is hard on equipment. The technique for getting a unit down a hill are different than those learned on the ski slopes. Spend training time concentrating on the primary training objectives of speed and endurance.

m. Traverse hills and approach all significant hills (up or down) as obstacles, with security teams and rallying points at the top and bottom. Fear of hills will be overcome by experience, however it will take time.

n. Problems with thick vegetation can be avoided by using trailbreaking parties.

o. The unit commander should prescribe the wax to be used and all skis should be inspected prior to movement.

After Action Report Cont'd

p. An attack position short of the objective should be used to improve intelligence, wax skis or attach mohair climbers. Mohair climbers have tremendous climbing characteristics.

q. Close in fighting should be conducted dismounted.

r. During retrograde and ambush operations trails should always be prepared to your rear.

s. Periodic halts during marches preserves soldier fighting strength.

t. Uphill attacks in deep snow have historically been costly and unsuccessful. However, maneuvering to cut off an opponents logistics combined with heavy volumes of fire and infiltration have caused well positioned forces to withdraw or to be defeated in detail.

u. The snow blowers used to clear highways mix sand with snow on 40 foot paths on both sides of the road, making it difficult for units to train while moving to and from Post.

v. A good Physical Training program during the summer will decrease training problems and injuries.

w. A great amount of how to use ski mounted units is available through DA Historical Studies and the Doctrine of Nordic Armies (copies in the Combat Development Library).

x. Load Carrying Equipment reduces circulation in the hands and arms increasing the probability to frost bite.


5. Recommendations:

a. Resolve equipment problems. It is impossible to learn to ski without proper waxing, and it is very discouraging to learn on equipment not designed to compliment the mission.

b. Improve doctrine to reduce the number of lessons which must be learned by hard knocks.

c. Require units to use skis as their primary mode of transportation in deep snow.

d. Adopt the training goal for tactical skiing of 4km per hour with equipment and normal tactical movement requirements.



WILLIAM D. JAMES
CPT, IN
Commanding

PROPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

ICE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AFZT-PTS-T

Military Skiing

Cdr, 172d LIB
ATTN: S-3

FROM DPTSEC

DATE 18 AUG 1979

CAT 1

LTC ANDERSON/bis/2-218

Request your comments be furnished on Suggestion No. R77-051M

(Improved Military Ski Instruction Program) NLT 28 Aug 79.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1 Incl
as

27 Aug 79
[Signature]
JEROME F. ANDERSON
LTC, GS
Chief, Training Division

Military Skiing -- Notes attached to this training guidelines from Ltc Anderson are poorly written. The response was required overnight.

Department of the Army Historical Studies and translations of training guidelines from Scandinavian armies had no effect on improving the Brigades training guidelines.

No senior commander or staff officer of the Brigade accompanied the only company in the Brigade which conducted ski mounted tactical exercises.

4. SUBJECT OF SUGGESTION

15. SUGGESTION NUMBER

DESCRIPTION (Describe the Current Situation and your Suggestion for change or improvement. Include where and how it can be used, and identify estimated tangible/intangible benefits which it will result from adoption.)

Present military ski techniques are the same as taught to soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division during World War II. Since that time, skiing as a civilian sporting industry has experienced several complete revolutions as have ski instruction methods. The old "Arlberg" ski instruction technique has been replaced by the "American Teaching Method" (ATM), a method calculated not only to drastically decrease the time required to attain reasonable skiing proficiency, but also to take full advantage of improved ski design. A pertinent example comparing the two teaching methods are: "The Arlberg technique" required a definite up and down movement of the entire body combined with strong shoulder rotation during execution of turns, (a difficult movement even for an expert when carrying a heavy pack). ATM teaches movements generally from the hips down with the upper body remaining relatively stable and relaxed. The ability to "steer" the skis with the legs, takes full advantage of the capabilities of modern ski design. The SUGGESTION FINISHED? Refer to Instruction Numbers 2 & 3 on reverse side of this set. NEED MORE SPACE? Reverse entire set. Pull out long carbons. Reverse and reinsert long carbons. Continue under Item 16.

FORM 1 SEP 72 343

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 AUG 67, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

COPY 2

skis currently issued to soldiers incorporate all the features of modern ski design.

If taught properly, eight hours of ATM downhill instruction (Incl 1: Proposed Ski Training Program) can produce a reasonably proficient downhill skier. ("Reasonably proficient" means able to negotiate difficult slopes under packed conditions.) If the soldier then begins normal ski training with military equipment he can be expected to progress at a much faster rate than normal. The greatest advantage will be the soldier's ability to face downslopes with confidence. Normal fears faced by soldiers required to negotiate gentle slopes during initial ski training will have been overcome by proper ATM training on steeper slopes. The injury rate should decrease since early falls will occur while wearing breakaway ski bindings. In Alaska the necessary equipment and facilities exist at special services ski areas. Special services facilities at several posts in CONUS e.g. Ft. Lewis and Carson, have appropriate equipment for issue. Use of facilities in those areas may involve some

(Continued see attached sheet)

247-051M

DESCRIPTION, ITEM #16 (Continued)

transportation costs. Instructors can be qualified during clinics held prior to troop training. The best way to commence such a program would be to send several expert military skiers to the Professional Ski Instruction Association (PSIA) ski instructor academy held annually at Arapahoe Basin, Colorado. Once established, the instructor cadre base would be self-sustaining through the clinic system mentioned above. An alternate method of establishing an instructor cadre base is to identify personnel within each command who are ATM instructor qualified to broaden the base using the clinic systems. (In Alaska there is at least one each ATM qualified individual at Fts Richardson and Greely.)

ESTIMATED TRAINING TIME SAVINGS

| | |
|--|----------|
| Estimated average annual rifle company training hours required to attain reasonable ski proficiency. | 80 hours |
|--|----------|

| | |
|--|----------|
| Estimated annual rifle company training hours necessary to attain higher level of proficiency if suggestion adopted. | 20 hours |
|--|----------|

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----------|
| Annual time savings per rifle company | 60 hours |
|---------------------------------------|----------|

I suggest establishment of a formal 20 hour ski instruction program consisting of eight hours of ATM downhill training followed by twelve hours of formalized cross-country training for beginner military skiers. Experienced military skiers may be required to repeat the course on an annual refresher basis as needed.

R 17-051M

PROPOSED SKI TRAINING PROGRAM

1st and 2d hour. (Beginner slope)

15 Min. - Introduction: Purpose and goals of instruction.
Definitions of common terms.

20 Min. - Walking, side step, herringbone, falling and
recovery.

65 Min. - Straight running.

NOTE: Rope tow procedures as integrated training.

3d and 4th hour.

50 Min. - Gliding wedge

50 Min. - Wedge turns

5th and 6th hour (Intermediate slope)

50 Min. - Step turns

50 Min. - Side slipping, edge control.

7th and 8th hours (Advanced slope)

50 Min. - Stem christiania

50 Min. - Parallel turn.

thru 18th
9th and 20th hour.

Cross-country training using current military equipment and techniques.

R 77-051M

I. Suggestion No. R77-051M, Subject: Military Skiing (Enclosed)

Suggestion No. R77-051M

Subject: Military Skiing, is a training plan which is typical of senior staffs who lack knowledge of their subordinate units' requirements. This is the type of training plan which STMS is supposed to eliminate. A ski training plan, as with any training plan, should start by identifying your requirements (i.e., ARTEP requirements based on mission, enemy, troops, and terrain), then evaluate your strengths and weaknesses (i.e., evaluated ARTEP), then make your training plan to efficiently achieve the standard of performance. For many years the Army has trained individuals in skiing in hopes that it would result in trained ski units. The ski training program listed in this suggestion is not significantly different from those other programs. B Company, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, was able to successfully conduct its operations as a ski unit with less than a week of tactical training using the philosophy that:

1. Skiing is easy to learn, if approached correctly. The primary emphasis should be placed on peculiarities of military operations while ski mounted.

2. Soldiers and leaders are inventive; when confronted with problems, *they* will find solutions.

I believe the Army should reinforce this success not the failure of past *Training* programs.

II. Identify Requirements: (METT)

The 172nd Infantry Brigade is
(A) MISSION: Arctic Infantry, targeted against Alaska (as opposed to an Alpine unit targeted against the Alps). Inherent in this mission is the requirement to be able to travel from one point to another. Historically, the most efficient ski training program for this mission environment has been cross-country. Skiing is a technique to accomplish this.

DA PAM 20-201, Historical Study - Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign, AUG 1951.

"The German training methods deviated from the Finnish since the Finns stressed cross-country skiing." "The German skiing technique always emphasized downhill runs." "Although the Finnish method had great advantages in the Arctic, where the downhill technique is of little use and where one can easily dispense with speed turns, German skiing instruction continued to follow the Alpine method."

Wilderness Skiing:

"The ideas, the very point of Nordic skiing has always been travel - getting from here to there, and not necessarily climbing up something, or somewhere, in order to enjoy an exhilarating run back down. (Primary function of Alpine skiing).

(B) ENEMY: He is well trained in winter operations, *many of his soldiers* come from an environment similar to Canada or Northern United States.

(C) TROOPS: Generally troops are inexperienced in winter operations. Many come from Southern United States and have no experience with winter, and almost all have no experience with skis. The requirement of a ski training program is to use limited time to overcome this lack of experience. To be efficient the training program must address the most important requirements first.

1. Wilderness Skiing:

"Nordic skiing is by no way a second choice (to Alpine Skiing). It is an extremely practical way of moving over the snow. It has its own esthetics and its own charm, but most of all, it has a special advantage for the beginner - it is very, very easy to learn."

2. Winter Operation Booklet, Norweigen Home Guard:

"2. Speed and endurance are the most valuable qualities in ski troops. The standard to be achieved is to be capable of undertaking a ski march as a unit, under varying conditions, and still be physically fit for battle."

3. During training, the speed, the distance of the march, the weight of the pack to be carried and the difficulty of ground chosen for march should be gradually increased in a well planned toughening-up program."

By evaluating B Company, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, other requirements can be identified. B Company, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry conducted all its operations during the winter of 1978-79 on skis (incl ARTEP) and some of the experiences gained are included in the commander's "After Action Report." In brief, that report cited the following as the most important factors in successfully conducting military skiing: (listed in order of importance)

A. Properly define "Military Skiing." Military Skiing is the conduct of military operations, with all the inherit subtasks which would result in successful completion of the mission, while mounted on skis. It is NOT learning to ski while wearing a uniform. Skiing is simply a movement tool, it is not the end goal. Training to provide only confidence is not a good military objective. For example, training soldiers in white water kayaking will give them confidence in their ability in water, but it does not train units to conduct beach assaults.

Example: if waxed too hard, EVERY 2 foot hill becomes a major obstacle
B. Proper waxing is the key to effective use of skis. If waxed too soft, the unit's rate of movement will drop to that of snowshoes. If waxed correctly you can ski up a 20% slope and glide 10 feet or more for each kick on flat terrain.

C. Leaders must know the perimeters (i.e. assets and limitations), of ski mobil units, so as to maximize effectiveness. Example, on ARTEP 79, the night attack on Hill 1825, B Co Commander failed to use an attack position to rewax skis, this resulted in his formation stalling just short of his objective until it was able to rewax with a softer wax. If he had waxed harder, there would have been no delay.

His failure to act. His inexperience resulted in a failure to recognize the requirement to rewax.

of a ski unit
D. ~~individuals must learn to ski as a unit~~, The requirements are different than individual skiers. Example, during an attack on your perimeter, ~~who is~~ ^{someone must be} responsible for insuring all skis are knocked down, so they will not be damaged by rifle fire. *A recreational skier is not normally confronted with this problem.*

E. There is a lack of confidence in units abilities to conduct military operations on skis. Example, despite a 400% increase in mobility, only one infantry company in the brigade conducts its tactical operations on skis. That company commander found the reasons for the lack of confidence was founded in:

(1) A lack of confidence of leaders in their knowledge of military ski training. ~~(well founded)~~ *Their knowledge is based on poor doctrine.*

(2) A lack of confidence in skis ability to be properly waxed so soldiers can climb small hills (unfounded in properly trained and equipped soldiers).

(3) The poor design of the issued ski and the VB boot compounds the confidence problems.

(4) Special Note should be made reference to the fear of skiing down steep hills, since this is the primary training objective of the present ski training program. The Recon Platoon Leader, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry, who is an excellent skier, states "When I stand at the top of a moderately steep slope, with a 2 foot wide track, packed through the forest by other members of my unit and I have a sustained operations weight ruck on my back, I have all the confidence in the world that I will fall. I also know that if the trail breaking party had done their job correctly, the trail they prepared would have traversed the hill so as to eliminate the steep slope. Soldiers will go down the hill anyway because they know they are supposed to, confident or not. Soldiers are not stupid, they quickly learn how to sit down to control their speed. Under the conditions just listed, none of the Alpine techniques taught by the present training program will be of any use."

The preceeding information and experience should be translated into the following training goals:

successfully
A. Ski units capable of conducting winter operations. During the transportation phase of the operations units should maintain a mobility rate of at least 4 km/hr.

B. Leader and Soldiers knowledgeable about their responsibilities as members of a ski unit.

C. Ski units capable of integrating new soldiers into their units with less than 8 hrs. of special ski training (to include ski care, waxing, etc.).

The goals should be translated into the following training objectives. Following training

1. OBJECTIVE: Learn to ski as a unit. Able to ski as a unit.

Conditions - Unit with combat equipment on ARTEP type training in all snow conditions except crud. Unit properly equipped.

Standard of Performance - Maintain a rate of movement of 4 km/hr for 6 km while maintaining normal security expected during ARTEP training.

- A. ITO: Leaders skilled in planning and conducting ski movements.

Conditions - All normal winter conditions.

Standard of Performance -

(1) All obstacles along a route of march are planned for and eliminated, bypassed, or reduced in significance by multiple trails or other techniques.

(2) Trail breaking party properly oriented, equipped, and given sufficient time to complete their mission.

(3) Equipment (tent) breakdown and other pre-operation requirements timed to reduce the stand-around time which causes fatigue in extreme cold weather.

(4) Stop and go movement caused by lack of planning eliminated. Stop and go movement caused by obstacles significantly reduced by prior planning.

(5) Skis rewaxed at appropriate times to prevent stalling at a critical point.

(6) Actions at objective planned to facilitate mission success and reduce stand-around problems.

(7) Have an effective straggler control plan.

- B. ITO:

(1) Learn to wax.

(2) Conditions - All snow conditions and temperatures.

(3) Standard of Performance - Be able to kick and glide under all snow conditions. Be able to kick a 20% slope without herring bone and glide 10 ft. on a single kick.

C. ITO: Be proficient at mounted drill.

Conditions - Packed, flat snow covered field with skis, poles and rifle.

Standard of Performance - Be able to execute the following, without falling down in time prescribed:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| (1) Kick turn | (1) Kick 10 sec. |
| (2) Right face | (2) Right 3 sec. |
| (3) Left face | (3) Left 3 sec. |
| (4) Kneeling firing position | (4) Kneeling 6 sec. |
| (5) Recover from kneeling position | (5) Recover 3 sec. |
| (6) Prone firing position | (6) Prone 6 sec. |
| (7) Recover from prone position | (7) Recover 6 sec. |
| (8) Practice getting up from fall | (8) Practice 6 sec. |

D. ITO: Be properly prepared for ski training.

Condition - Normal field equipment, inspection conducted by Squad Leader.

Standard of Performance:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) Normal equipment and weapon prepared for operations. | (1) Normal equipment and weapon prepared for operations. |
| (2) Skis properly waxed as prescribed by unit commander. | (2) Skis properly waxed as prescribed by unit commander. |
| (3) Pole strap, allow hand to rest on pole grip; allow hand to rest on pole grip. | (3) Pole strap, allow hand to rest on pole grip; allow hand to rest on pole grip. |
| (4) There are no twists in the pole straps, which could result in frost bite. | (4) There are no twists in the pole straps, which could result in frost bite. |
| (5) Socks dry. | (5) Socks dry. |
| (6) Unit has appropriate new wax materials. | (6) Unit has appropriate new wax materials. |

E. ITO: Learn individual skills.

Condition - Properly waxed skis on relatively flat terrain.

Standard of Performance - Be able to execute the following movements without consistently falling down:

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| (1) Diagonal stride. | (1) Diagonal stride. |
| (2) Double pole. | (2) Double pole. |
| (3) Step turn. | (3) Step turn. |
| (4) Skating turn. | (4) Skating turn. |
| (5) Skating. | (5) Skating. |

F. ITO: Effectively break trail.

Conditions - All normal winter conditions, troops without rucks, squad size group.

Standard of Performance - Maintain a rate of speed of 3 km/hr through unbroken snow and forests for 3 km. In alders maintain a rate of 2 km/hr for 2 km.

G. ITO: Effectively perform all ARTEP tasks while ski mounted.

Conditions - Normal winter conditions. (and as specified in ARTEP)
Objectives on steep hills should be avoided if possible due to the extensive time required to prepare for steep uphill attacks in deep snow.

Standard of Performance - Normal ARTEP standards.

H. ITO: Effectively perform all soldier manual tasks while ski mounted.
(i.e. Fire weapon, low crawl, high crawl, care of equipment, fire and movement, move as a member of a fire team, etc.)

Conditions - Normal winter condition and as specified in SM.

Standard of Performance - As specified in Soldiers Manual.

I. ITO: Troops physically fit to perform as members of a ski unit.

Conditions - Prepared trails, all normal winter conditions.
w/ combat equipment.

Standard of Performance - Unit able to complete a 15 km march in 4 hrs with less than 5% stragglers. Troops prepare to conduct mission upon arriving at their objective.

(D) 1. Terrain: Alaska has relatively large flat areas with short steep mountains. There are relatively few military targets in the extreme mountainous areas. The deep snow requires special transportation techniques. Nordic techniques were developed specifically to satisfy this transportation need.

Wilderness Skiing: "The idea, the very point of Nordic skiing has always been travel - getting from here to there."

III ← Logistical Support: In order to ski you must be able to wax. Waxing equipment is as follows: waxes, waxing irons, corks, scrapers, and a heat source.

2. Nordic skis are designed for transportation. They would be the most effective ski to use.

Wilderness Skiing:

Wilderness Skiing:

"Naturally, a good instructor, or a friend who is both a skilled skier and a patient explainer, can speed things immensely. Still, under the worst learning circumstances, we feel that an average healthy person can become competent with Nordic cross-country skis in a few days. With Alpine gear, especially in untracked snow, minimum mastery might take weeks, or longer."

3. Mountain boots are the most effective boot for ski training.

Personnel -- A study on how personnel turbulence
decays unit effectiveness.

The summary on pages 10 and 11 highlight the concerns of the paper. This paper is an interesting mathematical approach to proving what is intuitive to field commanders who are often with their units - that the effectiveness of teamwork decays rapidly as a function of personnel turbulence.

AN ANALYSIS OF TRAINING PERCENTAGES
IN C BATTERY, 1ST BN, 37TH FA

by

2LT John M. Hopkins

Summary on pages 10 & 11.

*This report is an interesting
mathematical approach which
notes why it is very difficult
to keep field units in a high
state of readiness.*

INTRODUCTION

The Training Officer of C Battery, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery is required to maintain minimum percentages of personnel of the unit, having completed certain training events during a prescribed time period in accordance with the following table:


| <u>Required Training</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | <u>Minimum Percentage Required</u> |
|--|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Gas Chamber Exercise | Annual | 80 |
| Cold Weather Indoctrination Refresher | Annual | 80 |
| Geneva/Hague Convention | Annual | 80 |
| Military Justice | Annual | 80 |
| SAEDA (Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army) | Annual | 80 |
| Five Mile Run | Annual | 80 |
| Field Training Exercise | Semi-Annual | 80 |
| Servicemen's Benefits | Semi-Annual | 80 |
| Standards of Conduct | Semi-Annual | 80 |
| Alcohol and Drug Abuse | Semi-Annual | 80 |
| Equal Opportunity Discussion | Quarterly | 80 |
| Human Self-Development | Monthly | 80 |
| M-16 Rifle Qualification | Annual | 90 |
| Chemical, Biological, Radiological Proficiency Test | Annual | 90 |
| Physical Proficiency Test | Semi-Annual | 90 |

Problem Definition

There are two considerations, inherent to a company or battery size military unit, that limit the achievement and maintenance of these minimum required percentages. The first is the percentage of unit personnel available for training on a scheduled training day. The second is the influx of new untrained personnel into the unit and the loss of previously trained individuals. It becomes incumbent upon the Training Officer, as the decision maker, to anticipate the effect of these considerations and schedule unit training such that the percentage of battery personnel, having completed each training event, does not fall below the required percentage for that event at any time.

Model Development

The situation for a given training event can be expressed graphically:



P_1, P_2 are the attained percentages as the result of training given at T_1 and T_2 , respectively. The equation of line segment $\overline{P_1T_2}$ is of primary concern, as it reflects the effect of personnel turnover. In general, this equation will provide the decision-maker with a relation that describes the behavior of training percentages with respect to time. The development of this equation follows:

Let Q = the required percentage for a given training event
 P = the percentage of personnel completing training
 N = the number of personnel assigned on day training completed
 C = the number of personnel completing training
 T = time (in months)
 D = the number of personnel, having completed training, departing unit per month
 A = the number of personnel, not having completed training, arriving in unit per month

The equation of the line segment $\overline{P_1T_2}$ is readily given by the slope-intercept formula ($y=mx+b$) where:

$$y=P$$

$$m = \frac{\Delta P}{\Delta T} = \frac{P_2 - P_1}{T_2 - T_1} = \frac{\frac{C_1 - D(T_2 - T_1)}{N_1 + A(T_2 - T_1)} \cdot 100 - P_1}{T_2 - T_1}$$

$$x=T$$

$$b = \frac{C_1}{N_1} = P_1$$

$$\text{substituting, } P = \left\{ \frac{\left[\frac{C_1 - D(T_2 - T_1)}{N_1 + A(T_2 - T_1)} \cdot 100 \right] - P_1}{T_2 - T_1} \right\} T + P_1$$

$$\text{since } T = T_2 - T_1, \text{ simplifying, } P = \frac{(C_1 - DT)100}{N_1 + AT - DT} = \frac{100C_1 - 100DT}{N_1 + AT - DT}$$

Using this equation, with N_1 and C_1 on the day a training event was completed, and treating A and D as constants based on sample data, the decision-maker can substitute T = the required frequency and determine if the attained percentage will exceed the required percentage at that future date, T .

Continuing with the equation for P and solving for T,

$$PN_1 + PAT - PDT = 100C_1 - 100DT$$

$$PAT - PDT + 100DT = 100C_1 - PN_1$$

$$T(PA - PD + 100D) = 100C_1 - PN_1$$

$$T = \frac{100C_1 - PN_1}{PA - PD + 100D}$$

By setting $P=Q$ the relation becomes the reschedule equation:

$$T_R = \frac{100C_1 - QN_1}{QA - QD + 100D}$$

This relation will enable the decision-maker to predict the length of time at which a given initial percentage, acted on by personnel turnover, will equal the required percentage.¹

Data

During the sample period, (1 APR 78 to 30 SEP 78), there were 39 personnel arriving in the unit. However, 13 of these personnel were obtained in a special personnel action of a one-time nature.

$$\text{Average personnel gained per month}(A) = \frac{\text{total gain} - \text{special personnel action}}{\text{number of sample months}} =$$

$$\frac{39 - 13}{6} = \frac{26}{6} = 4.33$$

During the same period 29 personnel departed from the unit.

$$\text{Average personnel lost per month}(D) = \frac{\text{total loss}}{\text{number of sample months}} = \frac{29}{6} = 4.83$$

¹ When $A=D=0$, the reschedule equation is undefined. This introduces no threat to the validity of the relation and is, in fact, consistent with the model. Therefore, the constraint $A=D \neq 0$ will not be addressed in the model solution.

| Total assigned and attached minus detached on orders | Leave | TDY/SD or detached not on orders | Sick call, hospital, or appointment | In/Out Pro- cessing | Comp time | Ed cycle | Total for Tng | Daily % |
|---|-------|---|---|------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|------------|
| 102 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 26 | 61 | 59.90 |
| 101 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 26 | 62 | 61.39 |
| 101 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 24 | 62 | 61.39 |
| 101 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 26 | 63 | 62.37 |
| 103 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 27 | 63 | 61.17 |
| 103 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 90 | 87.38 |
| 101 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 88 | 87.13 |
| 101 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 87 | 86.14 |
| 101 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 85 | 84.16 |
| 100 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 86 | 86.00 |
| 100 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 84 | 84.00 |
| 101 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 81 | 80.20 |
| 101 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 82 | 81.19 |
| 101 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 82 | 82.17 |
| 103 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 86 | 83.50 |
| 98 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 83 | 84.69 |
| 98 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 81 | 82.65 |
| 98 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 87 | 88.78 |
| 96 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 85 | 88.51 |
| 96 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 80 | 83.33 |
| 98 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 86 | 87.76 |
| 96 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 82 | 85.42 |
| 96 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 86 | 89.58 |
| 98 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 85 | 86.72 |
| 98 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 89 | 90.82 |
| 98 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 86 | 87.71 |
| 98 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 92 | 93.81 |
| 98 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 97 | 93.27 |
| 104 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 87 | 75.00 |
| 116 | 2 | 18 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 104 | 88.81 |
| 117 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 105 | 88.91 |
| 118 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 105 | 89.91 |
| 118 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 105 | 89.71 |
| 117 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 104 | 88.81 |
| 117 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 17 | 69 | 59.4 |
| 116 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 81 | 69.81 |
| 116 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 78 | 67.21 |
| 116 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 76 | 65.5 |
| 116 | 5 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 86 | 74.11 |
| 116 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 22 | 73 | 63.41 |
| 115 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 22 | 78 | 68.41 |
| 114 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 22 | 81 | 70.4 |
| 115 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 22 | 75 | 65.2 |
| 115 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 22 | 72 | 62.6 |
| 115 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 21 | 76 | 66.0 |
| 115 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 21 | 76 | 66.0 |
| 115 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 21 | 76 | 66.0 |

| Total assigned and attached minus detached on orders | Leave | TDY/SD detached not on orders | Sick call hospital, or appointment | In/Out Pro- cessing | Comp time | Ed cycle | Total for Tng | Daily % |
|---|-------|--|--|------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|------------|
| 115 | 9 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 18 | 79 | 68.70 |
| 115 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 21 | 60 | 52.17 |
| 113 | 11 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 68 | 60.18 |
| 112 | 11 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 71 | 63.39 |
| 112 | 11 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 71 | 63.39 |
| 112 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 15 | 70 | 62.50 |
| 112 | 12 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 84 | 75.00 |
| 112 | 15 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 83 | 74.11 |
| 113 | 14 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 81 | 71.68 |
| 112 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 79 | 70.54 |
| 114 | 10 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 97 | 85.09 |
| 114 | 11 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 91 | 79.82 |
| 115 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 80.00 |
| 115 | 10 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 96 | 83.48 |
| 115 | 14 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 87 | 75.65 |
| 115 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 89 | 77.39 |
| 114 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 89 | 78.07 |
| 113 | 14 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 83 | 73.45 |
| 113 | 14 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 94 | 83.19 |
| 108 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 95 | 87.96 |
| 108 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 88 | 81.48 |
| 110 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 90 | 81.81 |
| 111 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 89 | 80.18 |
| 113 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 89 | 78.76 |
| 115 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 89 | 77.39 |
| 114 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 89 | 78.07 |
| 114 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 85 | 74.56 |
| 114 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 13 | 3 | 0 | 85 | 74.56 |
| 114 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 0 | 81 | 71.05 |
| 117 | 9 | 15 | 2 | 13 | 2 | 0 | 76 | 64.96 |
| 116 | 9 | 12 | 4 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 76 | 65.52 |
| 116 | 9 | 13 | 2 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 77 | 66.38 |
| 115 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 90 | 78.26 |
| 117 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 93 | 79.49 |
| 116 | 9 | 13 | 2 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 80 | 68.97 |
| 116 | 9 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 85 | 73.28 |
| 114 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 94 | 82.46 |
| 115 | 8 | 37 | 3 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 57 | 49.57 |
| 115 | 7 | 37 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 63 | 54.78 |
| 115 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 97 | 84.35 |
| 113 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 93 | 82.30 |
| 113 | 11 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 81.42 |
| 113 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 81.42 |
| 113 | 11 | 2 | 15 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 80 | 70.80 |
| 113 | 12 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 24 | 0 | 68 | 60.18 |
| 114 | 18 | 2 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 76 | 66.67 |

| Total assigned and attached minus detached on orders | Leave | TDY/SD or detached not on orders | Sick call, hospital, or appointment | In/Out Pro- cessing | Comp time | Ed cycle | Total for Tng | Daily % |
|---|-------|---|---|------------------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|------------|
| 113 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 84 | 74.34 |
| 113 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 89 | 78.76 |
| 113 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 90 | 79.65 |
| 113 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 97 | 85.84 |
| 113 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 96 | 84.96 |
| 112 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 100 | 89.29 |
| 112 | 7 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 92 | 82.14 |
| 112 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 87 | 77.68 |
| 112 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 89 | 79.46 |
| 112 | 10 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 91 | 81.25 |

Average Daily % = 76.46


The average daily percentage is equal to the sample mean, \bar{x} .

The sample standard deviation is calculated by subtracting the sample mean from each daily percentage, squaring this value, multiplying by the probability associated with each daily percentage, compiling the summation for all sample points, and evaluating the square root of the summation. Symbolically, where x = a daily percentage, \bar{x} = the sample mean, $P(x)$ = the probability of a daily percentage, s = the sample standard deviation:

$$s = \sqrt{\sum (x - \bar{x})^2 P(x)}$$

The sample standard deviation = $s = 10.11$

Examination of the unit Daily Status Reports from 1 APR 78 to 30 SEP 78 indicates that the daily percentage of personnel available for training is approximately normally distributed with a sample mean percentage at $\bar{x} = 76.46$ and a sample standard deviation of $s = 10.11$.



Model Solution

Examination at the critical points (i.e. $x=80\%$ and $x=90\%$), using the sample distribution will readily yield the associated probability of attaining the minimum percentages on a given training day.

$$\text{for } x=80, \text{ where } z = \frac{x - \bar{x}}{s}, z = \frac{80 - 76.46}{10.11} = .35 \quad z_{.35} = .1368$$

the probability that $x \geq 80\% = P(x \geq 80) = .5 - .1368 = .3632$

$$\text{for } x=90, \text{ where } z = \frac{x - \bar{x}}{s}, z = \frac{90 - 76.46}{10.11} = 1.34 \quad z_{1.34} = .4099$$

the probability that $x \geq 90\% = P(x \geq 90) = .5 - .4099 = .0901$

NOTE: The notations $z_{.35}$ and $z_{1.34}$ are actually, $P(0 \geq z \geq .35)$ and $P(0 \geq z \geq 1.34)$, respectively.

Since the expected percentage of unit personnel available for training (76.46) falls below the minimum required percentage for every training event, the derived equation for P, in terms of T (where T = the required percentage), is not applicable, when N_1 and C_1 are based on expected or mean sample value. Similarly, the reschedule equation will produce a negative value for T_R , which indicates to the decision-maker to reschedule all training events immediately after the initial event.

The table below shows the probabilities associated with obtaining a percentage greater than or equal to the values in the left column. Additionally, based on sample data, the reschedule time is calculated for both of the required percentage levels.

| Percentage (P) | Probability that a percentage $\geq P$ will occur | Reschedule time (Q=60) | Reschedule time (Q=90) |
|-------------------|--|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 80 | 0.3632 | 0 months | |
| 81 | 0.3264 | .25 " | |
| 82 | 0.2912 | .50 " | |
| 83 | 0.2578 | .75 " | |
| 84 | 0.2266 | .99 " | |
| 85 | 0.2005 | 1.24 " | |
| 86 | 0.1736 | 1.49 " | |
| 87 | 0.1492 | 1.74 " | |
| 88 | 0.1271 | 1.99 " | |
| 89 | 0.1075 | 2.23 " | |
| 90 | 0.0901 | 2.48 " | 0 months |
| 91 | 0.0735 | 2.73 " | .25 " |
| 92 | 0.0618 | 2.98 " | .50 " |
| 93 | 0.0505 | 3.23 " | .75 " |
| 94 | 0.0409 | 3.48 " | 1.00 " |
| 95 | 0.0336 | 3.72 " | 1.26 " |
| 96 | 0.0268 | 3.97 " | 1.51 " |
| 97 | 0.0212 | 4.22 " | 1.76 " |
| 98 | 0.0166 | 4.47 " | 2.01 " |
| 99 | 0.0129 | 4.72 " | 2.26 " |

Summary

Given the sample data in the unit under consideration, the frequency requirements for the training events are not applicable, with the following exceptions:

1. In the case of the Equal Opportunity Discussion, if a percentage of 92% can be obtained, the requirement should be satisfied for 3 months.

This corresponds to the required frequency.

2. In the case of the Human Self-Development training, having attained 84% completion, the requirement should be satisfied for 1 month. However, treating the personnel turnover values as constants may introduce inaccuracies in the short term analysis. The decision-maker must take into account the fact that the values obtained represent long term behavior of the personnel turnover.

In all the 80% requirements, excluding the Equal Opportunity Discussion and the Human Self-Development training, the events must be rescheduled in less than 5 month cycles, regardless of the percentage attained initially. In the case of the following requirements - M-16 Rifle Qualification, CBR Proficiency test, and Physical Proficiency test, the required percentage is 90%. Even if every member of the unit could be mustered and successfully complete the requirement, the training would still need to be conducted approximately 9 weeks later.

Final Comments

The implications of these conclusions are severe from the standpoint of the Training Officer's scheduling of required training, especially in those events which require a 90% training level. In these instances, the practical problems are immense. It has been mathematically shown that, having attained a 100% completion, the battery percentage for these events can be expected to be greater than 90% for approximately two months. However, actually attaining 100% for any event is improbable at best. The data for the six month sample period shows that on only three occasions did the daily percentage exceed 90%. In order to attain and maintain the required 90% level, the Training Officer can expect to conduct an M-16 Qualification once annually for the entire unit, with at least one make-up immediately and subsequent make-ups approximately every two months. The same applies to the CBR Proficiency Test and the PT Test, except these two requirements must be conducted for the entire battery semi-annually. The total number of scheduled days for these three events alone can be projected to be 23 days annually. This scheduling policy is formulated under the assumption that everyone present for training successfully completes the requirements. This is by no means the case in actual practice and even a small number of failures will increase the number of make-ups needed.

Finally, it is not the purpose of this study to provide an alibi for low percentages, but rather to bring into focus the problems associated with the required percentages. Also, the final analysis of these findings may allow examination of the relative importance of stringent enforcement of these requirements and the associated consumption of training time that might be channeled to other mission essential training.

Equipment -- Requests for improved equipment and a
photo of equipment used by an effective northern
army.



This picture is of a Finnish paratrooper using equipment recommended by field officers in the 172nd Light Infantry Brigade. The equipment is used by the Norwegians and Finnish armies and is similar to that used by the Swedes and Russians. It is the type of equipment recommended by historical studies of northern operations.

Requests and reports for improving equipment sent through channels failed with little or no response provided back to the initiating commander.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 60TH INFANTRY
172D LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505

AFZT-C-P

24 July 1979

SUBJECT: Observations and Recommendation for improving the Arctic Light Infantryman and his Equipment.

THRU: ~~Commander~~
~~Support Company, 1/60th Inf~~
~~Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505~~ *JGR*

~~Commander~~
~~1st Battalion, 60th Infantry~~
~~Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505~~ *26 Jul*

~~Commander~~
~~172d Light Infantry Brigade (SEPARATE)~~
~~Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505~~ *10 Aug 79*

TO: Commander
172d Infantry Brigade (ALASKA)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1. The following recommendations are a result of recent winter exercises and mountain/glacier training experienced by the Recon Platoon, Co E (CS), 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry. This letter is the culmination of much thought and serious discussion on the part of this platoon fostered by a genuine interest in improving the Brigades arctic/mountain capabilities and is offered not as an appeal for irrational changes, but rather to address a need for further consideration by the army of more contemporary and progressive equipment needs unique to the 172d Brigade.

MOUNTAIN BOOTS: We strongly suggest that the Chippewa Mountain Boot be eliminated from the inventory. The Chippewa is not rugged enough or stiff enough for the mountaineering requirements of the Brigade. The boot's upper is too soft, lacking the necessary support that prevents ankle injuries and tendonitis. The boot does not have the torsional stiffness necessary for vigorous mountain walking over scree and talus, and for general rock and ice climbing. In fact, the Climbers Source Book (Anchor Press) states "they (Chippewa) do not carry a line of boots suitable for any serious mountaineering".

AFZT-C-P

24 July 1979

SUBJECT: Observation and Recommendation for improving the Arctic Light Infantryman and his Equipment.

The boots that are needed should be six to eight inches high, with a lug sole of fairly hard rubber. The Vibram Company makes such a sole. The boots should have thick enough leather at the mid-sole to add torsional stiffness. A more rigid boot (1/2 to 3/4 steel or strong fiberglass shank) facilitates much more acceptable and safer conditions when front pointing on ice and balance climbing on rock. The boot should have a hard toe to keep ski bindings and crampon straps from pinching the toes and cutting off circulation. The boot to sole connection should be a Norwegian welt, which is the strongest form of construction on the market. In regard to a lacing system, the bottom of the boot should be laced through swivel "D" shaped rings and the top should be laced through hooks. As for the overall construction of the boot, the number of seams should be minimized to reduce the number of water entry points. A gusseted tongue reduces pressure points and adds more protection to the top of the foot.

GAITERS (LEGGINGS): Gaiters are usually about 18 inches high and have elastic around the bottom with a tie down that passes under the boot to keep a tight gaiter to boot seal. Towards the bottom, in the vicinity of the ankle area, the gaiters are made of a waterproof nylon or cordura. A nylon and cotton blend, which can breath to a degree and lets body heat escape, makes up the upper part of the gaiter. The gaiters keep sand, rocks, snow, and other debris from getting onto the boots. It is evident that this feature would result in less blisters and reduce halts to change wet socks. On glaciers, gaiters keep baggie field pants close to the legs, thus reducing the risk of catching a crampon point in a pant leg and chancing ripped clothes, stab wounds, and possibly, a fatal fall.

RUCKSACK FRAMES: This primarily concerns the load distribution so greatly needed for the arctic/mountain infantryman to travel long distances over snow or mountainous terrain while carrying a winter load which sometimes exceeds 60lbs., especially in the case of an RT0. We suggest the optional use of civilian type rucksack frames, which are more rectangular in shape and slightly longer in length than the frames presently utilized by the Brigade. Certain individuals have acknowledged that the Army and Combat Development are presently testing a new rucksack with a built in internal frame, a built in rappel seat, outstanding quick releases, and a sack with large side pockets that is water repellent. Such a frame and pack are sold locally by Arctic Survival Equipment, a product of Fairbanks, Alaska.

SLEEPING BAGS: We highly recommend that the present military arctic and mountain sleeping bags be replaced by a civilian type Polarguard, Hillofill, or other synthetic fiber bag. As a unit that must meet the challenge of operating under conditions that vary from very best to very worst, it is imperative that a soldier's sleeping bag remain as dry and comfortable as possible.

24 July 1979

SUBJECT: Observation and Recommendation for improving the Arctic Light Infantryman and his Equipment.

It has been experienced that certain combinations of weather and tactical environment do not allow enough time for proper drying of a wet sleeping bag. Polarguard and hollofill bags when wet have the unique qualities of maintaining a person's body heat, and remaining quite light, and easy to pack and carry.

LCE: It is a consensus in the platoon that the LCE concept should be replaced with a vest, suitably designed to carry everything essential for survival, both in a tactical and non tactical mode.

ARCTIC CANTEEN: This particular piece of equipemnt is ineffective. Water in this canteen has frozen solid while the air temperature has not been much lower than 32 degrees. Utilization of the plastic issue canteen is recommended since it is lighter than the arctic canteen, and it can be carried close to the body more comfortably in extremely cold weather to offset the effects of freezing temperatures.

CRAMPONS: The twelve point SMC crampons that are presently phasing out the old ten point crampons are functional for the needs of the Brigade. However, the nylon strap that secures the crampon to the foot wears much too easily. When the nylon gets wet, it freezes, becomes brittle, and breaks. Pertaining to the buckles on the straps, they are cheap and break easily. A two piece neoprine binding is the answer to what has become a major problem. One piece fits over the toe and front center hooks of the crampon, while the other strap runs from one back hook around the ankle, and to the other back hook of the crampon. These bindings are stronger, last longer, and facilitate speed in putting the crampon on and taking it off.

ICE PITONS: The use of tubular ice pitons is slow and necessitates using more equipment. The tubular pitons must be used in pairs at right angles to each other. They are not safe when used individually. As an alternative, the Brigade should consider using tubular ice screws. The ice screws are made of metal alloys, are much lighter than the ice pitons, can often be emplaced without a piton hammer, and can be used in an individual mode.

GLACIER GLASSES: The sunglasses issued by the army are not good for glacier work. The brigade should consider glacier glasses with polarized lenses, blinders on the sides, and fitting to the individual. The glasses presently utilized are not fit to the individual, and they become very uncomfortable when doing glacier work for extended periods of time.

AFZT-C-P

24 July 1979

SUBJECT: Observation and Recommendation for improving the Arctic Light Infantryman and his Equipment.

2. The above is offered with a sincere hope that it will be taken as a consolidation of comments and suggestions from a handful of soldiers who must work with the issued equipment in a unique and often harsh environment. If the comments and suggestions foster a developmental investigation, or at the very least a second thought by those who are in a position to make changes, we have succeeded.

Robert W. Heun

ROBERT W. HEUN

1LT, IN

Platoon Leader

Response to Lt Heun Letter -- The equipment development people responded to Lt Heun with the comment, "Just another lieutenant who thinks he's an expert after 6 months up here." Actually Lt Heun was a capable and experienced leader.

Most of Lt Heun's requests were forbidden by 172nd Light Infantry Brigade Policy Letter 10. No action was taken on the other requests.

Comparison of Skis -- The following staff study was drafted to ask the Commanding General, Alaska to buy a cross country ski. The experience of the author and the opinion of DA Historical Studies is that cross country skis are the best type for training and tactical mobility.

A staff agency, supported by the Commanding General made a procurement decision to buy down hill skis.

Due to equipment problems and lack of training know-how, the Alaskan Brigade's mobility is 25% that of Soviet units with similar missions.

COMPARISSON OF ALPINE AND NORDIC SKIIS
FOR ARCTIC TROOPS
STAFF STUDY

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this study is to determine if a Nordic Mountain Touring Ski is the best ski for the 172d Light Infantry Brigade rather than an Alpine which was selected by CDA.

2. SCOPE: The scope of this document is to provide an understanding of the basic purpose for which Nordic and Alpine skiis are designed. Then, show how this compares with the needs of the arctic soldier and the results of the tests conducted by CDA and CRTC.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. Personnel will be available to evaluate ski tests.

b. In the near future the Army will procure a three year supply of Alpine skiis which will meet the specifications of the Trucker BCP unless action is taken by the CG, 172d Inf Bde (AK) to prevent it.

4. FACTS BEARING ON THE SUBJECT:

a. Definitions: (Copied from SKI CROSS COUNTRY, Brady & Skjemstad)

(1) Alpine Skiing: Recreational downhill skiing, slalom, giant slalom, and downhill racing, originally developed in the Alps of Europe.

(2) Camber: The arching of the middle of a ski up above its tip and tail, which distributes the skier's weight evenly over the ski.

(3) Edge: In skiing, refers to the edge of the ski bottom, or the use of these edges to gain control of the skiis.

(4) Forward Spring: The characteristics of a touring ski to spring upward and forward when unweighted.

(5) Glide: The part of a skiing stride when one or both skiis are gliding partially or fully weighted.

(6) Light Touring: Ski touring equipment closely resembling cross country racing equipment, but stronger and slightly heavier.

(7) Lignostone: (From the Latin lignum, meaning wood) Beach wood compressed to half its original volume, used for ski edges.

(8) Mountain: Heaviest type of general touring skiis, intended for extensive mountain touring or polar exploration.

(9) Pulk (Ahkio): Small toboggan drawn by poles fixed to belt around waist of touring skier. Used for transporting provisions on extended tours and for small children.

(10) Side Camber: The concave curve on the side of ski which makes the middle narrower than the tip or tail. Side camber aids ski tracking and turning.

(11) Sole: Ski bottom.

(12) Tail: The back end of the ski.

b. An Alpine ski (The Trucker BCP) has been selected as a replacement for the Head Ski (also an alpine ski) which is presently being issued.

c. Nordic skis are available for testing. (TAB D)

d. Funds are available and willing to be spent for a test by Commander, 4th Battalion, 23d Infantry.

5. DISCUSSION:

a. Advantages:

(1) A unit equipped with Nordic mountain touring skis has more potential combat power. (TAB A)

(2) Training time and expense could be reduced:

(a) "Nordic skiing... is very, very easy to learn." ^{ibidem skiing} W.S., pg. 22.

(b) ... an average healthy person can become competent with Nordic cross country skis in a few days. With Alpine gear, especially in untracked snow, minimum mastery might take weeks or longer. ^{ibidem skiing} pg. 22

(c) Draft TC 90-11-1, Chapter 4, has a two week POI which does not produce a ski proficient unit. (TAB B)

(d) B Co, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, was able to conduct tactical operations with less than four days of ski training.

(3) Units equipped with Nordic mountain touring ski would have a ski specifically designed to provide mobility over all terrain with equipment. (See definition of mountain touring ski)

(4) Nordic skis are used by Allied armies and civilians who operate in a comparable environment with similar loads to the arctic soldier.

(a) The Norwegian Army ski is a Nordic ski with a width of 65mm and a length of 215 cm.

(b) The Finnish Army ski is a Nordic ski with a width of 70 mm.

(c) A recommendation found in "Wilderness Skiing" to back country skiers is "The more expensive Nordic skis (of fiberglass and compound construction) are often preferable for long tours, because of their light weight and extreme strength. (The tip is almost unbreakable)"

(5) The Alpine, including the Trucker BCP, skis are not designed as a means of all terrain skiing nor are the Trucker BCP skis recommended by those who sell the ski in the Anchorage area for use by the military. (TAB C)

(6) By equipping units with Nordic skis, cost would be reduced by approximately \$96.35 to \$35.00 per pair, resulting in a savings of between \$96,350 to \$35,000 in only the Infantry units. In the case of the Bonna 2400 the savings in equipping would be twice as great as the cost of refitting the entire Brigade. (TAB D)

b. Disadvantages:

(1) Action would be required by the Commanding General, 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska), to stop the procurement of the Trucker skis.

(2) Such action will be contrary to the recommendation of CDA. CDA selected the Trucker BCP as a result of two tests which were inconclusive. (TAB E)

6. COMPARISON OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES: Units equipped with Nordic skis have the potential of producing greater combat power in less time and at a substantial savings in funds. However, immediate action by the CG would be required and that action would not be in accordance with CDA recommendations.

7. CONCLUSIONS:

a. It is desirable to stop the procurement of the Trucker BCP skis and purchase Nordic skis.

b. It is desirable to test the combat effect that changing to a Nordic ski would have. This test could be conducted on "~~JACK-FROST~~". Skis and funds are available for such a test.
ART 10

8. ACTIONS RECOMMENDED:

a. It is recommended that the CG, 172d Inf Bde (AK), take immediate action to stop procurement of the Trucker BCP.


b. It is recommended that the Commander, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, be allowed to purchase and conduct a tactical evaluation of Nordic skis on JACK-FROST.
ART 10

TAB A

As a commander I feel these are the requirements most important to the combat power of a small unit in a deep snow, cold weather environment:

- a. The ability to supply troops.
- b. The ability to maintain combat effectiveness with limited resupply.
- c. The physical and mental endurance of the soldiers. (fighting strength)
- d. The ability to outmaneuver your enemy. (Head on assaults in deep snow are very costly, historical lesson.) (German small unit operations in Russia. VVI)
- e. The ability to keep weapons and equipment functioning in cold weather. (Historical lesson) German small unit operations in Russia. VVI

Skiis have a direct effect on two of these factors, the fighting strength of a soldier and speed of maneuver. Nordic skiis are both faster and easier on a soldier. Commanders of units which can outmaneuver the enemy and are strong enough to fight when they get to their mission sight, have an outstanding advantage. These ideas comply with history of winter warfare and the Doctrine of the Norwegian Army.


WILLIAM D. JAMES
CPT, IN
Commanding

TAB B

The Northern Warfare Training Center recently engaged in a three week course of instruction using draft TC 90-11-1 to train Ski Instructors. Although much of the draft TC is very good, the instruction is ineffective in producing ski instructors for Co B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf. The reason is that the instruction does not apply directly to Co B's requirements.

Tactical mobility connotes the need for rapid movement of units over a variety of terrain to a mission sight. This movement will normally be conducted in formations to improve control, security and speed. These key items were not adequately addressed in the training. The training centered on Alpine skiing in generally open terrain. This type of skiing is individual in nature and conducted in terrain normally avoided by units on tactical operations.

Co B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, using Nordic techniques (from FM 30-70 and SKI CROSS COUNTRY) trained a company to conduct tactical operations in less than a week. This succeeded despite the low level of ski knowledge. In the future little special outside effort will have to be expended on ski training, because junior leaders now have ski knowledge. A squad leader now checks a soldier's ski wax just like they check his weapon or TA-50. There is now a higher level of abient knowledge of skiing.

TAB C

The Trucker BCP is an alpine ski, not designed for all terrain movements. The Company 3 literature (The company which makes the Trucker BCP) states:

a. "The BCP, perhaps the best known of the Trucker Alpine Skis, is a strong favorite among professional helicopter guides, ski patrolmen and the avid powder skiers" (Powder skiing is skiing down steep mountains in deep powder snow, transportation to the mountain top is usually by helicopter, or climbing with Mohair climbers) They are not designed for all terrain skiing.

b. Trucker BCP is sold by Alaska Mountaineering and Hiking (AMH) in Anchorage. Paul E. Denkwalter of AMH believes the BCP is not appropriate for military use. He recommended the Trucker Mountain Edge (width 66/55/60 mm, length 210 cm, and weight 6 lbs 4 oz) or similar mountain touring ski.

c. Two Wheel Taxi and Ski used to sell the Trucker BCP. Rene Regna of the Two Wheel Taxi believes the BCP is not appropriate for military use. He recommended the Kazama Mountain High (width 65/54/62 mm, length 210 cm, weight approximately 6 lbs) or similar mountain touring ski.

TAB D

The chart below lists locally available skiis and the approximate cost of an order of 100 skiis. This is assuming that the store could produce the number of skiis. (Most cannot) The skiis are listed in price per ski.

| | <u>TW***</u> | <u>AMH**</u> | <u>GARY KING'S</u> | <u>MUSKEG OUTFITTER</u> | <u>EBERHART'S</u> | <u>BARNY'</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| Trucker BCP 83/63/71 8 lb 4 oz | | \$145.00 | | \$150.00 | | |
| Trucker Mt Edge 65/54/56 6 lb | | \$100.00 | | \$100.00 | \$120.00 | |
| Europe 99 65/55/60 | \$110.00 | \$95.00 | | | \$100.00 | |
| Lovett Mt Touring | \$98.00 | | | | \$100.00 | |
| Kazama Mt High 62/55/57 6 lb | \$100.00 | | | | | |
| Karhu Titan TR **** 62/55/57 4.75 lbs | | | \$110.00 | | | |
| Bonna 2400* 62/55/57 | | | | | | \$48.65 |

* Over 200 skiis available in the 210-215 cm range.

** Alaska Mountaineering and Hiking

*** Two Wheel Taxi and Ski

**** Good chance of having 100 pair by JACK FROST.

This data was derived from telephone conversations with managers or sales representatives of each of these stores on 27 Dec 78.

TAB E

There were two tests which prompted CDA to select the Trucker BCP as the replacement ski for the Army's inventory. They were TECOM Project No. 8-EI-515-000-D27 and informal user evaluation report-Ski, and Ski Binding, Winter, 1977-1978. As a review of those tests follow along with the results of an opinion poll conducted by Cdr, Co B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf.

a. TECOM Project No. 8-EI-515-000-D27

(1) PURPOSE: This test was conducted at CRTC to evaluate skis and bindings.

(2) RESULTS: Conduct further tests on the three alpine skis in the test, eliminate further testing of nordic skis.

(3) PROBLEMS WITH THE VALIDITY OF THE TEST:

(a) Test criteria did not measure major indicators of skis ability to improve mission performance; that is-speed and ease of movement were not evaluated.

(b) Test was not conducted in a mission environment.

(c) Skis were tested with bindings which have been determined to be unsatisfactory.

(d) During critical periods of time (i.e., ARTEP, Winter FTX's), Commanders do not often send their best, nor even their average soldiers to CRTC to evaluate products they may never see.

(4) DISCUSSION OF THE TEST: The bindings used in the test (RAMMER and BARFLEX) would so degrade the performance of the nordic ski that the nordic skis could have been eliminated before the test. Mountain touring skis were simply not designed to support an alpine touring binding like the RAMMER. The poor performance of the BARFLEX is well known to the Brigade. It's poor flexibility would be amplified by a narrow ski.

b. Informal User Evaluation

(1) PURPOSE: This was a joint LIB and CDA test to evaluate skis.

(2) RESULTS: The results of the test were "No one ski tested(Head Cruiser (alpine), Lovett Mountain (Nordic), and Trucker BCP (alpine)) is more suited than the others for military skiing." A statistical analysis revealed that overall the Trucker BCP was slightly favored. It was noted however, "That a well trained, experienced skier may prefer a narrow ski although fully aware of it's drawbacks in some terrain and snow conditions."

(3) PROBLEMS WITH THE VALIDITY OF THE TEST:

(a) Test criteria did not measure major indicators of a skiis performance to improve mission accomplishment; That is-speed and ease of movement were not evaluated.

(b) Many skiis were tested with the BARFLEX binding. This binding will seriously degrade a nordic skiis performance.

(c) The statistical results of the test are questionable. The statistical base was very small. In at least one instance, of 4 troops questioned 3 had different opinions. To manipulate statistics with a high probability of error tends to multiply, or confuse the error.

(4) DISCUSSION OF THE TEST: Key items in this test were that the test was conducted in a mission environment, but, mission enhancement was not rated and "That a well trained, experienced skier may prefer a narrow ski."

c. B Co, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, used some nordic skiis prior to and during WARPATH IV (a major FTX conducted by 4th Bn, 23d Inf, at Ft Greely, AK, 27 Nov 78 thru 6 Dec 78)

(1) PURPOSE: The FTX was conducted to improve the tactical expertise of the unit. There was originally no attempt to evaluate skiis. Because of a "gut feel" of the Cdr, B Co, some leaders and troops were equiped with nordic skiis in an effort to increase combat power. The skiis were traded around during the FTX. The results were impressive enough to the company commander that he surveyed the users of the skiis to check if his impressions were valid. Key points and the results of the survey follow.

(a) Training conducted in how to properly wax was drilled and the proper equipment was used.

(b) Ski training was limited to a relative short (1 hour) training period each day and was taught according to the nordic teaching methods (FM 31-70 and Ski Cross Country). However, troops spent extended periods on skiis conducting patrols, moving to and from chow, moving supplies, etc.

(c) The bulk of the ski training was spent on mounted drill. Parade field type drill conducted to condition troops to the added length and weight on their feet.

(d) All normal snow conditions and terrains in which military units might operate were encountered.

(e) Tactical operations executed on skiis were: Recon patrols, movement to contact, night attack, platoon live fire assault, laying commo wire and resupply.

(f) The longest single movement was 20 km which was completed in 4 1/2 hours. The unit packed its own trail approximately 60% of the way.

(g) There were only two variables in the survey, one was that the mountain boot and the vapor barrier boot were used interchangeably. The second variable was which type ski was better, a nordic mountain touring or an alpine. (The binding used throughout were the Silvretta)

(h) The survey was broken down into 3 parts- (1) Handling characteristics (Those items evaluated by CRTC and CDA in their tests); (2) Speed, and (3) Ease of movement. The reason for three parts is that the commander felt a need to evaluate the same things as the two CDA tests, yet that handling qualities were only an indicator of a ski's military performance. One third was given to speed and one third to ease of movement. (A soldier could fall 50 times on the way to an objective, but if arrived there quicker, and with more fighting strength, then that becomes insignificant.)

(i) The results of the survey in number of rating received/% of possible are:

| CRITERIA | EXCEL | GOOD | ADEQ | POOR | US | UNK |
|--|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|---------|
| Handling characteristics, (These were evaluated by CRTC and CDA) | | | | | | |
| NORDIC | 90/40% | 85/37% | 34/15% | 8/3.6% | 0/0 | 10/4.4% |
| ALPINE | 6/2.6% | 66/29.3% | 101/44.9% | 39/17.3% | 13/5.8% | 3/1.3% |
| SPEED of MOVEMENT | | | | | | |
| NORDIC | 10/66.7% | 5/33.3% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ALPINE | 1/6.7% | 3/20% | 8/53.3% | 2/13.3% | 1/6.7% | 0 |
| EASE of MOVEMENT | | | | | | |
| NORDIC | 10/66.7% | 3/20% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2/13.3% |
| ALPINE | 0 | 1/6.7% | 6/40% | 6/40% | 0 | 2/13.3% |

Commander of Company B believes these figures show that the "well trained, and experienced" skier spoken of in the Informal User Evaluation can be had with very little training. The nordic mountain touring ski is not only highly rated by the troops, but more importantly, the commander feels it has improved his units combat effectiveness, and reduced the training time required to become ski proficient for tactical operations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BRADY, Michael M., and SKJEMSTAD, Lorns O. SKI CROSS COUNTRY. New York: The Dial Press, 1974.

Conversation with Mr. Paul E. Denkwalter, Alaska Mountaineering & Hiking, Anchorage, Alaska 16 December 1978.

Conversation with Renny Regua, Two-wheel Taxi & Ski, Anchorage, Alaska, 16 December 1978.

DA PAM 20-269, "Small Unit Operations During the German Campaign in Russia". Washington: Department of the Army, 1953.

FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual, Washington: Department of the Army, 1968.

FM 31-71, Northern Operations. Washington: Department of the Army, 1971.

"Informal User Evaluation Report, Skis and Ski Bindings, Winter, 1977 - 1978." Fort Richardson: U. S. Army Combat Development's Activity (Alaska), 1978.

Letter "Final Letter Report, Phase II, Feasibility Test of Skis and Bindings, 28 April 1978. Fort Greely: U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, 1978.

Pamphlet "Early Winter - Winter, 1978" Early Winters, Inc, Seattle, WA, 1978.

Pamphlet "From Norway, where Cross Country is a Way of Life." Norwegian Ski Council, Oslo, Norway, 1978.

Pamphlet "Our Products." Company 3, Aspen, CO, 1978.

Steck, Allen, and Tejada-Flores, Lito. Wilderness Skiing. San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1977

Telephonic conversation with Mr. Mike King of Gary King Sporting Goods, Anchorage, AK, 24 December 1978.

VVI UD 6-120, Vegledning; Vintertjenestevet Infanteriet (Guide to Winter Service for Infantry). Oslo: Grøndahl & Søn Boktrykkeri, 1956.

UD 17-1, Handbok for Soldaten (Soldier's Handbook). Oslo: Harens Stab, 1969, with Change 1, dtd 20 April 1970.

Unlimited Liability -- A letter from Gen Meyer on the
ethics of Command.

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

North
Dakota
Army


In speaking to our future battalion and brigade commanders at the pre-command orientation, I make it a point to emphasize that their job is to be the teacher of their officers. The details of leading and administering our Army occasionally cloud the issue for those soon to accept command responsibility and, consequently, emphasis on the essence of command responsibility is needed. If each of us successfully teaches our officers, we shall have fulfilled our responsibilities.

Three words sum up our role as leaders: teacher, trust, and self-sacrifice. As teachers, our mature leaders pass on their skill and experience to the new generation of officers under their command. Their concern and guidance build confidence and eventually develop trust that cements our units. Self-sacrifice is the epitome of leadership, and through personal acceptance of hardship and danger the leader provides the example that allows the unit to endure stress and rise to the challenge of demanding missions.

The profession of arms is a noble profession. The great task of each professional officer is to preserve our institutions through his teaching and example, and to pass on to those who follow his dedication to the profession of arms. The soldiers' duties and the scope of our responsibilities set us apart from all other walks of life. In the words of General John Winthrop Hackett, the soldiers' contract is an "unlimited liability contract." Our duty continues until the fight is over. Leadership, trust, self-sacrifice, and professional example draw our units together and allow soldiers to accept the duties of their profession. They make ours a noble profession and enable men to accept the "unlimited liability contract."

My concern is that our preoccupation with administrative detail may mask these fundamentals. We have engineered a useful system of personnel management; however, when allowed to function simply as a management system fueled by personal ambition our endeavors become self-serving and our profession appears less than noble. When we recognize the need to ensure that ours remains a truly noble profession and we set our personal priorities in their proper order, all else falls into place. Our administrative tools must serve the purpose they were intended to serve -- they don't drive the train. Commanders achieve low AWOL rates because they train their units well and lead units with esprit they help engender, not because they pound the desk and demand their subordinates meet statistical criteria.

I bring these thoughts to your attention because it appears that at times our officers lose sight of these fundamental truths. The attached letter, provided to me by Bob Shoemaker, provides mute testimony to the results of failure to communicate with junior officers. It demonstrates the appalling costs of failure to cultivate the character of our profession. Manning the force is our most pressing problem in the Army today. It will not be solved simply by increased emphasis upon statistical track records. It can be substantially corrected by communicating and ensuring we teach our subordinates the meaning of our profession. Good management provides a foundation upon which to build the profession. The spirit of our noble profession demands more -- it demands leadership.


E. C. MEYER
General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

Gen Meyer sent this out to the field a couple of months before my Oct 29 letter.

Dear

to
my

off
bas
sess
much

caus
I ma
beca
less
on t
and
your
I ma
did

an is
exper
cally
probl
peopl

mind
as in
doubt
with
the c

doesn
need
be a
in li
speci
suppo
carin
mistal
we hu

An Appeal for Help -- After working problems at every lower level of command without success, a letter was written to the Army Chief-of-Staff, Gen Meyer. The intention of this letter was to report deficiencies in a specific company command. It was hoped that it would generate enough command interest to reevaluate priorities for the defense of Alaska.

The response from the Army and notes on that response are enclosed.

Commander
B Co., 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

3 October, 1979

General Edward C. Meyer
Chief of Staff, Army
Department of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3-E-668
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Sir:

I am writing this letter because I believe that present Army policies and/or trends have resulted in a degradation of combat effectiveness to the extent that my soldiers would wastefully lose their lives trying to improvise solutions if we were to go to war. The major problem areas are: Intelligence, Leadership, Equipment, and Personnel. I will give you some personal background, after which I will state examples in each of the problem areas. Please understand that I do not write this letter because of any one example, but because the system which is supposed to solve problems is off-balance.

My personal background is as follows:

1. I have been an Infantry Company Commander for almost 19 months, during which time I have learned a lot about my job. My Company is good, with the men being good soldiers for the most part. We have become adapted to our environment. Last winter our tactical mobility was 400% better than that of any other company in Alaska.
2. I have studied winter warfare and equipment. My books are DA Historical Studies, and civilian. My unit uses Norwegian Army Doctrine, and the "School of Hard Knocks" to solve our operational problems. (Our doctrine is very poor -- try looking up hypothermia in an Infantry Soldier's Manual.)
3. My command philosophy is based on my "Soldier's Bill of Rights":
 - a. The Right to be well trained.
 - b. The Right to competent leadership.
 - c. The Right to be well equipped.
 - d. The Right to feel honorable for doing their duty for their country.
 - e. The Right to be honorably remembered for their sacrifices.

3 October, 1979

- f. The Right to know why they must fight and die, if they are called to war.
- g. The Right not to worry about the care their families would receive if they are called to war.
- h. Lastly, when their duty is done, the Right to be full and free citizens of the United States.

These rights are based on my appraisal of what is required for units to accomplish their missions, and to give their soldiers a reasonable shot at survival.

- 4. I understand that my mission is to defend Alaska in a "come as we are war." I take this mission seriously, for the following reasons:

- a. Geography:

- (1) General "Billy" Mitchell stated that Alaska is "the key of the whole Pacific."
- (2) Alaska was accessible and significant enough in World War II to pull over 250,000 troops to its defense.
- (3) During Lend-Lease the United States sent 6,430 airplanes through Alaska into the Soviet Union, I doubt that the Soviets have forgotten this avenue.
- (4) An invasion force, staging out of the Moscow area, would have a 10-hour flight into Anchorage. A Western Airlines employee gave me a 4-hour figure. She told me, also, that the Russians have closed the polar route to Moscow.

- b. What would the Russians gain?

- (1) Attacking Alaska would give the United States a second front -- a front which we would have to react to, which would be as difficult for us to support as the Russians, and which we are ill-prepared to fight in. (Look at the southern orientation of our Army. Our units are stationed in mild-weather states. We have poor winter experience, equipment, and doctrine.)
- (2) If the Russians were to keep their objectives in the populated areas, we would be unable to eliminate the threat with nuclear weapons.
- (3) The loss of Alaska's natural resources to the Russians would be bad for a war effort. It would also damage our mobilization.

3 October, 1979

- (4) Without complete U.S. control of Alaska, the independence of Japan would be questionable.
 - (5) Russian fighter/bombers based in Alaska would be within striking distance of many critical industrial and agricultural facilities.
 - (6) The loss of Eilson AFB as a base for our refuel aircraft would probably damage our strategic bombing capability.
- c. An invasion could be amazingly successful. At the present, Alaska is wide open for intelligence operations. An invasion using a combination of air strikes, unconventional and conventional forces, could take Alaska almost unopposed. Air strikes and unconventional forces could:
- (1) Take out ALASCOM's 34 major Earth Stations, damaging communications.
 - (2) Destroy the unrevetted military aircraft which are parked in neat little rows around Alaska.
 - (3) The 172nd Infantry Brigade could be rendered ineffective by seizing the centralized ammunition storage areas, and/or by air strikes on the compact quarters and barracks areas.
- Conventional forces could then occupy. Population control problems would be minimized as Alaskans realized they could not feed themselves. Support of an invasion would be difficult, but if an invasion were successful, it would be critical for the United States and our Pacific Allies.

Well, Sir, that is some background on myself, and a quick explanation of why I care. Here is a brief explanation of the problems:

INTELLIGENCE: We do not know ourselves, and we base our plans on this lack of knowledge. For example, the centralized nature of the Readiness Reporting System is inadequate. It asks questions which are answered honestly, despite the fact that the questions make no sense. The 172nd reports the status of its field ambulances and helicopters, which should indicate our ability to evacuate our wounded. The system assumes that there are usable roads, a bad assumption in Alaska. The roads can be quickly closed by blowing snow. Weather causes helicopter reliability problems, which would be compounded by an enemy situation. The Reporting System does not consider that different units have differences in their Mission, Enemy, Troops, and Terrain. Commanders can subjectively lower their ratings, but if there is no frame-of-reference to understand why, it would not be in the best interest of their careers to do so.

Ask experts, ask equal ldr's about squads, etc... I know some techniques but overall appropriate. ldr's know for more.

3 October, 1979

LEADERSHIP: Freedom has inherent responsibilities. Providing for the "common defense" is one of those. Americans must face their responsibilities, and the military must provide that defense. If we are going to have effective infantry companies, the Army needs to face some hard realities:

The individual soldier is not nearly as important as the Unit;
What is legal is not nearly as important as what is just;
Management is not nearly as important as leadership;
Bureaucracy has little place in command;
Etc.....

"well regulated"
militia "requires
priorities to be
realistically established"

16.
CDA

An Army must command a constantly changing situation. Its channels of communication must react to information based on content, not on form. Staffs must actively seek information -- not wait around like Bureaucrats, to be fed it on the proper form. We manage soldiers, instead of leading them. Look at our tool for motivation: money. It is a shallow motivator. It does not inspire soldiers to do more than the minimum standard. Look at the Soldier's Manuals. You will not find anything about the Constitution, which soldiers are sworn to defend; you will not find a message from the President, whom they are sworn to obey. In fact, you will not find any of the powerful motivators of: Duty, Honor, Country. Leadership is a moral function, yet we are legalist. I know who the drug dealers in my Unit are, and I know how to make drug abuse more difficult. Should I do what is illegal in the interest of justice? Should I violate the personal liberties of a pusher to insure the health and welfare of my Unit? The last pusher we caught, Pfc Sharp, went AWOL before his court date came around. The legal system is so cloudy that neither troops nor leaders know where they stand. My soldiers are American citizens who are sacrificing their rights to defend the Nation. They deserve better than we give them. The "common defense" is more important than the individual liberties of any soldier.

EQUIPMENT: In Alaska our TO&E and our equipment are non-supportive of our mission. Mobility has been a major ingredient for success in winter warfare, yet we have very little mobility relative to the Russians. As an S-4 and a company commander, my Units have undergone extended hardship because of our lack of proper transportation. These problems were encountered when helicopter assets were unrestricted by an enemy situation. We also had the benefit of roads plowed, and ice bridges made prior to the field operations. It is my opinion that we just get by on field exercises. The situation would be critical if we had enemy-caused casualties, and requirements for ammunition and barrier material. Our tactical mobility is as bad as our logistical. In winter, infantry units typically move at one kilometer per hour, a rate 1/4th to 1/10th

3 October, 1979

much.
of what we can expect of the Russians. Our individual equipment is as poor as our mobility, and is a significant factor in our poor mobility. I believe the problem is centered around the fact that developers do not know the requirements of the troop units. The perspective of those sitting in offices watching troops freeze is considerably different than the perspective of those freezing troops. Troops also have a statistical and motivational advantage. If 100 troops have a good idea once a week, and a special staff officer has a good idea once a day, the troops have it 14 to 1. The motivational advantage of troops is that winter is tough. We know its misery, and can instantly identify a technique or piece of equipment which reduces the misery. All this recently came to a critical point. Some of your Generals from DARCOM were here. One of my NCO's brought up a problem, to which the General gave a stupid answer. Sir, my troops are not stupid. Please do not let your Generals give them stupid answers. It gives them a feeling of hopelessness -- that their problems will never be solved. A couple of examples of our poor equipment are:

- a. CANTEEN: The Army pays about \$45 for our "Arctic" canteen. The problems with it are:

- (1) It freezes, and then is very difficult to thaw;
- (2) It easily falls out of its carrier, and
- (3) It is excessively heavy.

The solution to this problem is an 80¢ wide-mouth plastic water bottle. If the bottle is carried in the cargo pocket, the water will not freeze; in fact, you can put snow into the water bottle and the snow will melt. Dehydration and the hypothermia which often accompanies it are real and major problems.

- b. SKIS: Contract Number DLA 100-79-R-0681 is a three-year, \$1,000,000 mistake. It is a contract which is ordering skis which are too short, and have the wrong design. You should audit the studies which were used as a basis for selection of the ski. You would then understand why we have poor equipment. The test criteria are not based on mission requirements. The skis we do need are available, in appropriate quantities (8,000 pairs), and at about half the cost. The ski I want for my troops is purchased by 5 other Armies, and its commercial sister is the highest rated mountain touring ski in the Nation.

Sir, my Company is probably the best winter Company in your Army, but I know it could be cut to pieces by a properly organized and equipped unit. I have also been told that if we were to go to war tremendous effort would go into solving these problems. Well, Sir, I would like to save superhuman effort for superhuman needs, and let good planning and preparations take care of these known

3 October, 1979

problems. I do not think we should identify failures of the development system by watching American soldiers die on some winter battlefield.

*ice color
90%
WAX
Dye - snow*

PERSONNEL: Sir, you send Alaska leaders who are untrained. I believe I had a two-hour class on winter warfare in IOAC. You send a lot of troops who have never seen snow before. But the critical problem is that we are piecemeal rotated, just as we begin to learn our jobs. It has taken me 19 months to get a pretty clear picture of the problems, and I am up here in the middle of them. By the time senior officers learn the seriousness of the problems, they are gone. I have a great deal of respect for Major General Jenes, Colonel Waldeck, and Lieutenant Colonel Courson, but they, also, are not properly trained in winter warfare. I believe we need a better personnel system -- one which adequately prepares leaders, one which gives troops a sense of belonging, and one which allows us to become experts. As it stands now, we know a little about a lot of things, but are not excellent at anything.

If there were not solutions to these problems, I would not have written this letter. Some of the solutions are expensive, while others are not. All require effort. Regardless of the expense and the effort, to not take any action is to lose any capability to successfully fight a winter war, and leaves the defense of Alaska in question. Following is a quotation from DA Pam 20-201, an Historical Study:

'In view of the foregoing, the Germans were in a good position to learn the general as well as the climatic conditions of European Russia and the far north. If they actually acquired this knowledge, the Germans certainly failed to draw the proper conclusions for their military policy. Instead, they were forced to use improvisations because of a lack of advance planning and preparations. If they did not get that information in the first place, they were obviously guilty of neglect. For instance, the Finns might have told them that ordinary flat-country divisions (our TO&E) are not suitable for fighting in the impenetrable forests, the rocky labyrinths, and the swamps and marshes of the Arctic. Perhaps German planners were still too deeply entrenched in Central European military traditions.'

Perhaps we, also, have a single-minded orientation on Central Europe. I know that my company would do poorly in a northern war. The improvised solutions would be too late, with too

3 October, 1979

little. I have been unable to impress the importance of this on others. Perhaps you can solve my problems and improve my Company. If you cannot, I believe that it will require American soldiers needlessly dying on some winter battlefield to start the system correcting the problems.

Sincerely yours,



William D. James

398-54-5921

Cpt., In

B Co., 4th Bn 23rd Inf

Fort Richardson, AK 99505

WDJ;esg

xc The Honorable Mike Gravel
United States Senate
3121 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
260 Russell Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Don Young
The House of Representatives
1210 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Jay S. Hammond
Governor, State of Alaska
State Capitol Building
Juneau, Alaska 99811

General R. M. Shoemaker
FORSCOM Commander
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330

Major General Theodore G. Jenes, Jr.
Commanding General
172nd Infantry Brigade (Alaska)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

Colonel James J. Waldeck, Jr.
Commander
172nd Infantry (LIB)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

Lieutenant Colonel Donnie C. Coursor
Commander
4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

This letter was sent to those listed at the same time rather than through the chain-of-command for two reasons:

1. A letter on a similar topic by another officer sent through channels was ordered returned with instructions it was not to be sent again.
2. When another officer who was concerned about the mission capability submitted his resignation, he was ordered to Ft Wainwright for his last 6 months in Alaska. My wife was pregnant and I hoped to protect her from similar hardships.

When this letter was mailed, I almost added a note that sending this letter was the saddest activity of my life, for it would end my military career with little chance of success. The note was not added, it made no sense to add regret to the hardships about to be faced.

The Letter from General Vaught, 30 Oct 1979, is poorly researched and reflects the inability of small unit leaders to communicate up the chain-of-command.

Below are footnotes I have made on the attach copy of that letter.

1. The United States Army knew more about fighting a winter war, had better Doctrine, training and equipment in 1953 than it does today. REF: DA Pam 20-201 and other Historical Studies; Military Ski Manual, A Handbook for Ski and Mountain Troops, by Frank Harper, The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pa. 1943. Statement made by Col Egbert, 172nd Inf Bde (Alaska) Chief-of-Staff.
2. The 10th Mountain Division, in World War II, was better equipped to fight a winter or mountain war than the 172nd Inf Bde is today. REF: Military Ski Manual, Harper.
3. It is poor command procedure. to blame ones superiors for a situation. Department of the Army is part of the decision making apparatus which set the present manning and budget guidelines.
4. The Army needs to consider its Constitutional Obligations when it establishes priorities. The Constitution guarentees each State that it will be protected against invasion. To do that the Army must present an image that it is capable of conducting military operations against an invading force; the 172nd Inf Bde is not capable of this. Alaska is not protected. REF: Comments of Field Commanders (Ltc Herrick, Major Kreger, Cap James, etc...). The Constitution, Article IV, Section 4.
5. The United States Military is not prepared to fight a winter war. REF: New York Times, Mar 26, 79, "US Marines Struggle to Cope with Norway's Arctic." DA Historical Studies. Military Ski Manual. (BCT and NWTC are not effective)
6. When unit commanders can not adequately feed or medically care for their men they have logistical and personnel problem which should be reflected in a "Readiness Reporting System." REF: Experience on many Field Training Exercises.
7. The Army does not address the psychological parameters required to build units from individuals. It does not provide the tools of inspired leadership to its Officer Corps. REF: The lack of references- the absence of inspiration in the Soldiers Manuals, the lack of training Officers receive on their Duty as apposed to that on how to enhance their careers.
8. The Army's responsibility is to be "well regulated" not just concerned. If a management practice reduces the security of the Nation it is unConstitutional and should be discontinued. REF: Article II, The Bill of Rights.
9. The "Law" is the servant of "justice", not the other way around. Men have appealed to the moral law when they could not receive justice under the legal law. REF: Declaration of Independence.

10. The Constitution clearly recognizes that a "well regulated Militia" is "necessary for the security of a free State;..." The military must be regulated in such a manor that it can respond efficiently to deter a threat to the Nation or its Welfare, within the parameters set by the physics and psychology of war. Further, the Judge Advocate General of the Army stated that soldier's individual freedoms are limited by necessity. The inefficiency of present Regulations will result in the excessive loss of lives in war. Also, it is a very dangerous policy to teach Officers that discipline problems are caused by democracy. REF: Article II, The Bill of Rights.

11. The laws of thermodynamics have been around a long time; the human body has not evolved noticably; the civilian market has excellent equipment at competative prices; other armies are very well equipped; yet, the United States Army is still researching the problem and fielding inadequate equipment for winter operations. REF: Most any infantry soldier in the 172nd LIB.

12. The decision that the Trucker Ski (BCP) is the best military ski resulted from a meeting at NARADCOM, 15 June 1978. The conclusions of the "extensive evaluations" drew no such conclusion. REF: Minutes of Meeting, 15 June 1978, SUBJECT: Skis and Ski Bindings; Final Letter Report, Phase II, Feasibility Test of Skis and Bindings, 28 April 1978; Informal User Evaluation Report, Skis and Ski Bindings, Winter, 1977-1978.

13. The Army's track record for introducing American fighting men into winter warfare is terrible, from Valley Forge to Jack Frost, 79. At the Battle of Attu (Alaska, World War II), 10% of the landing force suffered severe cold weather injuries. 1200 Americans became casualties, resulting in hundreds of amputations. The Army is practicing the same situation again. REF: The Thousand-Mile War, World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians; Brian Garfield, Ballantine Books, New York, 1969. And nearly two years of experience as a company commander in Alaska, the author of these footnotes.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF: DAMO-ODO

30 OCT 1979

Captain William D. James
398-54-5921
Company B 4th Battalion 23rd Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

Dear Captain James:

On behalf of General Meyer, I am replying to your letter of 3 October 1979, regarding the degradation of combat effectiveness in Alaska.

As alluded to in your letter, Alaska is of strategic importance and vital to our national interest. The Army recognizes this strategic importance and I can assure you that we want our forces to achieve and maintain a high state of readiness. Although we have not yet reached our readiness goals, major improvements in our capabilities are on-going. Maintenance, training, fielding of new equipment, and taking care of our soldiers require constant attention at all levels to ensure our combat effectiveness in spite of limited resourcing and other constraints.

Today's Army must operate within the current Department of Defense funding and manning guidelines. To accomplish our mission, priorities must be established to get the most out of what we have. The current Army priority is to Europe and our NATO Commitment. Additionally, we are improving, also with a high priority, our capability to deploy tailored forces rapidly anywhere in the world.

The Readiness Reporting System, specifically unit status reports, is designed to measure only a unit's personnel, logistic and training status, not the force effectiveness. Force effectiveness is determined through on-going exercises, tests, studies and reports under specific scenarios.

Your concerns about Army leadership are not new. Our challenge has always been one of gaining credibility in the eyes of the soldiers we lead - credibility which creates confidence and confidence which produces commitment and the quiet courage to close with the enemy in combat and defeat him.

Captain William D. James

In our never-ending pursuit to achieve unit readiness however, we must be mindful of the fact that the American soldier has individual liberties. These liberties are guaranteed by the same Constitution which you and I are sworn to uphold and protect. Your frustrations serve to highlight a fundamental difference between leadership and management. For it is only in the Profession of Arms that we are called on to make decisions which must balance considerations of the prized values such as freedom, individuality, and skepticism with rigid standards for professional excellence to use wisely the resources which our country has provided to win in battle. In the Army of a democracy, good leadership must be able to recognize, through insight, proper training, and good judgment, which requirement should prevail when contradiction demands resolution. I believe that you understand this and that, as a commander, you cannot compromise the special trust and confidence which has been reposed in all officers.

It is inspired leadership which stirs the ambition of each soldier and sustains personal dignity. At the same time it creates and shapes a command climate which attracts and binds soldiers together to produce commitment to unit members and the unit as a group to accomplish the mission. Individual soldiers are important because it is the combined effect of their motivations, abilities, skills, and discipline which yields unit performance far beyond the sum that each soldier singularly contributes. ⑦

The Army shares your concern for management practices which contribute to personnel turbulence. Because of this concern, the CSA instructed the Army Staff and major commanders to identify and discuss all actions and policies which can be taken to strengthen cohesion in Army units at this year's Army Commanders' Conference. In this regard, both command tour lengths and personnel turbulence have been included as major discussion items. ⑧

Your "Soldier's Bill of Rights" omitted an essential element of command philosophy that led you to question the proper balance between legality and justice. The soldier also has "The Right to a fairly and properly disciplined environment." A major lesson of recent history made it abundantly clear that illegality is not condoned in the pursuit of justice. Leadership is a moral function as is justice. Neither can exist without the other, and both must be based upon respect for the Law. That which is illegal is never moral nor is it justice. A leader who relies on illegal acts to provide a disciplined environment forfeits his claim to morality and can hardly expect adherence to the Law by his subordinates. ⑨

Captain William D. James

A commander's authority under the Uniform Code of Military Justice is more than adequate to insure the health, safety and welfare of his command if properly utilized. To be sure, the Law is complex and its understanding must be pursued with the same ardor as is devoted to studies of strategy and tactics. When this understanding has been achieved we must ensure that our men are equally informed of their duties and responsibilities as free men engaged in the "common defense." (10) The American soldier can not be driven but by example he can be led. Your concern for the Law and the willingness to use your ample authority in a lawful manner will breed respect for and adherence to the Law. That is the essence of true leadership and I commend it to you. It is not an easy task but the rewards are well worth the effort.

The Army is aware of the cold weather problems that your letter described. In conjunction with civilian industry the Army is working to overcome these problems and shortfalls. During Mid-October, the US Army Natick R & D Command hosted a worldwide, all service conference on cold weather clothing and individual equipment. The unsatisfactory nature of the Arctic canteen was one of the subjects addressed. It has been recognized as being a marginally acceptable item. A new R & D requirement for an Arctic canteen has been initiated and is currently pending approval at TRADOC. (11)

It is only after extensive evaluations conducted by the Cold Regions Test Center (Alaska), utilizing typical user troop units (including troops from the 172d Brigade), that skis are identified, selected, and procured. Continuing evaluations of new commercial skis have resulted in the selection of a new Army standard ski (i.e. the Trucker Ski). This new ski is currently being procured. (12)

Soldiering is still a tough job, filled with many difficult challenges and frustrations, compounded in your case by adverse weather conditions. Our Army has never been without problems, but we do have a good track record in facing up to and solving these problems. (13) With young aggressive leaders like yourself, who care, work hard and keep the faith, we expect this trend to continue. As leaders, we must ensure that the welfare and needs of our soldiers are met and that they understand their mission and the important role they play as team members in our overall defense posture.

The Army is moving as a team toward increased capabilities. The continued work of concerned soldiers is fundamental to this process.

Sincerely,

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, GS
Director of Operations
and Readiness

3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, MN 55110

January 16, 1981

General Edward C. Meyer
Chief of Staff, Army
Department of Defense
The Pentagon, Room 3-E-668
Washington, D.C. 20310

Sir:

The Army is at a critical point on retention of capable Officers and NCO's. Recently, two career oriented officers contacted me for advice on leaving the Army, advice I prefer not to give without reviewing the possibilities for resolving the problem which is at the heart of their disaffection. That problem is, the Command Structure's failure to provide mission oriented leadership. Mission critical deficiencies which cannot be corrected with unit assets go unresolved. Appeals to the Chain-of-Command produce no significant results, and too often end in hardships for those making these appeals.

This problem is illustrated by the enclosed documents. These papers are set in two categories: The Symptom, which indicates our lack of readiness for winter warfare; and The Problem, a collection of communications on this lack of readiness and the Chain-of-Command's response to them. (The Army owes a debt to the men who wrote these papers, men who held their Duty above their sense of career preservation. I owe a special debt to Ltc Herrick and Ltc Courson, who paid a high price for adhering to a command ethic of Service to Country.)

Three mechanisms are recommended to resolve this problem. First, give leadership a legal basis and teeth for operating in our system. MG Wilton G. Persons, Jr., at the 1978 Texas State Bar Convention, noted "Unquestionably, certain freedoms are limited when a person enters the armed forces. These are not arbitrary restrictions, but result from years of experience in fighting, and more importantly, winning wars." Unfortunately, MG Persons identified no recognized legal basis for this opinion. Without such a basis, field commanders cannot balance mission requirements and individual liberties. Give commanders this capability by legally illustrating that the Constitution recognizes the military's requirement to balance these factors in accordance with the Situation (a dynamic state, subject to command not legal review). Article I, Section 8 assigns Congress the responsibility for making a separate set of laws for regulating the military and governing the people in it. Article II of the Bill of Rights requires that the quality of these regulations be such that the military secures our Nation as a "free state". Leadership and, Customs and Traditions (the historic/common law for military leadership practices) were once accepted and should be legally recognized as necessary and Constitutional tools for maintaining a "well regulated" military capable of defending against threats to the security of our Nation.

January 16, 1981

Second, hold commanders liable for the mission effectiveness of the units they command and/or support. Since tactical capability and many other factors which produce mission effective units are too subtle to be statistically quantified, commanders must command, not simply manage. Your subordinates will set priorities on areas you place emphasis by personal presence. As you well know, they do not have the assets to accomplish everything. Assets which are being expended adjusting statistics or perpetually developing non-fieldable or non-manufacturable items must be diverted to and focused on preparing units for the physics and psychology of war. It is my belief that if you shake the Army's structure and it is off balance, it will adjust itself. If it has the balance and agility war requires, it will roll smoothly with the changing situation.


Third, establish a positive feedback system by reinforcing our professional ethic. Remind soldiers they are honor bound to be:

- First a patriot, defending our Concept of freedom, justice and government, "The Constitution...."
- Second, a citizen, defending our Government, "The President...."
- Third, a soldier, responding to the needs of the Service, "The Officers appointed...."

Put the Constitution on the first page of The Soldier's Manual, and a message from the President on the second page.

Although I believe that leaders must perceive what ought to be, then plan, organize, and execute its implementation, I am not an idealist. I operate from well developed understanding that the "will to win" is central to survival, and that dedicated leaders are required to develop the "will to win" and focus it into the tools of National survival. I am aware of the political difficulties in opening channels of communication and prioritizing the expenditure of assets. So I ask you sincerely, is it possible for you to do this? Is there an effective place in the Army for these officers and other dedicated soldiers - who cannot align their personal futures with the future of the Army as it is presently regulated?

Sincerely,



William D. James

WDJ/paw

enclosures

THE SYMPTOM

The United States is obligated to defend Alaska and assist NATO Allies.

The enclosed reports indicate our inability to meet these obligations.

Additional Indicators:

"Army Injuries Raise Concern," Anchorage Times, page 4-5, January 23, 1980.

"U.S. Marine Unit Struggle to Cope With Norway's Arctic," New York Times,
March 26, 1979.

The Problem -- documents an Army failure to provide mission oriented leadership. This exposes the Nation to dangers far exceeding those of its Western defense. Military historians have developed "Principles of War" which describe how militaries must be operated to prevent war or minimize its cost. This section documents the violation of the critical Principles of Morale, Unity of Command and Simplicity.

These violations are illustrated in the inability to communicate thru command channels, the lack of focus in meeting mission requirements and the personal costs of reporting problems up the chain-of-command.

Many of the documents enclosed are rough and unsophisticated, they were written to work mission problems in an environment with few administrative assets. They indicate the step-by-step working of problems up the Army's Chain of Command; and the repeated failure of those efforts.

Response -- This is the response from the Office of the Chief-of-Staff on the Jan 16, 1981 letter. Though sincere, it excuses rather than makes a commitment to correct problems. The letter accepts the inadequacies with America's western defense as necessary.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

27 FEB 1981

DAPE-HRL-L

Mr. William D. James
3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, Minnesota 55110

Dear Mr. James:

This is in response to your letter of 16 January 1981 and your follow-on note dated 16 February 1981 to the Chief of Staff regarding the command climate of the Army and issues regarding the training and equipment of the Army's arctic brigade.

Your letter was most thought provoking and surfaced a number of concerns, some of which we are making progress upon, and others which require further work. As you correctly point out, leadership is the key component of the Army. You may be interested to know that major new initiatives have been and are being taken to improve the potential for success of Army units. Very recent initiatives to promote cohesion in Army units and to improve the stability of brigade, battalion, and company commanders are designed to promote continuity of those in leadership positions and enhance the commitment and cohesion of soldiers towards each other. This is not a short term solution. It requires a high degree of perseverance and support from within the Army, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and from the American people--who must ultimately supply the Army's most important component--its people.

I would like to address some of the other major areas you are concerned with.

Readiness of the arctic brigade. The readiness posture of the 172d Infantry Brigade is less than optimum because of equipment and personnel shortages. This is an outgrowth of budgetary constraints and Army-wide manpower deficits. Winter warfare capability continues to receive as much emphasis as is practical after consideration is given to threat assessments and global defense requirements.

Training in cold climates. In addition to scheduled field training exercises, the 172d Infantry Brigade recently participated in Joint Exercise "Brim Frost" during February 1981. The brigade participation included testing of new equipment such as cross country skis and newly designed winter boots.

2 FEB 1980

Cold weather clothing and equipment. There is a tremendous effort underway to improve cold weather gear. Researchers are directing their work toward reducing the weight and bulk of cold weather clothing. Various materials are under investigation, such as a new lightweight synthetic fiber which not only reduces weight, but also improves insulation. Ventilation capability of clothing items is being investigated. Trousers with leg-length zippers, a reversible parka lined with camouflage material which will eliminate the need for a separate overwhite cotton parka--are all in various stages of investigation. Hand, head, and footwear are also under continuing study. Conventional mittens will keep the hands warm, but reflective materials or electric heat may reduce the weight and bulk of future gloves so that the wearer can do more varied and precise tasks. A new system which will clothe the soldier from the skin out, and from the top of the head to the bottom of the foot--that will provide an improved means of carrying equipment for oversnow movement--is well into the implementation stage. The canteen which you mention has been totally redesigned. The new cold weather canteen, now well into the development stage will, among other specifications, keep water liquid for a minimum of six hours at -40 degrees, have a larger mouth opening, be capable of thawing by direct heat application, and be compatible with the standard protective mask. While a new sleeping bag is still under design, a cold weather sleeping pad has been classified and will be in the hands of our soldiers in February 1982.


Legal basis for military leadership. Authority for the legal concept that "individual freedoms are limited when a person enters the armed forces" is found in the case of *Parker v. Levy*, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). In this case the United States Supreme Court recognized that the military is a specialized society separate from civilian society with laws and traditions of its own. This distinction arises from the fact that it is the primary business of the military to fight wars. Quoting an earlier Supreme Court case of *Orloff v. Willoughby*, 345, U.S. 83, 94 (1953) the Court emphasized that the rights of men in the armed forces must be conditioned to meet overriding demands of discipline and duty. This theme has been repeated by the Federal courts both civilian and military and guidelines derived from these court decisions are promulgated by the Army Staff and Service Schools. In addition, commanders routinely have the opportunity to consult with their staff judge advocates regarding the legal limits of their authority.

Your statement that "leaders must perceive what ought to be, then plan, organize, and execute its implementation," is on target. The means which we use to achieve mission accomplishment is where each leader must draw upon his or her reservoir of personal values, ethical practices, and professional skills. The answer to your question regarding whether there is a place in the Army for those who cannot align their personal futures with Army goals and missions can ultimately be traced to the Officer's Commission which charges each officer to, "...observe and follow such orders and directions from time to time as may be given by me or the future President of the United States of America or other superior officers acting in accordance with the laws of the United States of America." If an officer feels strongly that a particular mission, policy, or order violates either this oath, or personal moral or ethical standards, then resignation may be the proper course of action.

DAPE-HRL-L
Mr. William D. James

I appreciate your obvious concern for today's Army. There are numerous challenges which we face. It is important for all Americans to remember--both those in and out of uniform--that the Army can only be as good as the Nation it represents. I hope you will continue to support us in civilian life.

Sincerely,


MARY E. CLARKE
Major General, GS
Director of Human Resources
Development

Counter -- An end to efforts within the Army.

April 10, 1981

MG Mary E. Clark
Department of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Washington, D.C. 20310

Attention: DAPE-HRL-L

Dear MG Clark:

The sincerity of your letter is appreciated. However, I am concerned that we do not have time to ponder the Army's situation nor to implement piecemeal efforts to resolve its problems. It seems the world is moving into compression, with populations expanding and available resources contracting. If the competition for basic needs becomes critical, military action is probable; war being the only form of competition in which the Soviets can expect to dominate the West.

If continued expansion of Soviet military activities result in direct confrontation, there will be only two ways to stop their war machine. We can send in enough well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped units to break it. Or, we can stuff such large numbers of hastily or poorly prepared men into the meat grinder that we jam it. I prefer the first, and expended my military career in an effort to implement it. If it becomes necessary to use the second, I wish for this to be the last time. In the aftermath of a bloodletting, I will use available documentation to illustrate that the high costs resulted from a failure to regulate our military and manage our defense in accordance with the Principles of War, our National Interests, and the Principles of our Republic.

My objective is to improve our defense, so if I can be of assistance to you in the future, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



William D. James

WDJ/paw

Personal Cost

There is an elasticity in organizational structures which allows for adapting to changing circumstances. Open command channels provides that flexibility in the Army.

To secure the flexibility needed by the Army an "open door" policy is stated. Unfortunately, to use that door is not without risk. Those risks tax individuals trying to communicate through the chain-of-command and endanger the nation which needs a military capable of competing in an ever changing environment.

The section which follows illustrates one type of react to an individual reaching the elastic limit of the organization.

The first portion indicates the organizations opinion of the individual prior to exceeding allowed tolerances. The second records the costs added to the sacrificing a career.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 172D LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505

AFZT-LI-CO


26 July 1979

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

THRU: Commander
4th Battalion, 23d Infantry
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

TO: Captain William P. James
Company B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf
Fort Richardson, AK 99505

1. Your company led the way on the recent battalion field training exercise Sundance II. You accomplished your missions with a high degree of professionalism and esprit.
2. Pass on to your troops "well done." Your company certainly demonstrated a "Par" performance. This is a direct result of your leadership, aggressiveness, and ability to demand and achieve outstanding results under very rigorous field conditions.
3. Keep up the good work!


JAMES J. WALDECK
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

a. RATER (Complete each question in the space provided)

1. What did this officer do best?

Trained his company to perform expertly in an arctic environment.

2. In what capacity or assignment do you believe this officer would make the greatest contribution to the Army?

Positions responsible for development of new tactics, doctrine and equipment.

b. RATER AND INDORSER If I had full responsibility and authority, I would (place score in applicable box):

| | Promote this officer immediately | Promote this officer to the next higher grade ahead of his contemporaries | Promote this officer with his contemporaries | Promote this officer to the next higher grade behind his contemporaries | Not promote this officer |
|----------|----------------------------------|---|--|---|--------------------------|
| SCORE | 30 | 29-24 | 23-8 | 7-2 | 1-0 |
| RATER | 30 | | | | |
| INDORSER | 30 | | | | |

* You are required to cite SPECIFIC examples or illustrations in Part VII to support this rating.

PART VII - COMMENTS (Read paragraph 4-3b, AR 623-105)

a. RATER Narrative evaluation is mandatory.

CPT James is an outstanding commander with extraordinary drive and innovativeness, who has aggressively pursued the improvement of the arctic training of his company to include tactical ski training, use of innovative arctic movement techniques and experimentation with different equipment. At the same time he has insured his company maintained proficiency in basic skills and has given emphasis to maintenance and administrative responsibilities. CPT James has the potential to accomplish great things for the army and should be considered for accelerated promotion.

b. INDORSER Narrative evaluation is mandatory unless the provisions of paragraphs 2-2h and 4-4g, AR 623-105 apply.

CPT James is a very outstanding company commander. He's a selfless leader who leads by example. He's in superb physical condition as is his entire company. An innovator, self-motivator, but at times a bit impetuous. Given good guidance and a firm rein, his energies produce outstanding results. He's battalion commander material and should be managed toward this end. Fully worthy of accelerated promotion and attendance at CGSC.

| PART VII - REPORT SCORES | | | PART IX - AUTHENTICATION (Read paragraph 3-2j, AR 623-105) | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|----------|--|--|--|
| PART | RATER | INDORSER | SIGNATURE OF RATER <i>Robert M. Herrick</i> | | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) HERRICK, ROBERT M. |
| | | | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT LTC, IN, HHC, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, Ft Richardson, AK Battalion Commander | | SSN 093-32-3965 |
| V | 70 | 70 | SIGNATURE OF INDORSER <i>James J. Waldeck</i> | | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) WALDECK, JAMES J. |
| VI | 30 | 30 | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT COL, INF, 172d Light Infantry Brigade, Commander | | SSN 226-38-3897 |
| Sum | 100 | 100 | c. REVIEWER SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER <i>T. G. Jenes, Jr.</i> | | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) JENES, T. G., JR. |
| REPORT SCORE | | 200 | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT BG, USA, 172d Inf Bde (AK), Commanding | | SSN 533-24-4241 |
| 1. With INDORSER (a + b) | | | | | DATE May 79 |
| 2. Without INDORSER (2 x a) | | | | | |

PART X - PERSONNEL OFFICER (Read paragraph 3-2k, AR 623-105)

| UNIT ESOL | | SUBSEQUENT | |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| a. DATE ENTERED ON THE FORM 66 790504 | b. RATED OFFICER COPY (Check one and date) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Given to officer 790504 <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Forwarded to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Forwarded to indorser <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Forwarded to reviewer | c. FORWARDING ADDRESS (RATED Officer) | d. DATE RECEIVED e. RATED OFFICER COPY <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Given to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Forwarded to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Returned to MPO |

| | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|--|---|---|-----------------------------|
| RATED OFFICER'S LAST NAME AND SSN | | JAMES 398-54-5921 | | Ed of Rpt 730224-730223 | |
| PART VI - POTENTIAL (Read paragraph 4-3g, AR 623-105) | | | | | |
| a. RATER (Complete each question in the space provided.) What did this officer do best? | | | | | |
| Trained his unit to a high level of arctic warfare proficiency. | | | | | |
| 2. In what capacity or assignment do you believe this officer would make the greatest contribution to the Army? | | | | | |
| Command in combat | | | | | |
| b. RATER AND INDORSER If I had full responsibility and authority, I would (place score in applicable box): | | | | | |
| | Promote this officer immediately | Promote this officer to the next higher grade ahead of his contemporaries | Promote this officer with his contemporaries | Promote this officer to the next higher grade behind his contemporaries | Not promote this officer |
| SCORE | 30 | 29-24 | 23-8 | 7-2 | 1-0 |
| RATER | 30 * | | | | |
| INDORSER | | 29 * | | | |
| * You are required to cite SPECIFIC examples or illustrations in Part VII to support this rating. | | | | | |
| PART VII - COMMENTS (Read paragraph 4-3h, AR 623-105) | | | | | |
| a. RATER Narrative evaluation is mandatory. Captain James has performed outstandingly as an infantry company commander. He is an aggressive, energetic and totally dedicated officer who has trained his company to a state of proficiency in skiing and arctic warfare skills well beyond that of other companies in the battalion. Also, he has been a driving force toward improving arctic equipment, and implementing dietary and movement techniques to sustain soldier fighting strength. Captain James is innovative, leads by example, and is selflessly devoted to the missions of his unit. Because of these characteristics he will be a tremendous combat leader who possesses the capability to perform higher level command and other responsibilities, and should be considered for accelerated promotion. would fight to serve with him in the future. | | | | | |
| b. INDORSER Narrative evaluation is mandatory unless the provisions of paragraphs 2-2h and 4-4g, AR 623-105 apply. CPT James is a superbly fit, aggressive rifle company commander. He's a bit headstrong, but not too much. He's a warrior who would perform outstandingly in combat. Few, if any, of his peers possess the arctic expertise CPT James possesses. He's an innovator, an imaginative leader, and totally committed to his troops and his duty. CPT James thrives in command. He should be given successive commands. A company commander in every sense of the term. With a bit of staff experience, CPT James will be an equally superb battalion commander. | | | | | |
| PART VIII - REPORT SCORES | | PART IX - AUTHENTICATION (Read paragraph 3-2f, AR 623-105) | | | |
| PART | RATER | INDORSER | a. SIGNATURE OF RATER | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) | SSN |
| | | | HERRICK, ROBERT M. | 093-32-3965 | |
| V | 70 | 70 | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT | DATE | |
| VI | 30 | 29 | LTC, INF, HHC, 4th Bn, 23d Inf, Battalion Commander | 1 MAR 74 | |
| Sum | 100 | 99 | b. SIGNATURE OF INDORSER | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) | SSN |
| | | | WALDECK, James J. | 226-38-3897 | |
| | | | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT | DATE | |
| | | | COL, IN, Commander, 172d Light Infantry Brigade | 12 Nov 79 | |
| REPORT SCORE | | | c. REVIEWER | MY REVIEW | INDICATES NO FURTHER ACTION |
| 199 | | | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWER | TYPED NAME (Last, First, MI) | SSN |
| 1. With INDORSER (a + b) | | | JENES, THEODORE G., JR | 533-24-4241 | |
| 2. Without INDORSER (2 x a) | | | GRADE, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, DUTY ASSIGNMENT | DATE | |
| | | | BG, USA, 172d Inf Bde (AK), Commanding | 19 MAR 79 | |
| PART X - PERSONNEL OFFICER (Read paragraph 3-2g, AR 623-105) | | | | | |
| DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 466 | | UNIT | | SUBSEQUENT | |
| 790322 | | FSDI | | | |
| MPO INITIALS | | b. RATED OFFICER COPY (Check one and date) | | d. DATE RECEIVED | |
| | | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Given to officer 790322 <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Forwarded to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Forwarded to indorser <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Forwarded to reviewer | | <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Given to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Forwarded to officer <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Returned to MPO | |
| | | c. FORWARDING ADDRESS (Rated Officer) | | | |

Added Personal Costs

This records costs added to the loss of a career. After working mission problems at every lower level of command, a letter was sent to the Chief-of-Staff on 3 October 1979. By accusation against the author, the credibility of this letter was attacked:

- 3 Oct Letter to Gen Meyer was sent noting the inability of B Company, 4/23rd Infantry to perform its mission.
- 9 Oct Local commanders received copies of the Letter to Gen Meyer.
- 10 Oct Col Waldeck and MG Jenes directed that the Inspector General (IG) at Fort Richardson conduct an investigation for misconduct against the author of the Letter to Gen Meyer. The misconduct related to a non-military purchase of recreational skis by the men of B Company.
- 11 Oct The IG investigation began.
- 13 Oct The IG investigation and its final report were completed. This report failed to note that both MG Jenes' and Col Waldeck's staffs had been consulted about the purchase. Nor did the report note that the purchase of skis had grown out of a purchase of skis which MG Jenes had requested for himself.
- 19 Oct Letters of Reprimand (enclosed) were issued based on the results of the IG investigation. Those letters had the ability to cripple careers.
- 26 Oct Responses to the Letters of Reprimand (enclosed) were written without knowing the evidence or charges against those accused.
- mid Nov The first opportunity was provided to review the charges and evidence behind the Letters of Reprimand. Errors and the haste of the investigation were obvious. The FORSCOM IG was requested to review the 172 IG investigation (preliminary review enclosed). More complete files on this matter are available for review.

This is a very obvious and easily documented means of discouraging action; most are more subtle -- the risk of change, habit, administrative burden, lack of resources and others. Little of the discouragement which exists comes from bad men or bad intentions, most comes from the feeling you cannot win. A feeling so strong it is becoming a military tradition.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 172D LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505


AFZT-LI-CO

16 October 1979

SUBJECT: Administrative Reprimand UP Paragraph 128c, MCM

Captain William D. James
Company B, 4th Bn, 23d Inf
Ft Richardson, AK 99505

1. I have recently discovered that you have encouraged your soldiers to purchase and use civilian equipment in lieu of military equipment, specifically, skis, in direct violation of paragraphs 2-1j and 5-2a(5), AR 600-50, and 172d Light Infantry Brigade Commander's Note #10.
2. You are hereby reprimanded for your conduct concerning the solicitation, purchase and intended use of the skis mentioned above.
3. My policy with regard to the use of nonstandard items of equipment is well known by you. In fact, you have disregarded direct orders and specific guidance given you by me on two previous occasions which addressed the use of nonstandard items of military equipment, specifically, the use of civilian balaclavas and jungle boots within your unit. These past violations of my policy are well documented. Your most recent efforts to circumvent my policy are unconscionable and inexcusable despite your efforts to secure permission to do so from your battalion commander. Your actions reflect repeated disregard for orders and lack of judgement such that your future usefulness as a commander, indeed, as an Army officer, is suspect.
4. This letter is imposed merely as an administrative measure and not as punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. It is my decision that this letter will be placed in your Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). Your review of and any comment on the letter should take that factor into consideration.
5. In accordance with paragraph 2-6, AR 600-37, you have the opportunity to review this letter and to rebut the information contained herein. You will reply by indorsement acknowledging receipt of this letter within seven days. Your indorsement will include one of the statements contained in paragraph 2-6, AR 600-37.


JAMES J. WALDECK
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY B, 4TH BATTALION, 23D INFANTRY
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

26 October 1979

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Reprimand

Commander
172d Light Infantry Brigade (Separate)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1. I have read and understand the allegations made and submit the following statement in my behalf.
2. I did not violate AR 600-50 nor Brigade Policy Letter #10. I am receiving this Letter of Reprimand as part of a witch hunt, punishing me for writing a letter to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer. My response will address the charges in the Letter of Reprimand, then I will log the events which surround the Letter of Reprimand.
3. My troops were provided an opportunity to purchase cross-country skis at 14% below wholesale. It was expected that the skis could be used for military training and for recreation. Troops were informed that the opportunity was "available" and there was "no pressure to buy". No one made any money on the purchase. AR 600-50, para 2-1j and 5-2a(5) simply do not apply; the term "personal commercial solicitation" as defined by the AR, does not apply. My troops trust me, I would not take advantage of that trust. For other reasons, I was offered free skis on two occasions which I declined to avoid any suspicion of misconduct.
4. I was corrected for improper uniforms on two occasions prior to Policy Letter #10 being published. After seeing the superior camouflage and warmth of the Canadian white balaclava I allowed my troops to wear similar balaclavas. The second incident resulted from my ^{right} unstable right ankle. (It will be operated on 2 Nov 79) I wore jungle boots because they provided better support than combat boots. I did not request permission to wear the boots from COL Waldeck because I had good reason to wear them and I thought I was capable of making such a trivial decision. After COL Waldeck screamed at and threatened me in front of my troops over the boots and Policy Letter #10 was published I have obeyed guidance on uniforms no matter what the logic or cost. I have allowed my ankle to deteriorate rather than obtain a profile to wear better boots. The resulting damage to my ankle has been significant. I have had to quit playing sports, running and hunting; I have stopped doing many of the things I enjoy, but I have absolutely adhered to the guidance of Policy Letter #10.

26 October 1979

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Reprimand

5. I have never disregarded COL Waldeck's orders with respect to the skis. I approached my battalion commander several times to get permission from COL Waldeck to use personal skis in training. After several attempts to get in touch with COL Waldeck, LTC Courson told me to order the skis, that the decision was a simple one, and that he would get COL Waldeck's permission. I honestly believed COL Waldeck would approve the military use of personal skis. We had used them last year and MG Jenes had bought a pair (MG Jenes bought his last spring). On or about 24 Sep 79 I asked LTC Courson to try to contact COL Waldeck again, at which time he called COL Waldeck and asked about the use of personal skis. The request was barely spoken before it was denied. To avoid non-compliance with COL Waldeck's decision I intended to cancel the ski order. I did not cancel the order because my troops still wanted the skis for recreational purposes. I informed the people that if anyone wished to cancel their order I would buy the skis. The skis have not been worn in military training nor would I have allowed them to be worn without COL Waldeck's personal permission. In fact the skis have not arrived yet.. The circumstances which surround my receiving this Letter of Reprimand are oriented more on my letter to General Meyer than my alleged wrong doing. The following is an approximate log of these events:

skis
arrive
15th 21
Sept 7
u

| <u>APPROXIMATE DATE</u> | <u>EVENT</u> |
|-------------------------|--|
| Aug 79 | LTC Courson attempted to contact COL Waldeck and request the use of personal skis in military training. |
| 31 Aug 79 | I told LTC Bouton, Bde S-3, about the ski order. I did this because it would have been out of character for LTC Bouton not to tell COL Waldeck. I wanted COL Waldeck to know about the skis to prevent problems. |
| 7 Sep 79 | The skis were ordered. |
| 12 Sep 79 | I escorted LTC Burdett, Bde XO, around my company area. I told him about the ski order. |
| 18 Sep 79 | I told LTC Bouton again about the skis. |
| 24 Sep 79 | COL Waldeck denied permission to use civilian skis for training. |
| 4 Oct 79 | Mailed the letter to General Meyer. |
| 5 Oct 79 | CSM Green heard one of my soldiers complain about having to use the heavy Army skis. Apparently CSM Green questioned him further and found out about the ski purchase. Also, I mailed the local courtesy copies of General Meyer's letter. |

26 October 1979

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Reprimand

APPROXIMATE DATE

9 Oct 79

EVENT

0915 hrs - COL Waldeck read my letter to General Meyers. He told my battalion commander that I was relieved. The Brigade Personnel Officer (MAJ Rush) researched the Officers Roster to find a replacement for me.

1030 hrs - MG Jenes, COL Waldeck and LTC Courson met in ~~MG Jenes'~~ office.

Col Waldeck's

1100 hrs - COL Waldeck called LTC Rodgers, 172d Inf Bde Inspector General, to initiate an investigation against me.

1330 hrs - COL Waldeck, MG Jenes and LTC Rodgers met in MG Jenes' office.

10 Oct 79

1400 hrs - LTC Rodgers and MAJ Crown met in LTC Coursons' office to inform LTC Courson that I was to be investigated.

1513 hrs - LTC Rodgers and MAJ Crown met with me in my office to tell me I was under investigation.

11 Oct 79

COL Waldeck told LTC Courson that I was going to be relieved.

12 Oct 79

IG inquiry completed. I was not given the results.

16 Oct 79

COL Waldeck wrote my Letter of Reprimand.

19 Oct 79

COL Waldeck issued me my Letter of Reprimand.

I am not allowed to see a copy of the IG Inquiry, but I believe I was not relieved from command because the IG Inquiry found me not guilty. I also believe I was given this Letter of Reprimand because it was the only alternative left to punish me for my letter to General Meyer. Furthermore, the fact that this action was taken against me without COL Waldeck or MG Jenes having me clarify the situation is indicative that they did not want the situation clear. I would not punish my worst soldier without giving him chance to explain himself.



WILLIAM D. JAMES
CPT, IN
Commanding



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BATTALION, 23D INFANTRY
FORT RICHARDSON, ALASKA 99505

AFZT-LIB-CO

26 October 1979

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Reprimand

Commander
172d Light Infantry Brigade (Separate)
Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

1. I have read and understand the allegations made and submit the following statement in my behalf.
2. This administrative reprimand states that I violated para 4, 172d Light Infantry Brigade Commander's (COL Waldeck) Note #10, whereby I gave a subordinate commander of mine, Commander, Company B (CPT James) "permission to purchase and use civilian skis for military training" and "your concurrence in this request contributed to your subordinates violation of para 2-1j and 5-2a(5) of AR 600-50".
3. Since no one in my chain of command in the 172d Inf Bde (AK) has asked me what happened, I'll explain formally in writing to COL Waldeck and request that he provide an information copy to MG Jenes, Cdr, 172d Inf Bde (AK) and the Inspector General, 172d Inf Bde (AK). The reasons for these requests are due to the fact that when COL Waldeck gave this letter of reprimand to me, 19 Oct 79, he explained that MG Jenes was very upset due to my lack of judgement in not "following orders" and so that the IG can "close the loop" in his inquiry pertaining to the allegation of a violation of AR 600-50.
4. CPT James approached me, in my office, approximately eight weeks ago requesting that he and his troops, on a voluntary basis, be allowed to purchase civilian cross country skis to be used for off-duty recreation and military skiing. We discussed the fact that we must have approval from COL Waldeck to use these skis in military training. I explained to CPT James that I would contact COL Waldeck for such approval. Immediately following CPT James departure from my office, I called COL Waldeck on his "hotline" phone and he was out of his office. Approximately one week later CPT James asked me if I had received such permission. I stated "no" but that I had called for COL Waldeck again and he was not in his office. I then asked CPT James what color the skis were. He showed me a picture of the skis and they were white.

26 October 1979

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter of Reprimand

I again (for a third time) called for COL Waldeck and he was out of his office. (Since military skis are white too I gave CPT James permission to proceed with buying them and I then gave him a check to purchase a set for me.) I attempted for a fourth time to get in touch with COL Waldeck to get permission, however he was on a two week leave. Upon COL Waldeck's return from leave, I called him. As soon as I explained the subject of my call he stated: "Denied". I then attempted to further discuss this issue with COL Waldeck when he again stated "Denied". At that point, since CPT James was already in my office, the actions taken were: To notify all personnel who had ordered skis that the skis would not be allowed for military use and to refund all money to personnel who desired their refund. That was done.

5. COL Waldeck's initial letter for establishing Commander's Notes, dtd 18 Oct 78, states "If at any time you find the content of these notes not meaningful or relevant, please bring them to my attention immediately". Also, para 4 of this Administrative Reprimand states "I also expect you to bring to my attention any order or directive that does not make sense". Since I was not given the opportunity to discuss the issue of civilian skis for military training, I do not believe either of these were followed.

6. CPT James has not violated any directive as I gave him permission to purchase and use the skis in military training. I gave this "in good faith and not in a willful violation of any order of COL Waldeck". The Armed Forces Officer Guide, page 152, states: "When a subordinate has made a mistake, but not from any lack of good will, it is common sense to take the rap for him rather than make him suffer doubly for his error". (COL Waldeck made reference to this chapter and commented on this specific page during an officer development class for my battalion on 12 Oct 79)

7. I have always totally supported COL Waldeck in all his orders and actions and in carrying out his, the Bde (AK), FORSCOM and DA orders and regulations with total loyalty, respect, and responsibility to the best of my ability--I will continue to do that.



DONNIE C. COURSON
LTC, IN
Commanding


- After discussions with Ltc Stone, Ltc Courson withdrew this letter and submitted the handwritten note on the following page. It was hoped it would lower the stress with Col Waldeck, feelings were very hostile at this time. (Col Waldeck's).

7T-LI-CO

16 October 1979

SUBJECT: Administrative Reprimand UP Paragraph 128c, MCM

6. In accordance with paragraph 2-6, AR 600-37, you have the opportunity to review this letter and to rebut the information contained herein. You will reply by indorsement acknowledging receipt of this letter within seven days. Your indorsement will include one of the statements contained in paragraph 2-6, AR 600-37.



JAMES J. WALDECK
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 FZT-LI-B.

1ST IND.

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LETTER OF REPRIMAND.
DA, HQ, 4TH BN, 172ND LIB (SEP), FT. RICHARDSON, AK., 99505
O: CDR, 172ND LIB (SEP), FT. RICHARDSON, AK., 99505

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 2-6, AR 600-37, I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ALLEGATIONS MADE AND SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING ON MY BEHALF: "IF ANY ERROR WAS MADE ON MY PART IT WAS UNINTENTIONAL AND 'IN GOOD FAITH' -- IT WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN. ALSO, I HAVE TOTALLY SUPPORTED YOU, MG JENES, FORSCOM, AND DA IN CARRYING OUT ALL DIRECTIVES, ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS WITH TOTAL LOYALTY, RESPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY -- I WILL CONTINUE TO DO THAT.


LTC IN
COMMANDING

AFZT-CG (16 Oct 79) 3d Ind

DA, Headquarters, 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska), Office of the Commanding General, Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

TO: Commander, 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska), ATTN: AFZT-AG-O, Fort Richardson, Alaska 99505

In accordance with Paragraph 2-4b, AR 600-37, I direct that the attached Letter of Reprimand concerning Lieutenant Colonel Donnie C. Courson be filed in the Military Personnel Records Jacket for one year or until Lieutenant Colonel Courson departs the command, whichever is sooner.



T. G. JENES, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

31 OFFICE OF THE COMMAND GENERAL



DATE: 31 OCT 79

O: IG

IF I AM AUTHORIZED TO
ALLOW CPT JAMES TO READ
THIS REPORT, LESS THE TESTIMONY,
AND IF COL WALDECK BELIEVES
IT WOULD BE USEFUL, CPT
JAMES MAY READ THE REPORT
IN YOUR OFFICE.

~~TOP~~


SAME APPLIES TO LTC COURSEN

WASM BOA

SUBJECT: Improper use of the Office of the IG

Commander
FORSCOM
ATTN: IG
Fort McPherson, GA

1. An IG inquiry was conducted against me for violation of AR 600-50 and 172d LIB Commander's Note #10. I believe the inquiry was poorly conducted, subject to command influence and was intended to punish me for writing a letter to General Meyers.
2. I am providing information relative to the inquiry (TAB A) and background information (TAB B).
3. I would like General Shoemaker made aware of this correspondence. I am writing you because I trust Colonel Franklin, and because of a comment General Shoemaker made about me.



WILLIAM JAMES
CPT, Infantry

2 Incl
as

AFIG-AI

30 Nov 79

SUBJECT: Report of Inquiry Conducted by 172d Infantry Brigade

Commander
172d Infantry Brigade (AK)
ATTN: Inspector General
Ft Richardson, AK 99505

1. Reference ROI dated 12 Oct 79 dealing with the purchase of civilian snow skis.
2. The following comments are provided concerning that ROI.
 - a. Para V, 6b(3). Paragraphs of AR 600-50 are listed in evidence with no explanation as to what is contained in these paragraphs.
 - b. Para V, 6c(1). Concerning personal gain on discount for a group purchase of skis: No evidence was presented in para V, 6b that there was a discount offered for a group purchase of skis. There was also no evidence that this was a motivating factor, which lessens guilt.
 - c. Para V, 6c(2). Para 2-1j, AR 600-50 is listed as reference prohibiting solicitations or sales to personnel junior in grade. This paragraph pertains to DOD personnel who are employed as a sales agent on commission or salary. The reference listed should have been para 5-2a(2).
 - d. Para V, 6c(3). Reference listed applies more to making a commercial endorsement using title or position. This is a weak point and attempt at "overkill." Violation of para 5-2a(2) is sufficient.
 - e. Para V, 6c(4). "However, collectively, they represent a more significant violation of the Standards of Conduct." This statement might be true if it were proven that it was done for significant personal gain or had gone on TV in uniform advertising the product. Based upon the evidence presented, it is a minor violation of AR 600-50.

AFIG-AI

30 Nov 79

SUBJECT: Report of Inquiry Conducted by 172d Infantry Brigade

f. Para V, 7b. There is no evidence presented that there is, in fact, a violation of the LIB Cdr's Note #10. In fact, SP4 Foster testified that CPT James told the unit that they could not use the skis for military training.

g. Para V, 7b(3). Once again, a reference is listed in evidence with no explanation of what it contains.

h. Para V, 7d(2). Do not agree that it was poor judgment because he failed to question the approval from his chain of command. By obtaining approval from his battalion commander and informing the Bde XO, he did all that a reasonable man would have expected of CPT James.

i. Para VI, 9. "...in the context of CPT James' personality and influence on the company." Nowhere is it presented in evidence what CPT James' personality or influence on the company is.

j. Para VI, 10. It was not clear that CPT James violated the LIB Cdr's Note #10. No evidence was presented that indicated that the directive was violated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES A. FRANKLIN
Colonel, IG
Inspector General

Wm James

This section provides background information on the editor of "Letters: A Crisis in Military Leadership."

As the editor, it is my opinion that I was an ordinary officer presented with ordinary circumstances. The only unusual thing I did was report mission problems one or two steps higher in the chain-of-command than most officers.

The willingness to make this effort comes from a poem, a prayer and a promise:

The Poem

After winning All-American wrestling honors my junior year in college, I lost in the quarter-finals of the championships my senior year. Although my opponents deserved to win, I lost because I lost the simple disciplines which had led to previous wins -- the keen drive to win and the focus on objectives.

After the tournament a former coach told me a poem about how the world is full of "would have beens, could have beens and should have beens."

In the game of wrestling, I failed to win when I had the ability. Though the difficulties of working problems within the Army are complex I did not want to fail in life.

The Prayer

Though more like an oath, there is a prayer which is clear statement of the ethics needed within the military if its power is to be secure from abuse. That prayer is:

Strengthen and increase our admiration for honest dealing and clean thinking, and suffer not our hatred of hypocrisy and pretence ever to diminish. Encourage us in our endeavor to live above the common level of life. Make us choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong, and never to be content with the half truth when the whole can be won...."

In my opinion this is not an idealistic wish but a commandment for those who hold great power.

The Promise

Much was asked of the young men I commanded in Alaska and they responded with all the initiative, courage and determination which is America. This brought a realization that the problem in the Army is not one of soldiers but of leaders. Like an athletic team whose players are mostly willing but lacks teamwork and adequate equipment, it is the coaches who are responsible.

In a harsh environment with few resources these soldiers had freely and abundantly given their loyalty to our mission and to me. As a commander, as a man, I could do no less. I became obligated to their sacrifices and mission regardless of the personal cost.

For me these letters record a crisis of being driven to bridge the gap between the ethics of Duty and the realities of the military bureaucracy. If this study is an isolated case it is a personal loss; if it is indicative of the condition of America's military institutions then it is a study of a national tragedy and grave danger.


AFZC-CG (28 Apr 75) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

DA, Headquarters, Fort Carson and Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado 80913 MAY 12 1975

THRU: Commander, First Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado 80913

TO: First Lieutenant William D. James, 398-54-5920, Company B,
1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado 80913

It is a pleasure to forward Major General Bowers' letter commending you for your performance as wrestler and coach of the Army Wrestling Team which recently captured the 1975 Interservice Championships. Please accept my personal commendation for a job well done.


JOHN W. VESSEY, Jr.
Major General, USA
Commanding

Jan 85
Currently Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 21, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. President:

It is our understanding that Bill James of Vadnais Heights, Minnesota, has applied for a White House Fellowship.


We are very familiar with Bill's outstanding background and abilities and know him to be eminently qualified for this position. He would make a superior contribution and be a real asset to the Administration.

Accordingly, we strongly urge that he be most favorably considered for a Fellowship.

Sincerely,



Ted Stevens
United States Senator



Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senator

RB:grm



March 19, 1984

Mr. William D. James
3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, Minnesota 55110

Dear Bill,

Let me thank you again for looking after me so well during my recent visit to the Twin Cities. In your good hands, I touched all the scheduled bases and spent my time productively and well. I particularly appreciate your picking me up at the airport and your giving me the guided tour of the old residential part of St. Paul on the way to the hotel.

Thank you also for your kind words of introduction at the Founder's Day dinner. One of the many reasons the dinner was fun for me was that I had such wonderful dinner companions, namely Christy and Bob and Grace Marben.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Frederick A. Smith, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Dean of the Academic Board

P.S. I read your letter to Travis, Kory, and Terra with much interest and was very impressed. All I can say is that your children are in good hands.

F.A.S.

John G. Stoessinger

275 CENTRAL PARK WEST
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10024

212-799-6086

May 15, 1982


William D. James
Procurement Engineer
3315 Centerville Road
Vadnais Heights, Minnesota 55110

Dear Mr. James:

Thank you so very much for your kind note and the essay which I read with interest and profit. It is well done and I congratulate you. I wish more engineers would concern themselves with political and social questions the way you do. The world would no doubt be a more peaceful and better place then.

Again, my appreciation.

Cordially,


John G. Stoessinger

Written on an Essay "In defense of the Republic"

EDUCATION; A LETTER TO MY CHILDREN

Some basic beliefs

May 1, 1982

Dear Travis, Kory and Terra,

I am writing this letter on education with the hope that my observations and recommendations will aid in giving direction and accelerating the development of your ability to positively direct your lives. My comments cover the Objective of Education, the Elements of Learning, Schooling and the Forces Shaping Your Lives. Some of this letter may seem complex, but it is not. The limits you see are often more perceived than real, reach out and test these limits.

OBJECTIVE OF EDUCATION

The individual, with a mind, soul and body, is the source of wisdom, compassion and power. The objective of your education is to develop principles with which you can guide and project your life; so you understand power, and use it wisely, so that you are thoughtful, compassionate and courageous. Despite some of the problems likely to be encountered in schooling, education is the dynamic process which develops harmony within you, so that reason is your ruling principle. Achieving and maintaining this objective will allow you to be a force of positive good in your life.

As a guide to defining reason I ask you to periodically read the works of Plato, Thomas Jefferson, Emerson, Benjamin Franklin, Mark Twain and Milton Friedman. Study the Constitution, its development and the individualistic nature of American culture to see how reason can be applied to practical and just governing. For this the following quotation is an excellent guidepost:

"and would you not say that he (individual or state) is just who has these same elements in friendly harmony, when the one ruling principle is reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule..."

-Plato

ELEMENTS OF LEARNING

In developing your ability to reason, consider that there are three elements of learning; instincts, experience and abstract concepts. Instincts form our basic character, the background against which we project our learning. Experience and abstract concepts are the intertwined elements of form and substance, which make-up our ability to project our thoughts and apply them in a real world. Look at yourself as a cup of water; the base of the cup, instincts, combined with the walls, experience, provide the form which allows the substance or thought, the water, to be used.

To tell a child he will be hurt by eating food that is too hot, is an abstract concept. Once he burns himself, combines that experience with his instincts, he develops a form for using the concept, 'hot'. He develops the ability to use experiences and concepts to project thoughts, to avoid or seek situations; he begins to reason. The more constructive experiences you have, the larger your cup. The more you train your mind, the greater your ability to fill that cup.

TWO WARNINGS: First, there are experiences which are destructive to our nature; use your instinctive sense of good and bad to guide your choices. Second, the assumption upon which we base our concepts can be flawed, damaging our cup. It seems that many grave crimes have been committed by common people acting on bad assumptions, when they failed to reason and "followed orders." Reexamine your assumptions regularly, to repair the cracks in your cup.

SCHOOLING

The activity by which you build your framework and develop concepts is schooling. This schooling, extending far beyond the classroom, is the process of interaction between you and all the forces of culture, environment, and basic nature. To develop as a whole person, to maintain your ideals and succeed in this complex and dangerous world, your training should be divided into four equal parts:

1. HISTORY, LANGUAGES AND BUSINESS

Study history in the context of the cultures which recorded it so you can learn where we have been and where we are today. Participate in society to experience how we relate, behave and work with each other. Take note of how we have succeeded; individuals working against the odds have repeatedly reached beyond the known limits of their time. Take special note of languages and the concepts they define, for they are the reflection of our minds.

2. ART and MUSIC

Study the arts and music so you can dream the dreams which have never been dreamt before. Practice these so you develop skill in translating dreams into reality. It is in the arts that you can perceive the reflection of our souls.

3. The MILITARY, WILDERNESS, and ATHLETICS

There is an honesty, directness and self-searching simplicity which seems to develop in those who have endured hardships to protect the liberty of others. I would have you develop this by serving in defense of our Republic. In addition, there is an awesome concentration of power in the military. Preventing its abuse requires that you have both form and substance in your understanding of that power.

From the wilderness I would have you learn of God, and the everyday courage and harmony in life, death, and existence.

In athletics develop your courage to face the unknowns of your dreams; for more than training the body, athletics train the soul.

4. BASIC SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING

We are tool makers. Study and apply basic science and engineering to build, operate and control the tools needed to bridge the gap from where we are to where your dreams will take us.

At this point I would re-emphasize my warning about assumptions. There are many dreams and bridges which are contrary to our nature, which should not be built. And if built, they should be dismantled. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, implements of mass destructions, are such tools; and their use is such a bridge.

FORCES SHAPING YOUR LIVES

As you develop, there will be three primary forces which will act upon you. Although there will be interactions between these, each will dominate for a period.

1. When you are young, your cup will be built for you by authority figures. These consist of your mother, church, teachers, television, books, me, etc... These authorities will tell you what the world is, interpret it for you, and tell you how to act towards it. Because the assumption of some authorities are flawed, your mother and I try to control you and the access of these authorities to you. Your mother and I participate in our schools, church and community to contribute to minimizing the flaws we see.

Because television is a very controlled media with very limited participation possible, and because it is being operated with

some poor assumptions, I am strict about limiting the time you spend watching it. Be a participant not a spectator in life.

2. As you grow into your teens, your peer group will become a major force. When contained by a cohesive community and a dynamic culture this is a very positive force. It allows you to challenge the assumptions of authority while avoiding the consequences of individual failure. But as a favor to your mother and me, choose your tests wisely and trust your sense of good and bad.

3. The last force is you. It seems that girls in their very late teens to mid-twenties, and boys in their early to late twenties, become the dominant force in their own lives. This is the dynamic age, the vigor of which will last as long as your mind remains flexible; as long as reason drives your courage and contains your desires. This is the age of reason. Make the most of this time, reach out to build your cup, extend yourself to fill it, and create a more just world. But again my warning--check for cracks.

Although I have much to learn, these are some of the observations your mother and I have made so far in our lives. They are the guidelines we are using to foster your growth. I hope they are of some value as you develop and become positive forces in your lives and time.

With Love
Your Dad,



William D. Jamess